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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CIVIL RIGHTS -- SECTION 1985 (3) - STUDENTS ATTENDING PRIVATE
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS MAY SUE SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS FOR
DEPRIVATION OF EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS AND EQUAL
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES.
I. INTRODUCTION
Within a period of eighteen months, the issue of whether students
attending a private educational institution have any judicial remedies for
deprivations of their constitutional rights by school administrators was
litigated in two separate actions in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Both cases - Brown v. Villanova
University,' and Committee to Save Saint Thomas More v. The Roman
Catholic Archdiocese2 - involved section 1985 (3) of the Civil Rights Act
of 18713 (Civil Rights Act). This article will examine, in two contexts,
the scope of protection from private discrimination afforded by that statute.
First, it will analyze the results in Brown and Saint Thomas More to
determine whether the court in each instance construed the statute prop-
erly. Second, it will discuss in detail two essential characteristics of section
1985(3) which are touched upon in the Brown and Saint Thomas More
opinions in order to elucidate what constitutional rights could be protected
under the statute in future suits.
1. 378 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
2. The findings of the district court are unreported, but the complaint, Civil
No. 75-1677 (E.D. Pa., filed June 12, 1975), motion to dismiss, Civil No. 75-1677
(E.D. Pa., filed June 26, 1975), denial of the motion for preliminary injunction, Civil
No. 75-1677 (E.D. Pa., filed Aug. 18, 1975), and final order dismissing the suit for
failure to prosecute, Civil No. 75-1677 (E.D. Pa., filed Nov. 24, 1975), are on file at
the Villanova Law Review.
3. Section 1985(3) provides in pertinent part:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise
on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either
directly or indirectly, any person or class of person of the equal protection of
the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws [and] in any case
of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do,
or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy,
whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and
exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so
injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages, occasioned
by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.
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In Brown, members of a student organization known as the Ad Hoe
Committee 4 held a demonstration in an on-campus women's dormitory
which was "off limits" to those students under university regulations.
5
Fifty-six students were charged by university officials with insubordina-
tion and participation in an unauthorized mass demonstration. 6 Hearings
were held for each student so charged, 7 resulting in the expulsion of seven
students from the university.8 The plaintiffs, relying upon sections 19839
and 1985 (3)10 of the Civil Rights Act, brought suit in federal court claim-
ing that they had been deprived of their constitutional rights. The district
court dismissed the claim asserted under section 1983,11 but held that a
cause of action had been stated under section 1985(3) because there was
a substantial probability that the plaintiffs would be able to prove at trial
the existence of a conspiracy on the part of s6me of the school's adminis-
trators to deny plaintiffs their first amendment rights.12
In Saint Thomas More, the Archdiocese of Philadelphia decided to
close Saint Thomas More Catholic High School for Boys, a Catholic
parochial high school, and to transfer its pupils to West Catholic High
4. The Ad Hoc Committee had been formed by certain individual students at
Villanova University in early 1974 to seek greater protection for the rights of
students and a greater student voice in university affairs. 378 F. Supp. at 343.
5. Id. Under Villanova's parietal rules, students were allowed to remain in
the lounge areas of the residence halls of the opposite sex until 3 a.m. on weekends.
On the weekend of the demonstration, the normal parietal rules had been suspended so
that prospective students and their families could visit the residence areas of dormi-
tories. Individuals of one sex had to leave the residence areas of the dormitories of
the opposite sex at 9 p.m. The demonstration took place in Sheehan Hall, a women's
dormitory, at 9:30 p.m. Id.
6. Id. at 344.
7. Id. At the hearing, the students were given the right to be represented by
counsel, the right to cross-examine witnesses, and the right to present evidence on
their own behalf. They were fully notified of the subject matter of the hearing, and
had their cases heard by a panel composed of the Dean of the Villanova Law School,
the Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, and the Dean of Men. Id.
8. Id. Of the 56 students charged, 31 were punished: seven students were ex-
pelled and 24 were suspended for periods ranging from 12 to 15 months. The plaintiffs
in the Brown suit consisted of six of the suspended students and six of the students
who were expelled. Id.
9. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the de-
privation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action of law, suit in equity or
other proper proceedings for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
10. For the text of section 1985(3), see note 3 supra.
11. 378 F. Supp. at 344. The court found that the action of the university officials
was not state action within the meaning of section 1983 and, accordingly, dismissed
the claims asserted under that statute for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id.
12. Id. at 344-45. The court did not specify whether the first amendment rights
colorably violated were the rights of freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, or
both. Id.
2
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School.' Several students - both black and white - and their parents
filed suit under section 1985(3), alleging that the decision to close the
school had been based upon racial grounds 14 and that, as a result, the
students were deprived of their constitutional right to a racially har-
monious educational environment. 15 At the hearing on the preliminary
injunction sought by the plaintiffs to prevent the closing of the school, the
federal district court found that: 1) there was no evidence that there had
been racial or other class-based motivation in the decision to close the
school, 16 and 2) it was not clear that the students had a constitutionally
protected right to a racially harmonious educational environment. 17 Thus,
the court denied the prayer for a preliminary injunction and, subsequently,
dismissed the suit for failure to prosecute.' 8
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF SECTION 1985(3)
Section 1985(3) of the Civil Rights Act was originally introduced in
1871 to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amendment against private
citizens as well as against the states.19 Because it was felt that a statute
which could regulate private action to the same degree as state action
would have a pervasive effect upon private life, section 1985(3) was
amended before it passed the House of Representatives so as to restrict
its scope to proscription of private conduct which was discriminatory and
which deprived citizens of equality of legal rights. 20
Section 1985(3) was rarely invoked to remedy strictly private dis-
crimination; prior to 1951, the statute had usually been invoked in con-
nection with claims asserting discriminatory state action.21 In 1951, in
13. Complaint at 6, para. 26, Committee to save Thomas Moore v. Roman
Catholic Archdiocese, Civil No. 75-1677 (E.D. Pa., filed June 12, 1975) (on file at
the Villanova Law Review).
14. Id. at 5-8, 9, paras. 13-14, 41. Plaintiffs alleged that white parents had
brought pressure to bear upon the Archdiocese to close the school because they did
not want their children to attend a school with a high proportion of black students.
Id. at 5-6, paras. 14-22.
15. Id. at 6-8, paras. 28-34.
16. Findings on the Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 3, Committee to Save
Saint Thomas More v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese, Civil No. 75-1677 (E.D. Pa.,
filed Aug. 18, 1975) (on file at the Villanova Law Review). The court found that
the decision had been made for financial reasons. Id.
17. Id. at 4.
18. Memorandum and Order, Committee to Save Saint Thomas More v. Roman
Catholic Archdiocese, Civil No. 75-1677 (E.D. Pa., filed Nov. 24, 1975) (on file at
the Villanova Law Review).
19. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 100 (1971). The view that the
constitution was enforceable against private citizens, as well as against the states,
was expressed by Representative Shellabarger in the debates preceding passage of
section 1985. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. App. 68 (1871), cited in Griffin
v. Breckenridge, supra at 100.
Section 1985(3) was part of a series of statutes collectively designed "[a]n
Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States, and for Other Purposes," popularly known as the Klu Klux Klan
Acts. See Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 656-57 (1951).
20. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 100 (1971).
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Collins v. Hardyman,22 the Supreme Court of the United States so
narrowly construed the applicability of section 1985(3) to private con-
spiracies as to restrict it virtually to private conspiracies which partook
of state action.2 3 Although the language of section 1985(3) does not
specifically require the presence of an element of state action, the Court
reasoned that deprivation of the equal privileges and immunities under
the law could only be achieved by manipulation of the law and that, ordi-
narily, only a state could manipulate the law.24 For 2 decades thereafter,
Collins stood for the proposition that there must be state involvement in the
discrimination in order to present a cause of action under section 1985 (3).
Twenty years later, the Supreme Court reversed the limited construc-
tion of section 1985 (3) imposed by Collins, and held, in Griffin v. Brecken-
ridge,25 that in light of recent decisional law,26 statutory construction,
27
and legislative history,28 section 1985(3) could be invoked to redress
22. 341 U.S. 651 (1951).
23. Id. In Collins, the plaintiffs, members of a political club, had gathered to
discuss the Marshall Plan and other political issues. The defendants, who wore
American Legion caps, disrupted the meeting by voicing threats of violence against
the plaintiffs. Id. at 654. The disruption was clearly an act of discrimination by
private parties without any state involvement. In their complaint, the plaintiffs
alleged that defendants had conspired to deprive them of their equal privileges and
immunities as United States citizens and, specifically, of their right to petition the
government for redress of grievances. Id. at 653-55.
24. Id. at 661. The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision to grant relief
under section 1985(3) on the ground that plaintiffs had not adduced sufficient evidence
to prove injury which would be redressable under section 1985(3). Id. at 662.
25. 403 U.S. 88 (1971). In Griffin, the plaintiffs were several blacks who were
traveling in an automobile on a federal highway near DeKalb, Mississippi. The
defendants, mistakenly believing the plaintiffs to be civil rights workers, blocked the
road on which the plaintiffs were traveling, and threatened and beat them. Id. at
90-91. Plaintiffs sued on the grounds, inter alia, that the defendants had conspired to
deprive them of their constitutional rights of freedom of speech, freedom of assembly,
freedom of association, freedom to travel interstate, and the right to be secure in
their persons and property. Id. at 91. Their claim for relief was founded upon section
1985(3). Although the Griffin Court found that there was no state action, it never-
theless upheld the claim based upon section 1985(3). Id. at 103.
26. The Court in Griffin noted the reservations which the Collins Court had ex-
pressed concerning the constitutional power to regulate private activity. Id. at 94-95.
However, the Griffin Court noted that a "state action" requirement existed only with
respect to claims asserted under the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 96. Without refer-
ring to any specific case, the Court stated:
[I]t is clear, in light of the evolution of decisional law in the years that have
passed since [Collins v. Hardyman] was decided, that many of the constitutional
problems there perceived simply do not exist. Little reason remains, therefore,
not to accord to the words of the statute their apparent meaning [i.e., that section
1985(3) regulates private conspiracies].
Id. at 95-96.
27. The Court stated:
An element of the cause of action established by the first section, now 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, is that the deprivation complained of must have been inflicted under color
of state law. To read any such requirement into § 1985(3) would thus deprive
it of all independent effect.
Id. at 99.
28. Id. at 100.
1975-1976]
4
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 5 [1976], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol21/iss5/6
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW[
injury inflicted by purely private conspiracies.29 Analyzing the language
of the statute, the Griffin Court held that a plaintiff must plead and prove
four separate elements in order to state a cause of action under section
1985(3): 1) the existence of a conspiracy; 2) a conspiratorial purpose to
deprive any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws
or equal privileges and immunities; 3) acts in furtherance of the con-
spiracy; and 4) injury to the person or his property or deprivation of his
constitutional rights.30 In addition, the Griffin Court suggested that a
fifth element - an invidiously discriminatory animus underlying the acts
(i.e., a racial or otherwise class-based discrimination) - was essential to
a cause of action under section 1985(3), even though there was no such
language in the statute.8 '
The Griffin Court also partially resolved the thorny question raised in
Collins32 concerning the constitutional source of Congress' authority to
provide an avenue of redress for victims of private discrimination. The
Court relied, in part, upon the thirteenth amendment since that amend-
ment was addressed to private citizens as well as to the states ;83 it also
relied upon the right of interstate travel because it was one of the privi-
leges and immunities of United States citizenship.8 4 Whether section 5
of the fourteenth amendment would provide a constitutional source of
Congressional authority was not resolved in Griffin. 8
29. Id. at 104.
30. Id. at 102-03.
31. Id. at 103. The Court made clear that a conspiratorial deprivation would not
be redressable under section 1985(3) unless there was proof of some discriminatory
animus. Id. Without such animus, the asserted constitutional deprivation would not
rise above the level of a "tortious injury." Id. "Animus," as defined by the Griffin
Court, does not mean a specific intent to injure, but rather an intent to treat classes of
people unequally. Id. at 102 n.10. In Griffin, the discriminatory animus involved was
racial, but the Court did not foreclose the possibility that nonracial discrimination
could be actionable under section 1985(3). Id. at 102 n.9.
32. Among the matters with which the Collins Court expressed particular con-
cern were the constitutional source for section 1985(3), the conflicts between that
statute and the reserved power of the States, and the content of rights derived from
national as distinguished from state citizenship. See Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S.
651, 659 (1951).
33. 403 U.S. at 105. The Court said:
"Congress has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to deter-
mine what are the badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authority to trans-
late that determination into effective legislation." We can only conclude that
Congress was wholly within its power under § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment
in creating a statutory cause of action for Negro citizens who have been the
victims of conspiratorial, racially discriminatory private action aimed at depriving
them of the basic rights that the law secures to all free men.
Id., quoting Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968).
34. 403 U.S. at 105-06.
35. It was unnecessary that the Court discuss whether a section 1985(3) cause
of action could be supported by the fourteenth amendment because the discrimination
in Griffln was racial. See note 25 supra. Thus, the thirteenth amendment foundation
was a sufficient source of authority. It follows that where the discrimination is non-
racial, courts will have to rely upon some other amendment. The Griffln Court
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Griffin v. Breckenridge is the most recent case in which the Supreme
Court directly construed the scope of section 1985(3). However, several
lower federal courts confronted with suits alleging nonracial discrimina-
tion have found, in certain circumstances, that a cause of action was stated
under section 1985(3).36 The problematical aspect of the post-Griffin
decisions has been the constitutional source of authority for section
1985(3). Action v. Gannon3 7 was among the first of the circuit court de-
cisions to hold that the fourteenth amendment was the source of authority
for section 1985(3). In upholding a suit challenging nonracial discrimina-
tion, the court relied upon section 5 of the fourteenth amendment as
authorizing congressional legislation to regulate private activity. 38 While
not every court would agree that section 1985(3) made the fourteenth
amendment enforceable against private citizens,8 9 most courts tacitly indi-
cate, often without even raising the question of constitutional authoriy, 40
that the statute grants a remedy for some nonracial discrimination.41
The ability of students to state a section 1985(3) cause of action
against administrators of a private educational institution had been liti-
gated in only one case prior to Brown and Saint Thomas More.42 That
of nonracial discrimination, but the Court did not preclude the fourteenth amendment
as a basis. Id. at 107.
36. See Westberry v. Gilman, 507 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1975) (discrimination
against a quasi-political group); Azar v. Conley, 456 F.2d 1382 (6th Cir. 1972)
(discrimination against a single family); Stein v. Massachusetts Indem. & Life Ins.
Co. 365 F. Supp. 433 (E.D. Pa., 1973) (sex-based discrimination).
37. 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971). In Action, church services at the Saint Louis
Cathedral parish were disrupted by two black groups, the Black Liberation Front and
Action. These groups staged a series of demonstrations in the church on successive
Sundays and threatened to continue such demonstrations until their demands were met.
Id. at 1229-30. The church members sued the disrupters for violation of their rights
of freedom of worship and freedom of assembly under section 1985(3). Id. at 1230.
38. Id. at 1235. The court stated: "Congress was given the power in § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the rights guaranteed by the amendment against
private conspiracies." Id. Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment provides: "The
Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions
of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
39. See Cohen v. Illinois Institute of Technology, 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 96 S. Ct. 1683 (1976) ; Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190, 194-96 (7th Cir.
1972) (rejecting the fourteenth amendment as a basis for a section 1985(3) cause
of action). Other courts have dismissed plaintiffs' claims under section 1985(3) on
the ground that the statutory remedy was available only if the action was engaged in
by a governmental entity. See Arnold v. Tiffany, 487 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 984 (1974) (freedom of association); Bellamy v. Mason's Stores,
Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1025 (E.D. Va. 1973), aff'd, 508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1974) (freedom
of assembly).
Typically, the courts have held that deprivation of certain rights can be
effected only by governmental entities. This view may be influenced, in part, by a
tacit assumption that suits under section 1985(3) for nonracial discrimination must
be supported by the fourteenth amendment.
40. See note 36 supra.
41. See, e.g., Cameron v. Brock, 473 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1973); Richardson v.
Miller, 446 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1971); Brown v. Villanova Univ., 378 F. Supp. 342
(E.D. Pa. 1974).
42. Furumoto v. Lyman, 362 F. Supp. 1267 (N.D. Cal. 1973). For a discussion
of Furuinoto, see notes 63-66 and accompanying text infra.
1975-1976]
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suit was dismissed for failure to prove both an invidiously discriminatory
animus and deprivation of any right protected by section 1985(3) .4 3
Brown and Saint Thomas More again raised two important questions
upon which student claims under section 1985(3) depend: 1) whether the
student-plaintiffs fall within a "class" which has been invidiously discrimi-
nated against; and 2) whether the student-plaintiffs have been deprived of
either equal protection of the laws or equal privileges and immunities.
III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE Brown AND Saint Thdmas
More DECISIONS
In light of prior case law and a careful analysis of the facts in both
Brown and Saint Thomas More, it is submitted that the plaintiffs in Saint
Thomas More did not state a cause of action under section 1985(3), and
that the plaintiffs in Brown did not state a cause of action although they
could have stated one under one interpretation of the facts.44 Because
the schools in each case were private institutions, 45 it is clear that neither
of the two sets of plaintiffs could have stated a cause of action under
section 1983 because of a lack of state action.46 In terms of the five
element test of section 1985(3) set forth in Griflin, the plaintiffs in Saint
Thomas More met two of the elements ("the existence of a conspiracy"
and "acts in furtherance of the conspiracy") ,'47 and the plaintiffs in Brown
met two of the elements ("the existence of the conspiracy" and "acts in
furtherance of the conspiracy") .48
43. 362 F. Supp. at 1286.
44. For a discussion of such possible interpretation of Brown's facts, see text
accompanying notes 95 & 96 in!ra.
45. Villanova University is a private Catholic institution. 378 F. Supp. at 343.
Saint Thomas More Catholic High School for Boys was a parochial high school.
Complaint at 1, para. 1, Committee to Save Saint Thomas More v. Roman Catholic
Archdiocese, Civil No. 75-1677 (E.D. Pa., filed June 25, 1975) (on file at the Villanova
Law Review).
46. The court in Brown specifically found that the plaintiffs had not stated a
cause of action under section 1983. 378 F. Supp. at 344. The plaintiffs in Saint
Thomas More did not even plead a claim under section 1983. Complaint, Civil No.
75-1677 (E.D. Pa., filed June 25, 1975) (on file at the Villanova Law Review).
It is virtually impossible to state a section 1983 claim against a private,
religiously operated institution. For a thorough analysis of factors to which courts
will look in determining whether state contacts with a private educational institu-
tion are sufficient to constitute state action, see Blackburn v. Fisk Univ., 443 F.2d 121
(6th Cir. 1971) (tax-exempt status, requirements for courses, chartering of the in-
stitution by the state, limited power of eminent domain, etc., held insufficient to con-
stitute state action for purpose of stating claim under section 1983).
47. Findings on Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 3, Committee to Save Saint
Thomas More v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese, Civil No. 75-1677 (E.D. Pa., filed
Aug. 18, 1975) (on file at the Villanova Law Review).
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A. The Existence of a Conspiracy
Prior decisions have held that in order to satisfy the existence of a
conspiracy requirement of the section 1985(3) cause of action, the plaintiff
must: 1) plead the existence of a conspiracy, and 2) allege facts in support
of the existence of the conspiracy. 49 Consequently, mere allegations that a
conspiracy existed without a recital of facts supporting its existence are
insufficient,"0 and failure to plead the existence of a conspiracy is grounds
for dismissal of the suit.51
The complaint in Saint Thomas More alleged the existence of a con-
spiracy, but the trial judge found insufficient evidence to support the
allegation.5 2 The complaint in Brown also alleged a conspiracy, and the
court found that there was a substantial probability that the plaintiffs
would, at trial, prove its existence. 5 3 Therefore, the plaintiffs in both
Brown and Saint Thomas More made sufficient allegations in their com-
plaints to state a prima facie cause of action, but, in Saint Thomas More,
the suit was dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence.
B. Acts in Furtherance of the Conspiracy
Both complaints stated that acts in furtherance of the conspiracy
existed. In Brown, the acts in furtherance of the conspiracy were the
suspension or expulsion of students ;54 in Saint Thomas More, while no
conspiracy was alleged or proved, the acts would have been the closing of
49. See El Mundo, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Newspaper Guild, Local 225, 346 F. Supp.
106, 113 (D.P.R. 1972). In El Mundo, a newspaper union, by use of threats and acts
of violence, prevented the publisher and certain management personnel from entering
the newspaper's offices during a newspaper strike. Id. at 107. The court dismissed the
suit because, inter alia, "[p]laintiffs failed to fully allege, with particulars, in the
complaint, how the defendant has conspired to deprive them of the equal protection of
the laws" and because "[a] pleading is not sufficient to state a cause of action under
the Civil Rights Act if its allegations are but conclusions." Id. at 113.
50. Id.
51. Droysen v. Hansen, 59 F.R.D. 483 (E.D. Wis. 1973). In Droysen, the plain-
tiff alleged that the police illegally arrested him for pandering. Id. at 483. The court
dismissed the complaint, stating: "Plaintiff does not state a claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985. . . . Conclusory allegations of conspiracy without any specification of the
agreement forming the conspiracy, are insufficient." Id. at 484 (citations omitted).
It should be noted that courts have not been as strict in the civil rights con-
spiracy cases as they have been in crimnal conspiracy cases with regard to proof of
the conspiracy's existence. But there is not sufficient case law to permit a precise
statement of what standard of proof will be required for civil rights conspiracies.
52. Complaint at 8, para. 33, Committee to Save Saint Thomas More v. Roman
Catholic Archdiocese, Civil No. 75-1677 (E.D. Pa., filed June 25, 1975) (on file at the
Villanova Law Review); Findings at 3, Committee to Save Saint Thomas More v.
Roman Catholic Archdiocese, Civil No. 75-1677 (E.D. Pa., filed Aug. 18, 1975) (on
file at the Villanova Law Review).
53. 378 F. Supp. at 345.
54. Id. at 345.
1975-1976]
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the high school and the transferral of the students. 55 Therefore, both
claimants fulfilled this requirement.
C. Injury to Person dr Property or Deprivation of Rights
Assuming that the rights of which the plaintiff claims to have been
deprived are protected under section 1985(3), complaints alleging such
deprivation or injury satisfy this element. Therefore, the determination
of whether the plaintiffs in Brown or Saint Thomas More met this "in-
jury" element must be deferred until the rights protected under section
1985(3) have been examined. 56
D. Racial or Otherwise Class-Based Invididusly
Discriminatory Animus
Case law has established that two separate types of evidence must be
adduced in order to meet the requirements of this element. Initially, there
must be proof that plaintiffs were members of a valid class. Proof that
the plaintiffs are members of a "class" within the meaning of section
1985(3) requires two items. First, plaintiffs must prove that the discrimi-
natory treatment at issue was directed against them, not as individuals,
but because of their membership in a class. Courts have dismissed suits
where activity which was concededly discriminatory was directed against
individuals rather than members of a particular class.57 Second, plaintiffs
must prove that the persons comprising the group discriminated against
have characteristics in common which render the group of persons a class.
Under this requirement some courts have demanded that the class have
"discrete, insular and immutable characteristics."5 8  Other courts have
55. Complaint at 6-7, paras. 26-28, Committee to Save Saint Thomas More v.
Roman Catholic Archdiocese, Civil No. 75-1677 (E.D. Pa., filed June 25, 1975) (on
file at the Villanova Law Review).
56. See notes 69-80 and accompanying text infra.
57. Hughes v. Ranger Fuel Corp., 467 F.2d 6 (4th Cir. 1972). In Hughes, plain-
tiffs, individual citizens who were not members of any organized environmental group,
attempted to photograph a landslide which had obstructed a public highway in viola-
tion of a federal act prohibiting such obstruction. Defendants, who were responsible
for the landslide, threatened the plaintiffs and drove them from the scene. Id. at 8.
In dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of action under section 1985 (3),
the court stated:
In their complaint, the plaintiffs make no allegations of any class-based
motivation on the part of the defendants. . . . The action of the defendants was
directed at the plaintiffs as individuals because they were engaged in attempting
to photograph them . . .not because of any animus against them as members
of some class or race.
Id. at 10 (footnote omitted). See also Arnold v. Tiffany, 487 F.2d 216 (9th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 984 (1974), a group of independent newsdealers suing
under section 1985(3) were held to constitute separate individuals, not a class.
58. See, e.g., Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1025, 1028 (E.D. Va.
1973), aff'd, 508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1974). In Bellamy, plaintiff was an employee of
a private corporation who was discharged from his employment because of his mem-
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adopted a more liberal approach,59 one going so far as to accept even a
single family as a section 1985 (3) class.60
Upon examining the complaints in Brown and Saint Thomas More,
it may reasonably be assumed that the actions which the schools had taken
in each case were directed against the plaintiffs, not in their individual
capacities, but as members of a class.6' Furthermore, each set of plaintiffs
in Brown and Saint Thomas More had certain characteristics in common
such that each group could be characterized as a class under a liberal
interpretation of that term.62 Thus, the plaintiffs in Brown and Saint
Thomas More were able to assert membership in a particular class.
Next, the class itself must be one which is protected under the Griffin
rationale. Only one case prior to Brdwn and Saint Thomas More -
Furumoto v. Lyman63 - dealt with the class of student-plaintiffs. In that
in a racially exclusive organization did not necessarily make one a member of a class.
The court stated:
Nor, despite its proclaimed exclusive policies does membership in the Klu Klux
Klan constitute membership in a class otherwise defined by the traditional indicia
of suspectness, the type of class required by Griffin's analysis. The class com-
posed of members of the Klu Klux Klan is not, in the Court's opinion, possessed
of discrete, insular and immutable characteristics comparable to those charac-
terizing classes such as race, national origin and sex.
368 F. Supp. at 1028.
59. See, e.g., Westberry v. Gilman, 507 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1975). In Westberry,
plaintiff, an activist in local environmental groups, was fired from his job because
he engaged in activities demonstrating opposition to his employer's pollution of the
environment. The court stated:
We believe that the indications of [plaintiff's] alignment with environmental
causes . . . raises a sufficient inference that there may have been a "class-based,
invidiously discriminatory animus . . ." to evidence subject matter jurisdic-
tion . . . under § 1985(3) ....
Id. at 210 (citation omitted).
60. Azar v. Conley, 456 F.2d 1382 (6th Cir. 1972). The Azars brought suit
against 27 private parties for alleged harassment of their family. Id. at 1384. The
district court dismissed the complaint on a variety of grounds in an unreported
memorandum opinion. Id. The Sixth Circuit held that the trial court had not dealt
with the issue of whether the Azars constituted a class, and remanded the suit for
such a determination. In dicta, the court said that it would not be unreasonable to
assume that a family could be a class within the contemplation of section 1985(3).
Id. at 1386 n.5.
61. In Brown, the court found that the class to which the plaintiffs belonged and
against which the defendants had taken action was "members of the Ad Hoc Com-
mittee." 378 F. Supp. at 345. In Saint Thomas More, the question of to which
"class" plaintiffs belonged was never raised by the district court. Although it would
not control the "class" issue, an argument that plaintiffs belonged to a class can be
asserted by virtue of the fact that the students brought their suit as a class action,
and the court did not object to the class status of the action. Findings on the Motion
for Preliminary Injunction, Civil No. 75-1677 (E.D. Pa., filed Aug. 18, 1975) (on file
at the Villanova Law Review).
62. Although the characteristic of being a student may lack "discreteness" or
"immutability" (see note 58 supra), it would appear to be no less discrete or im-
mutable than that of being a member of an environmental organization (see note 59
supra). The plaintiffs in each case fit, de minimis, into the class of "students."
63. 362 F. Supp. 1267 (N.D. Cal. 1973). In Furumoto, 15 people entered the
Stanford University classroom where a quiz on electrical engineering was being given
by Professor William Shockley. The group was chiefly non-Caucasian. Id. at 1271.
1975-1976]
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case, a California federal district court classified students who had dis-
rupted a quiz as either "non-white opponents of racism" or "disrupters of
university operation. ' 16 4 Neither class, in the view of the court, was "suffi-
ciently limited to pass the Griffin test." 65 The theory underlying the
Furumoto court's decision is, apparently, that unequal treatment of student
groups that are classifiable only as opponents of racism or campus dis-
rupters did not evidence the invidiously discriminatory animus required by
Griffin.6 6 Based upon Furumoto, it is arguable that the plaintiffs in Brown
and Saint Thomas More would not fall within a class protected under
the Griffin rationale. Presumably, the class to which the plaintiffs in
Brown belonged was "campus disrupters" or "members of the Ad Hoc
Committee"; the class into which the plaintiffs in Saint Thomas More
fit was "racially mixed students." By analogy to Furumoto, such classi-
fications are not of the same "invidious" nature as racial discrimination
and are not "sufficiently limited" to pass the Griffin test. There is, in
addition, some authority for the proposition that the class of students qua
students is not a constitutionally protected class.67 Therefore, it may be
concluded that the classifications into which the plaintiffs in Brown6 s and
Shockley ordered them to leave the room, but the group proceeded to denounce
Shockley's view on genetics and disrupt the quiz. Id. at 1271-72. Subsequently, the
disrupters were charged with having violated university regulations, and three mem-
bers of the group, the plaintiffs in Furunoto, were suspended. Id. at 1272-73. The
plaintiffs sued for readmission under section 1985(3). The claim was dismissed on
a motion for summary judgment. The court held that the plaintiffs had failed to
prove that the reason for their dismissal was an invidiously discriminatory animus
rather than for their violation of a valid campus regulation. Id. at 1286.
64. Id. at 1286. The court stated:
There is no evidence here that the defendants had a particular racial intent in
taking action against the plaintiffs. . . .The only relevant classes in which plain-
tiffs would appear to fall are "non-white opponents of racism" and "disrupters of




67. Prostrollo v. University of South Dakota, 507 F.2d 775 (8th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 952 (1975).
In Prostrollo, the plaintiffs were two college students who challenged a uni-
versity regulation requiring all single freshman and sophomore students to live in
residence halls provided by the university. Id. at 777. The university justified the
regulation on the ground that it developed good study habits in the younger students.
Id. The court, in upholding the rationality of the classification, noted that "[t]he
class within the regulation is created on the basis of educational attainment. This
classification has never been recognized as an inherently irrational basis for differen-
tiating between persons otherwise equal." Id. at 781 (citations omitted).
Although Prostrollo was not a suit involving section 1985(3), it is instruc-
tive on the issue of whether a classification of individuals according to educational
attainment is constitutionally suspect. If unequal treatment of students is not con-
stitutionally forbidden (assuming a rational relation between the treatment and the
state purpose), it may reasonably be inferred that unequal treatment of students does
not evidence an invidiously discriminatory animus.
68. Notwithstanding the failure of the plaintiffs in Brown to fall within a suffi-
ciently limited class, an argument for granting a remedy to those plaintiffs could be
made on the basis of Cameron v. Brock, 473 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1973), which involved
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Saint Thomas More fit failed to satisfy the Griffin requirement that the
alleged discriminatory treatment proceed from an invidiously discrimina-
tory animus.
E. Deprivation of Equal Protection of the Law and
Equal Privileges and Immunities
The fact that a plaintiff is able to allege that the defendant has de-
prived him of a constitutional right will not, in all cases, ensure the
plaintiff's right to maintain an action under section 1985(3) ; the statute
protects only deprivations of the "equal protection of the laws" and "equal
privileges and immunities." 69 The meaning of those two phrases, as in-
corporated in section 1985(3), was not clearly delineated in Griffin.70
While the statutory language tracks that of the fourteenth amendment,'
1
the Griffin Court paradoxically relied upon the thirteenth amendment as
the constitutional source of authority for section 1985(3).72 Lower court
cases which have been decided subsequent to Griffin have created a diffi-
cult constitutional dilemma. The fourteenth amendment, by its language,
Cameron, the plaintiff was imprisoned for handing out campaign leaflets in support
of a political candidate who was opposing the election of the incumbent sheriff. Id.
at 609. The court held that "supporters of a political candidate" would constitute a
clearly defined class. Id. at 610. Since the plaintiff fell within that class, he could
bring suit under section 1985(3). Id. However, Cameron is arguably distinguished
from Brown on the ground that the speech exercised in Cameron was advocacy with-
out disruption of public order, id. at 610, while the speech exercised in Brown in-
volved the disruption of campus order. 378 F. Supp. at 343.
69. See Crabtree v. Brennan, 466 F.2d 480 (6th Cir. 1972), wherein an un-
tenured teacher sued the school board for failing to renew his contract, thus depriving
him of his livelihood. Id. at 481. The court dismissed the suit in a per curiam
opinion, holding that such acts on the part of the school board did not constitute a
deprivation of plaintiff's right to the equal protection of the laws or equal privileges
and immunities. Id. See also Dowsey v. Wilkins, 467 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 982 (1974), wherein a 17-year-old boy filed a section 1985(3) suit,
alleging that he was unlawfully detained by the police and subsequently shot in the leg
when he attempted to flee. Id. at 1024-25. The court said, "Even conceding . . .
that the treatment visited upon Dowsey was as odious as he contends, such actions
are not sufficient to constitute a denial of equal protection which will support an
action under Section 1985(3)." Id. at 1026.
70. The Griffin Court, addressing the phrases "equal protection of the laws" and
"equal privileges and immunities," stated:
This language is, of course, similar to that of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which in terms speaks only to the States . . . . A century of Fourteenth Amend-
ment adjudication has, in other words, made it understandably difficult to con-
ceive of what might constitute a deprivation of the equal protection of the laws
by private persons. Yet there is nothing inherent in the phrase that requires the
action . . . to come from the State.
403 U.S. at 96-97.
71. The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States . . . nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
72. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 105 (1971).
9391975-19761
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proscribes certain state action.75 Section 1985(3) proscribes private action
of a conspiratorial nature.74 Yet some lower courts have relied upon the
fourteenth amendment as constitutional authority for section 1985(3)
causes of action for redress of private, nonracial discrimination.5 While
the circuit courts are not unanimous on this position,76 and while some
courts have required state action where certain categories of deprivation
are involved,77 a constitutional dilemma exists concerning whether a con-
gressional statute (section 1985(3)) can exceed the language of the
Constitution (specifically, the fourteenth amendment). The Supreme
Court has not addressed this issue, and the only authoritative guideline
at present is Grifln v. Breckenridge, which did not have to reach the
fourteenth amendment question because the discrimination involved there-
in was racial.78 Although this constitutional quandry remains unresolved,
the following guidelines are offered as a summary of the prior decisions.
In general, it appears that the scope of the rights protected by section
1985(3) depends upon the nature of the discrimination. The relationship
is one of cause and effect: the type of discrimination at issue determines
the constitutional source of authority and that source determines the rights
protected thereunder. If the discrimination is racial, the thirteenth amend-
ment is the source of power, and protection will extend to every act
which tends to impose a badge or incident of slavery. 79 If the discrimina-
73. See note 71 supra.
74. For the language of section 1985(3), see note 3 supra.
75. See Westberry v. Gilman, 507 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1975); Action v. Gannon,
450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971).
76. There is a split among the lower federal courts which have dealt with non-
racial discrimination concerning the scope of the rights protected by section 1985(3)
when a fourteenth amendment source of authority has been asserted. Two circuits
have held that section 1985(3) made the fourteenth amendment enforceable against
private parties. See Westberry v. Gilman, 507 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1975) ; Action v.
Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971). Other circuits have rejected the enforce-
ability of the fourteenth amendment against any activity other than state action.
See Cohen v. Illinois Institute of Technology, 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
96 S. Ct. 1683 (1976) ; Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1972) ; Flores
v. Yeska, 372 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Wis. 1974). The rationale of these latter cases is
that all fourteenth amendment cases, even those decided after Griffin, have required
state action.
77. Cases of nonracial discrimination that have required state action include:
Collins v. Bensinger, 374 F. Supp. 273 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (right to be free from cruel
and unusual punishment) ; Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1025 (E.D.
Va. 1973), aft'd, 508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1974) (right to freedom of association);
Rundle v. Madigan, 356 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (right to procedural due
process). Although never explicitly stated, it may be assumed that these cases were
premised upon the fourteenth amendment. No court has stated a clear rationale for
requiring the presence of state action only when certain rights are involved, although
this may have resulted from the view developed under prior fourteenth amendment
cases that "equal privileges and immunities" are very limited with respect to the
scope of rights protected. Cf. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
78. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 91 (1971).
79. In holding that the cause of action, brought under section 1985(3), did not
require state action, the Griffin Court relied upon both the thirteenth amendment and
the right to interstate travel as the constitutional sources of congressional power.
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tion is class-based, the fourteenth amendment is the source of power, and
protection will be extended only to that conduct whereby a private person
deprives another of the equal protection of the laws or equal privileges
and immunities.80
The plaintiffs in Saint Thomas More alleged that the school authori-
ties had deprived them of their right to a racially harmonious educational
environment.8 ' To assert that one's right to a "racially harmonious"
education at a private institution is protected under section 1985(3)
presupposes the existence of a constitutional right to education which
can be protected under the equal protection or equal privileges and im-
munities clause. In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rod-
riguez,s 2 the Supreme Court of the United States made clear that there
is no fundamental constitutional right to education.88 Still, the Court has
held that where the state has provided a statutory entitlement to education,
the Constitution mandates that a student not be deprived of education
without due process.8 4 Thus, although the right to education has been
accorded constitutional protection in a limited due process context, section
1985(3) authorizes redress only for deprivations of equal protection of
the laws and equal privileges and immunities.85 Therefore, the plaintiffs
80. See cases cited in notes 75-77 supra.
81. Complaint at 7-8, paras. 28-30, Committee to Save Saint Thomas More v.
Roman Catholic Archdiocese, Civil No. 75-1677 (E.D. Pa., filed June 25, 1975) (on
file at the Villanova Law Review).
82. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). In San Antonio, parents of children in a low-income
school district challenged a system of public school financing based on property taxes
levied on the properties within the school district. The plaintiffs alleged that the
system deprived low-income families of the equal protection of the laws. Id. at 4-6.
In the course of the opinion, the Court rejected the "strict scrutiny" test as a means
of evaluating the constitutionality of the system because the right to education was
deemed not to be a fundamental right protected by the Constitution. Id. at 37, 40.
Applying the "rational relation" test, the Court found that the system of financing
was a constitutionally legitimate exercise of the state's power to tax, and reversed
the lower court's holding that the system violated the fourteenth amendment's equal
protection clause. Id. at 56.
83. Id. at 35. The San Antonio Court stated: "Education, of course, is not
among the rights afforded explicit protection by our Federal Constitution." Id.
84. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), noted in 20 VILL. L. REv. 1069
(1974-75). In Goss, nine public high school students were suspended, on grounds of
misconduct, from their Columbus, Ohio, high school for periods of up to 10 days with-
out having been afforded any hearing or an opportunity to present their version of
the story. Id. at 568. Ohio law provided for free education to all children between
the ages of 6 and 21. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.64 (1972). The Court found that
this Ohio law constituted a statutory entitlement to a public education. 419 U.S. at 574.
On the constitutional issue, the Court stated:
Here, on the basis of state law, appellees plainly had legitimate claims of entitle-
ment to a public education.... Having chosen to extend the right to an educa-
tion to people of appellees' class generally, Ohio may not withdraw that right on
grounds of misconduct, absent fundamentally fair procedures to determine
whether the misconduct has occurred.
Id. at 573-74 (citations omitted).
85. There is a line of federal court cases which indicates that section 1985(3)
does not afford a remedy to persons alleging denial of due process by private parties.
See, e.g., Dowsey v. Wilkins, 467 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 982
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in Saint Thomas More, in charging defendants with a violation of their
right to a racially harmonious education, did not assert a deprivation of
a constitutional right that is protected by section 1985(3), either because
there is no constitutional right to education under the San Antonio decision
(and thus, no constitutional right to a particular quality of education),
or because there is no remedy for due process infringements under
section 1985(3).
The plaintiffs in Brown alleged deprivation of their first amendment
rights, presumably, freedom of association as members of the Ad Hoc
Committee and freedom of speech. 6 Under a thirteenth amendment
analysis of section 1985(3), the Griffin Court protected the freedom of
association of blacks.8 7 However, some lower courts have held, subsequent
to Griffin, that section 1985(3) does not protect 'freedom of association
when the asserted discrimination is nonracial and thus lies within the
ambit of the fourteenth amendment.88 Typically, these post-Griffin cases
have reasoned that freedom of association is made enforceable through the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and, as such, is not pro-
(1974); Crabtree v. Brennan, 466 F.2d 480 (6th Cir. 1972). See also Rundle v.
Madigan, 356 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Cal. 1972). In Rundle, plaintiffs brought suit
against a county sheriff and his deputy for shooting at and wounding plaintiffs in an
attempt to clear a "people's park" in the university area of a college campus. Id.
at 1050. Plaintiffs claimed that the defendants had acted to deprive them of liberty
and life without due process of law. Id. at 1051. The court stated: "Several elements
constitute a § 1985 conspiracy claim. One is that the plaintiffs have been deprived of
'equal protection of the law' or of 'equal privileges and immunities under the law.'
Due process violations alone do not suffice." Id. at 1050-51 (emphasis by the court).
See also Brosten v. Scheeler, 360 F. Supp. 608 (N.D. Ill. 1973). The plaintiff in
Brosten had operated a salvage business in Park City until the city council passed an
ordinance regulating junk yards. Id. at 610-11. Plaintiff alleged that the ordinance
violated his due process rights in that it deprived him of his business and caused him
to lose property worth $300,000. Id. at 611. The court dismissed the complaint under
section 1985(3), stating:
Section 1985 applies only to a conspiracy to deprive some person or class of
persons of equal protection and does not apply to conspiracy to deny due process.
The plaintiff in his complaint fails to allege any facts in support of his claim
that he has been denied equal protection.
Id. at 614 (citations omitted).
In general, the courts have not even referred to this constitutional dilemma.
The clear language of section 1985(3) includes "equal protection" and "equal
privileges and immunities" and, by negative implication, does not include "due
process." Cf. Slegeski v. Ilg, 395 F. Supp. 1253 (D. Conn. 1975) ; Weise v. Reisner,
318 F. Supp. 580 (D. Wis. 1970).
86. 378 F. Supp. at 345.
87. See note 25 supra.
88. See Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1025 (E.D. Va. 1973),
aft'd, 508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1974). For a discussion of Bellamy, see note 58 supra
& note 89 infra. See also Arnold v. Tiffany, 487 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 984 (1974), where certain independent newsdealers alleged harass-
ment and intimidation on the part of various employees of the publisher who had
attempted to prevent them from joining a union. Id. at 216. The court held that
freedom of association was a right protected from state, but not private, interference.
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tected under section 1985(3).89 Nevertheless, some lower federal courts
have protected freedom of association under section 1985(3), despite
the nonracial character of the discrimination, as one of the fundamental
rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.90 Therefore, because the
lower courts have not uniformly protected freedom of association from
nonracial discrimination, it may be concluded that it is not clear that the
plaintiffs in Brown had a remedy for the alleged deprivation of their
freedom of association under section 1985(3).
An additional constitutional deprivation asserted by the plaintiffs in
Brown was the denial of the plaintiffs' freedom of speech. The protection
afforded freedom of speech under section 1985(3) has depended upon the
quality of the speech involved in the suit. While speech deemed to be
"pure advocacy" has been afforded protection on numerous occasions, in
Griffin and in several lower court cases, 91 advocacy coupled with demon-
stration which disrupts the public order has not been similarly protected. 92
In Brown, the plaintiffs exercised their right of free speech in a manner
which disrupted the orderly operation of the university;93 thus, such
speech was not pure advocacy, 94 but was advocacy cure demonstration.
89. In Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc., 368 F. Supp. (E.D. Va. 1973), aff'd,
508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1974), the district court stated:
Freedom of political association has long been recognized as a fundamental
element of the First Amendment ....
While certain constitutional rights are protected against private as well
as state interference, freedom of association has not been considered such a right.
Rather it is an element of the First Amendment applied to the states through the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and as such it is constitu-
tionally protected only against interference by the state.
368 F. Supp. at 1028 (citations omitted).
For cases holding that due process rights are not protected by section 1985(3),
see note 85 supra.
90. See Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971). See also Hampton v.
Chicago, 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974), in which the
Chicago police raided an apartment where several members of the Black Panther
Party were holding a meeting. Id. at 605. Plaintiffs, members of the Black Panther
Party, alleged that the purpose of the raid was, inter alia, to prevent plaintiffs from
exercising their freedom of speech and association. Id. Ruling on defendant's motion
to dismiss, the court held that such allegations stated a cause of action cognizable
under section 1985(3). Id. at 607. However, the court did not discuss the issue of
the constitutional source of authority, nor did it indicate that it would grant section
1985(3) remedy solely on the grounds that the discrimination was racial.
91. See Hampton v. Chicago, 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 917 (1974); Cameron v. Brock, 473 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1973); Richardson v.
Miller, 446 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1971); Pendrell v. Chatham College, 370 F. Supp. 494
(W.D. Pa. 1974).
92. See Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971); Furumoto v. Lyman,
362 F. Supp. 1267 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
93. 378 F. Supp. at 343. The students held a demonstration in the women's
dormitory, began to distribute beer from kegs, and locked arms to resist the police
who were called in to quell the disturbance. 378 F. Supp. at 343.
94. In Cameron v. Brock, 473 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1973), the speech involved the
distribution of pamphlets on a public street. In Richardson v. Miller, 446 F.2d 1247
(3d Cir. 1971), the speech consisted of advocacy of racial equality in front of fellow
16
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Consequently, the speech at issue in Brown would appear to be outside
of the protection of section 1985(3). Indeed, in two prior cases,9 5 speech
similar to that exercised in Brown was held to be unprotected by section
1985(3), and it would be difficult to argue that these precedents should not
control. If, in Brown, plaintiffs had offered to prove at trial that there
were additional deprivations of speech that amounted to pure advocacy, a
cause of action might have been stated under section 1985(3).96 Never-
theless, because the plaintiffs in Brown exercised their right to speak
through demonstrations which disrupted campus order, they did not clearly
assert the deprivation of a constitutional right which is protected by
section 1985 (3).
IV. WHEN A CAUSE o ACTION UNDER SECTION, 1985(3)
CAN BE STATED
Although the plaintiffs in both Brown and Saint Thomas More could
have met three of the five elements which the Griffin Court found necessary
to support a section 1985(3) cause of action,9 7 their complaints failed to
incorporate two important elements - an invidiously discriminatory
animus and a deprivation of equal protection or equal privileges and
immunities. In light of prior case law, however, it appears that there are
certain situations in which students attending a private educational insti-
tution might be able to satisfy these two elements and thus state a cause
of action against the school administration under section 1985(3). The
remainder of this article delineates particular factual situations in which
these two elements could be met.
employees and criticism of the employer. In Pendrell v. Chatham College, 370 F.
Supp. 494 (W.D. Pa. 1974), the speech at issue was advocacy of racial and sexual
equality in a classroom.
95. The two cases in question are Furumoto v. Lyman, 362 F. Supp. 1267 (N.D.
Cal. 1973) (see note 63 and accompanying text supra), and Action v. Gannon, 450
F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971) (see note 37 supra).
In Furumoto, in addition to holding that the plaintiffs had failed to state a
cause of action with respect to an asserted deprivation of their freedom of speech,
the court held that the university administrators had acted properly in enforcing
university regulations. 362 F. Supp. at 1287. The need for maintaining order and
discipline was held to be a proper limitation upon the plaintiffs' exercise of freedom
of speech, provided the limitation was applied equally to all students. Id. at 1286-87.
In Action, in addition to holding that church members had stated a cause of
action against the disrupters, the court held that the disrupters did not have an
absolute right to exercise their freedom of speech. 450 F.2d at 1232. The court
reasoned that when the exercise of speech interfered with the legitimate rights of
other citizens, the former right had to give way. The disrupters had the right to
exercise their freedom of speech but did not have the right to disrupt the church
services. Id. at 1232-33.
96. See note 91 and accompanying text supra.
97. The court in each case could have found: 1) the existence of a conspiracy;
2) acts in furtherance of the conspiracy; 3) injury to person or property or depriva-
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A. Invidiously Discriminatory Animus
Although the group of students qua students is arguably not a
"protected group" under section 1985(3),98 students who possess certain
additional characteristics can attain this "protected group" status. One
such protected group would be a student group discriminated against on
account of race. Griffin specifically held race to be a classification pro-
tected by section 1985(3). 99 The race classification has an additional
advantage over other class-based classifications because its source of con-
stitutional protection is the thirteenth rather than the fourteenth amend-
men, thereby allowing a court to redress a broader range of constitutional
deprivations than in cases of nonracial discrimination. 100 In the Third
Circuit, protection under section 1985(3) has been extended not only to
actual members of the racial group, but also to nonmembers who have
advocated the rights of the group, particularly the rights of blacks to
equality.1 1 Based upon the cases so holding, it would appear that if a
student were expelled or a nontenured teacher lost his or her job, allegedly
for advocating the rights of blacks, that person could state a section
1985(3) claim regardless of that person's own racial background.
Sex, while not the basis of the discrimination dealt with in Griffin,
does fall within the class of "discrete, insular and immutable charac-
98. See Prostrollo v. University of South Dakota, 507 F.2d 775 (8th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 952 (1975). For a discussion of Prostrollo, see note 67 and
accompanying text supra.
99. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971). For a discussion of Griffin,
see notes 25-35 and accompanying text supra.
100. See note 79 supra.
101. See Richardson v. Miller, 446 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1971). In Richardson, a
white employee was discharged for criticizing his employer's racially discriminatory
employment practices and for advocating racial equality in employment opportunities.
Id. at 1248. The court acknowledged that the plaintiff was not a member of the class
discriminated against, but held that the plaintiff had stated a cause of action under
section 1985(3) based upon the Griffin decision. Id. at 1249. The court stated:
While the question is very close, particularly because unlike Griffin the plaintiff
is not a member of the class allegedly discriminated against, we have concluded
that, in light of the trend in recent decisions to "accord [to the civil rights
statutes] a sweep as broad as [their] language" . . . the question [whether plain-
tiff has sufficiently alleged the racial or otherwise class-based invidiously dis-
criminatory animus required by Griffn] must here be answered in the affirmative.
Id. at 1249, quoting Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97 (1971). See also Pendrell
v. Chatham College, 370 F. Supp. 494 (W.D. Pa. 1974). In Pendrell, an associate
professor of anthropology alleged that her teaching contract was not renewed at a
private school because of her age, sex, and involvement in the struggles of blacks
and women for equality. Id. at 495. The court held that she had met each of the
five elements of the Griffin test. Id. at 500. As to the element of invidiously dis-
criminatory animus, the court held that she had met this requirement in two ways:
Insofar as she alleges that she was discriminated against for her advocacy of
women's rights, she has satisfied the class-based animus requirement a to a class
of which she is a member. Insofar as she alleges that she was discriminated
against for her advocacy of the rights of blacks, she has satisfied the require-
ment as to a class of which she is not a member.
Id. at 501, citing Richardson v. Miller, 446 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1971).
1975-1976]
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teristics" which the court in Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc.,102 held to
be the hallmarks of an invidiously discriminatory animus. 1 3 In Stern v.
Massachusetts Indemnity and Life Insurance Co.,10 4 the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that sex-
based discrimination was within the definition of invidiously discrimina-
tory animus. 105 It is difficult to discern the exact scope of protection
against sex-based discrimination afforded by section 1985 (3), but it appears
that suspension of a student or discharge of a faculty member solely on the
basis of sex could give rise to a cause of action under section 1985(3).
Exactly what other classes might qualify for protection under section
1985(3) is unclear. A particular decision would depend principally upon
whether the deciding court required the asserted class to possess "discrete,
insular and immutable characteristics," as the Bellamy court did,10 6 or
whether the deciding court would accept a broader definition of class. 0 7 No
clear guidelines for such a determination have yet been enunciated, and the
question remains, at the moment, subject to considerable judicial discretion.
B. Deprivation 'of Equal Protection and Equal
Privileges and Immunities
Leaving aside the constitutional dilemma regarding the source of
authority for section 1985(3)'s protection of rights, cases decided since
Griffin indicate that courts have pigeonholed rights into two principal
categories: 1) those which are afforded no protection under section
1985(3) or which are protected only against state deprivation, and 2)
those which are protected against private interference. Only under this
second category might students assert claims under section 1985 (3) against
private school administrators for deprivation of their protected rights.
The rights which are not protected under section 1985(3) are rights
which cannot be classified as being within the equal protection of the laws
or equal privileges and immunities since those are the only type of rights
covered by the language of section 1985(3). This limitation is based upon
language in Griffin indicating that section 1985(3) was not intended to
102. 368 F. Supp. 1025 (E.D. Va. 1973), aff'd, 508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1974).
103. 368 F. Supp. at 1028.
104. 365 F. Supp. 433 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
105. Id. at 443. In Stern, an insurance company issued disability insurance policies
whose terms and conditions accorded disparate treatment to men and women. Id. at
435. The company refused to sell a policy to the plaintiff, a woman, containing the
same terms and conditions available to men. Id. Focusing upon the Griffin require-
ment that there must be some racial or otherwise class-based invidiously discrimi-
nating animus, the court stated: "In the instant case plaintiff has alleged a class-based
(sex), invidiously discriminatory animus behind the defendants' actions. Conse-
quently, plaintiff may maintain a cause of action under Section 1985(3). . . ." Id. at 443.
106. See note 58 supra.
107. See, e.g., Westberry v. Gilman, 507 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1975); Azar V.
Conley, 456 F.2d 1382 (6th Cir. 1972). For a discussion of Westberry and Azar, see,
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create a federal tort law.10 8 Thus, injury to a person in the form of assault,
battery, or other tortious invasions of bodily integrity, 10 9 deprivation of
personal property," 0 and interference with certain rights conferred by the
state upon its citizens"' are not protected by section 1985(3) because they
are not injuries which rise to the level of deprivation of constitutional
rights. The plaintiff must be able to rely upon a constitutional provision
protecting him from the activity complained of. Consequently, as a general
proposition, threats of corporal punishment directed against a student by
a school administrator would probably not be characterized as a depriva-
tion of a constitutional right and, hence, would not form the basis of a
suit under section 1985(3).
Even where the plaintiff can rely upon a specific constitutional pro-
vision as protection for certain activities, courts have held that a section
1985(3) claim is not stated if the constitutional right is protected only
from state interference. Some courts have taken the position that only a
108. In Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971), the Court stated: "That the
statute was meant to reach private action does not, however, mean that it was in-
tended to apply to all tortious, conspiratorial interferences with the rights of others."
Id. at 101.
109. Hughes v. Ranger Fuel Corp., 467 F.2d 6 (4th Cir. 1972). In Hughes, the
Fourth Circuit held that assault and battery were not injuries redressable under
section 1985(3). 467 F.2d at 10-11. Concerning the threats uttered against the
plaintiffs and the batteries inflicted upon them by the defendants, the Hughes court
stated: "Nowhere in their complaint do the plaintiffs base their constitutional claim
on a conspiracy generated by a class-motivated animus to deprive them of either 'equal
protection of the law' or 'equal privileges and immunities' under the law .. " Id. at 10.
110. Milburn v. Blackfrica Promotions, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 434 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
In Milburn, an author brought suit against his publishing corporation to recover
possession of numerous stories and songs which he had written, but which the cor-
poration refused to return to him. Id. at 435. The court held that the complaint failed
to state a cause of action under section 1985(3) because "it fails to allege any wrongs
that rise to the level of a constitutional denial of equal protection of the laws." Id. at 436.
111. El Mundo, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Newspaper Guild, Local 225, 346 F. Supp. 106(D.P.R. 1973). In El Mundo, the court found that actions of the newspaper union
which impeded the entrance and exit of the management personnel from the newspaper
offices (a state-conferred right to travel within that state) did not constitute a depriva-
tion of the equal protection of the laws. Id .at 115. See also Johnston v. National
Broadcasting Co., 356 F. Supp. 904 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). In Johnston, reporters for NBC
encouraged the plaintiff, a former narcotics pusher, to procure narcotics for which he
was subsequently arrested. Id. at 906-07. The plaintiff alleged in his complaint that
he had been entrapped by defendants. Id. at 907. The court dismissed the section
1985(3) claim, stating:
To state a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act it is necessary that
there be an allegation that plaintiff was denied or that there was a conspiracy to
deny him a constitutional right, privilege or immunity. Here, at best, all that
appellant has alleged is entrapment. While entrapment may be a proper defense
in a criminal action, a police officer's participation in such activity does not con-
stitute a constitutional violation.
Id. at 908, quoting Jones v. Bombeck, 375 F.2d 737, 738 (3d Cir. 1967) (cita-
tions omitted).
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state can deprive a person of due process of law,112 or impose cruel and
unusual punishment,11 or deprive persons of freedom of association.114
These infringements, when undertaken by private individuals, would not
qualify for redress under section 1985(3). Therefore, a student claiming
that he was dismissed or suspended from a private school without being
afforded due process, would probably not state a cause of action under
section 1985 (3).
Significantly, the courts have consistently protected one constitutional
right - freedom of speech - from deprivation by both the state and
private conspiracies. Griffin protected that right under the thirteenth
amendment where the discriminatory animus was racial. 115 Subsequently,
the lower federal courts have protected freedom of speech where the
animus was racial," 6 where the animus was based upon both race and
sex, 1 17 and even where the animus embodied a more general "class-based"
discrimination such as "supporters of a political candidate."" 8 In addition,
in cases involving freedom of speech, the courts have tended to give a
more liberal reading to the protected "class" test, and have upheld suits
by plaintiffs who would not ordinarily have possessed the Bellamy require-
112. See Brosten v. Scheeler, 360 F. Supp. 608 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Rundle v.
Madigan, 356 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Cal. 1972). For a discussion of Rundle and
Brosten, see note 85 supra.
113. Collins v. Bensinger, 374 F. Supp. 273 (N.D. Il. 1974). In Collins, a juvenile
was placed in a correctional institution and denied certain rehabilitory treatment
Id. at 275. Within a year after her release, the Seventh Circuit, in Nelson v. Heyne,
491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974), held that a minor confined in such an institution had a
constitutional right to treatment. The plaintiff-juvenile sued under section 1985(3)
on the grounds that she had been denied such treatment in violation of her fourteenth
amendment due process rights and her eighth amendment rights to be free from cruel
and unusual punishment. 374 F. Supp. at 275. The court dismissed the claim, stating:
This section [1985(3)] applies only to conspiracies to deprive persons of equal
protection and does not apply to conspiracies to violate due process or Eighth
Amendment rights. Insufficient facts are alleged to support any claim of a denial
of equal protection .... Thus, no cause of action has been stated under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985.
Id. at 277 (citations omitted).
114. Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1025 (E.D. Va. 1973), aff'd,
508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1974). But see Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971).
115. See note 25 supra.
116. Richardson v. Miller, 446 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1971) ; see note 101 supra. See
also Hampton v. Chicago, 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973). Although the issue of the
plaintiffs' race was not specifically discussed by the court, the plaintiffs were members
of the Black Panthers and alleged that the acts had been taken against them because
of their race. Id. at 605. Thus, the matter of racial discrimination was implicitly
considered in the court's decision.
117. Pendrell v. Chatham College, 370 F. Supp. 494 (W.D. Pa. 1974). For a dis-
cussion of Pendrell, see note 101 supra.
118. Cameron v. Brock, 473 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1973). For a discussion of
Cameron, see note 68 supra. The Cameron court held that distribution of campaign
leaflets was an exercise of first amendment freedom of speech, and that deprivation of
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ment of "discrete, insular and immutable characteristics."" 9 In each of
the lower court cases dealing with freedom of speech in the section 1985 (3)
context, there was virtually no mention of a constitutional quandary over
the sources for protection of this right. Typically, the courts have held
that freedom of speech was one of the rights covered under the equal
protection of the laws or equal privileges and immunities element of
section 1985(3).120 Therefore, a student or faculty member who falls
within a class protected by section 1985(3)121 and who claims to have
been suspended, expelled, or fired on account of his exercise of freedom
of speech, would be likely to have a cause of action against private school
administrators under section 1985(3).
V. CONCLUSION
As section 1985(3) suits continue to be litigated, it will probably
become clearer that, as Brown and Saint Thomas More have indicated,
section 1985(3) provides a more limited remedy against private discrimi-
nation than plaintiffs' attorneys in those cases believed. However, section
1985(3) does clearly protect certain rights from conspiracies by private
parties. In cases of conflict between students and administrative officials
of private educational institutions, it may provide the one legal remedy
which the editors of a student newspaper, the leaders of a women's caucus,
and the participants in a civil rights rally have against an administration
that finds their activities incompatible with school policy.
John F. Horstmann III
119. See also Richardson v. Miller, 446 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1971); Pendrell v.
Chatham College, 370 F. Supp. 494 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (see note 101 supra), where,
in both cases, the class discriminated against was blacks but the court allowed whites
who advocated the rights of blacks to sue for deprivation of their freedom of speech.
In Cameron v. Brock, 473 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1973) (see note 68 supra), and Hampton
v. Chicago, 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973) (see note 90 supra), the classes asserting
cognizability under section 1985(3) were, respectively, "supporters of a political can-
didate" and "members of the Black Panther Party." Both courts implicitly held that
such groups were within the Griffin definition of class even though they did not possess
"discrete, insular and immutable characteristics." Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc.,
368 F. Supp. 1025, 1028 (E.D. Va. 1973), aft'd, 508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1974).
120. See, e.g., Richardson v. Miller, 446 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1971), wherein the
court summarily stated that "the Griffin decision provides an adequate basis upon
which to conclude that plaintiff's complaint at least states a cause of action under
section 1985(3)." Id. at 1249. See also Cameron v. Brock, 473 F.2d 608 (6th Cir.
1973), where the court simply held as follows:
The appellants conspired to deprive the appellee of his rights and the purpose
of the deprivation was to halt or discourage anti-Brock activity on the part of
the challenger's supporters. The elements of a § 1985(3) suit were present and
the jury had sufficient evidence before it to find for the appellee, as it did.
Id. at 610.
121. For a discussion of the "invidiously discriminatory animus" requirement, see
notes 98-107 and accompanying text supra.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CONSENT SEARCH - KNOWING WAIVER
REQUIRED FOR NONCUSTODIAL CONSENT SEARCH UNDER NEW JERSEY
CONSTITUTION.
State v. Johnson (N.J. 1975)
Defendant, indicted for violating the New Jersey narcotics laws,'
moved to suppress the fruits of a warrantless search of his fiancee's
apartment 2 on the ground that no valid consent to the search had been
given. 3 Applying a standard of voluntariness and knowing waiver of fourth
amendment rights, the trial court found the consent invalid and granted
the motion.4 The Appellate Division reversed and remanded, stating that
in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte5 the United States Supreme Court had
ruled that the validity of a consent to a search in a noncustodial situation
was to be measured, not in terms of waiver, but by a standard of voluntari-
ness as determined from the totality of the circumstances, and that knowl-
edge of the right to refuse consent was a relevant, but not an indispensable
factor in determining voluntariness.6 A divided7 New Jersey Supreme
Court reversed the Appellate Division and remanded the motion to the
trial court for redetermination on the existing record,8 holding that while
Schneckloth governed the effectiveness of a consent under the fourth
1. State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 357, 346 A.2d 66, 70 (1975) (Pashman, J.,
dissenting). Defendant was charged with possession of narcotics, and with possession
with intent to distribute, in violation of state law. Id.
2. The defendant kept some personal belongings at the apartment where the
search was conducted. Id. at 351, 346 A.2d at 66-67. According to police witnesses,
the defendant's fiancee, who was the occupant of the apartment, consented to the
search. Id. The court noted without discussion that the defendant had standing to
challenge the validity of this third party consent. Id. at 351 n.1., 346 A.2d at 66-67
n.1.
3. Id. at 351, 346 A.2d at 66-67. Defendant's fiancee testified at a hearing
that she did not give the police officers permission to enter the apartment, that
she was not informed of the purpose of the police visit but was asked merely if there
were any narcotics in the house, that she was given Miranda warnings after the
police had begun to search, and that she did not see the police remove the narcotics
from the dresser drawer in which defendant kept his personal items. Id. at 358, 346
A.2d at 70 (Pashman, J., dissenting). Sharply conflicting testimony regarding these
circumstances was given by the police officers who conducted the search. Id. at 357-58,
346 A.2d at 70 (Pashman, J., dissenting).
4. Id. at 351-52, 346 A.2d at 67. The trial judge found that the prosecution
had not satisfactorily proved that a voluntary and knowing consent to search the
apartment had been given. He further stated that the knowledge element of the
consent "'[went] to the knowledge of whether or not [defendant's fiancee] had a right
to refuse to have the apartment searched at all .... '" Id. at 352, 346 A.2d at 67.
5. 412 U.S. 218 (1973). For a discussion of Schneckloth, see notes 21-29 and
accompanying text infra.
6. 68 N.J. at 352-53, 346 A.2d at 67.
7. Four judges joined in Justice Sullivan's majority opinion; one judge concurred
in the result, and one dissented.
8. 68 N.J. at 354, 346 A.2d at 68. The trial judge was directed to make
findings as to the conflicting factual versions of the search and consent and as to
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amendment,9 the standard to be applied in the instant case was article I,
paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution, ° which placed upon the
prosecution the burden of proving that the subject, in acting voluntarily,
knowingly waived the right to refuse consent. State v. Johnson, 68 N.J.
349, 346 A.2d 66 (1975).
With the present decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court reopened
the issue of the standard to be applied in determining the validity of an
individual's consent to a police search in a noncustodial situation."
While voluntariness - freedom from coercion - had traditionally been
deemed a requisite element of a valid consent,12 a question had long per-
sisted as to whether the prosecution, in demonstrating that a consent
was voluntarily given, was also required to prove that the subject of the
search waived his fourth amendment right to refuse consent in a knowing
and intelligent manner.
Although the United States Supreme Court had applied a knowing
waiver analysis with respect to certain constitutional guarantees, 18 it did
not, prior to Schneckloth, squarely face the question of the applicability
9. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment was
applicable to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
10. Article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution of 1947 provides in
pertinent part that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated .... " N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 7. The Johnson court noted that the New
Jersey provision was virtually identical to the fourth amendment of the United
States Constitution, and that, until the present case, it had been interpreted in
accordance with United States Supreme Court's fourth amendment decisions. 68 N.J.
at 353 n.2, 346 A.2d at 68 n.2. For purposes of this discussion, the term "fourth
amendment rights" shall also refer to the rights protected under article I, paragraph 7
of the New Jersey Constitution.
11. A search conducted pursuant to a valid consent is one of the established ex-
ceptions to the warrant and probable cause requirements of the fourth amendment
See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 165-66 (1974); Davis v. United States,
328 U.S. 582, 593-94 (1946) ; United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 69-70 (1943).
12. In Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968), the United States Supreme
Court stated that "[w]hen a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify the
lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact,
freely and voluntarily given." Id. at 548. See also Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10, 13 (1948) ; Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 317 (1920).
13. For example, in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), the Supreme Court,
noting that "[a] waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment
of a known right or privilege," held that the waiver of the right to counsel in a
criminal trial must be knowingly made. Id. at 464. For other applications of the
knowing waiver test, see Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (right to speedy
trial) ; Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968) (right to confront witnesses) ; Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion) ; Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957) (right to be free from double
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of the waiver test to cases involving fourth amendment rights. 14 In the
absence of any definitive High Court ruling, state and lower federal courts
were divided as to the elements necessary to validate a noncustodial consent
search.15
In State v. King,16 decided in 1965, the New Jersey Supreme Court
intimated that voluntariness included a showing that the subject knowingly
waived his fourth amendment rights. The defendant in King, convicted
of armed robbery, had moved to suppress a gun, coat, and cap found during
a search.' 7 The court held that the consent, given at 1:30 a.m. in a police
14. In many instances, consent search issues, even when framed in terms of
waiver, were primarily resolved on the basis of coercion. See, e.g., Bumper v. North
Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968) ; Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948) ; Amos
v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1920).
15. Some courts held that knowledge of a right of refusal was not required
in consent search cases. See, e.g., United States v. Dornblut, 261 F.2d 949 (2d Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 912 (1959) ; People v. Michael, 45 Cal. 2d 751, 290 P.2d
852 (1955). Other courts, however, imposed a knowing waiver requirement. In United
States v. Blalock, 255 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1966), the court stated:
[W]here consent is relied upon to validate a warrantless search, the Government
must prove that the consent was (a) intelligent and (b) voluntary ....
First, the consent must have been "intelligent." Obviously, the requirement
of an "intelligent" consent implies that the subject of the search must have been
aware of his rights, for an intelligent consent can only embrace the waiver of a
"known right" . . . . The Fourth Amendment requires no less knowing a waiver
than do the Fifth and Sixth.
Id. at 269 (citations omitted) ; see Schoepflin v. United States, 391 F.2d 390 (9th
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 865 (1968) ; United States v. Page, 302 F.2d 81
(9th Cir. 1962) ; State v. Snead, 76 N.M. 349, 414 P.2d 858 (1966) ; Tobin v. State,
36 Wyo. 368, 255 P. 788 (1927).
Even when knowledge of the right to refuse consent was required, it was
often unclear whether such knowledge was an element distinct from voluntariness.
Compare Note, Consent Searches: A Reappraisal After Miranda v. Arizona, 67
COLuM. L. REV. 130, 132 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Consent Searches], with Note,
The Doctrine of Waiver and Consent Searches, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 891, 892-97
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Doctrine] ; see Wefing & Miles, Consent Searches and
the Fourth Amendment: Voluntariness and Third Party Problems, 5 SETON HALL
L. REV. 211, 217-27 (1974).
A similar division existed on the question of whether fourth amendment
warnings were required for a valid consent search. A majority of courts did not
require warnings. See, e.g., United States v. Cox, 464 F.2d 937 (6th Cir. 1972);
Gorman v. United States, 380 F.2d 158 (lst Cir. 1967); State v. Oldham, 92 Idaho
124, 438 P.2d 275 (1968); Hohnke v. Commonwealth, 451 S.W.2d 162 (Ky. 1970).
The rationale of some of these cases was that if Miranda warnings had been given,
fourth amendment warnings were unnecessary. E.g., Brown v. Langlois, 103 R.I. 273,
237 A.2d 309, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 881 (1968). Some courts, however, did require
fourth amendment warnings. For example, in United States v. Moderacki, 280 F.
Supp. 633 (D. Del. 1968), the court stated:
The key to a voluntary waiver is whether it was done knowingly. An inference
that a person has been warned is not one and the same thing as an actual
warning . . . . Lacking an explicit warning as to his rights under the Fourth
Amendment, it can never be known with certainty whether a defendant voluntarily
waived those rights.
Id. at 636 (footnote omitted).
16. 44 N.J. 346, 209 A.2d 110 (1965).
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car while defendant was being taken to City Hall for questioning, was
nonetheless valid.' In reaching its decision, the court determined that
a valid consent had to be voluntary and "freely and intelligently given,"' 9
a standard which subsequent state decisions construed as requiring the
state to show that defendant knowingly abandoned his constitutional right
to refuse consent.2 0
The test formulated in King, however, was subsequently eclipsed by
the United States Supreme Court in Schneckl6th v. Bustamonte,2 1 which
held that the effectiveness of an individual's consent to a noncustodial search
did not require a finding that the individual knowingly waived his fourth
amendment rights.2 2 In Schneckloth, defendant moved to suppress stolen
checks discovered during the search of an automobile in which he was
a passenger. 23 After the automobile had been stopped by police for dis-
playing inoperative lights, one of the passengers consented to a search of
the vehicle.24 In upholding the validity of the noncustodia 25 consent the
Court expressly rejected a waiver analysis, and adopted a test of voluntari-
ness as determined from the totality of the circumstances.20 Under this
standard, knowledge of the right to refuse consent was not sine qua non
of an effective consent, but merely one factor to be considered in deter-
mining voluntariness.2 7 The Court based its holding primarily upon the
assumptions that a knowing waiver was required only for those rights
which protected a fair criminal trial,28 and that police would be sorely
18. Id. at 355-56, 209 A.2d at 115.
19. Id. at 352, 209 A.2d at 113 (footnote omitted).
20. In State v. Rice, 115 N.J. Super. 128, 278 A.2d 498 (App. Div. 1971), the
court stated :
Where the State relies on a defendant's consent to enter his home to make a
search without a warrant, it has the heavy burden of proving by clear and positive
evidence that the consent was unequivocally, intelligently, and voluntarily given.
Id. at 131, 278 A.2d 498, citing State v. King, 44 N.J. 346, 209 A.2d 110 (1965);
accord, State v. Price, 108 N.J. Super. 272, 282, 260 A.2d 877, 883 (Law Div.
1970).
21. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
22. Id. at 227.
23. Id. at 219-20.
24. Id. at 220.
25. In United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976), the Supreme Court sum-
marily applied the Schneckloth standard to a custodial search. Id. at 416.
26. 412 U.S. at 225-27. The Schneckloth Court defined a voluntary act as one
which was the product of "a free and unconstrained choice." Id. at 235.
27. Id. at 227.
28. Id. at 235-46. The Schneckloth Court reasoned that a waiver analysis applied
only to those rights which ensured the reliability of the truth-determining process
at the trial itself - for example, the rights to counsel at trial, to confrontation of
witnesses, to a jury trial, to a speedy trial, and to be free from double jeopardy. Id.
at 236-38. Similarly, the court stated that a waiver standard had been used for pre-
trial situations only to protect the fairness of the trial itself: the waiver of counsel
at a pretrial lineup was judged on the basis of knowledge and intelligence as
"[t]he trial which might determine the accused's fate may well not be that in the
courtroom but at the pretrial confrontation .... " Id. at 239, citing United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 235-36 (1966).
1975-1976]
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hampered in their work were knowing waivers required in consent
searches.
29
In reaching the present decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court
flatly rejected the rationale of Schneckloth. Adopting a waiver analysis,
the court held that the prosecution had the burden of proving voluntary
consent, with knowledge of a right of refusal an essential element of
voluntariness. s0 While acknowledging that the Schneckloth test governed
consent searches under the fourth amendment, the court asserted its power
to impose a more stringent standard under the parallel search and seizure
provision of the New Jersey Constitution. s1 Stressing that most persons
would consider any request made by a police officer to be a command, the
court reasoned that consent to a request to search was meaningless if made
without knowledge of a right to refuse to consent.32 However, the police
were not required to warn individuals of their right to refuse consent in a
noncustodial situation.83
In his dissent, Justice Pashman argued that the requirement of a
knowing waiver necessitated the giving of Miranda-type warnings34 in
29. 412 U.S. at 243-45. The Schneckloth Court reasoned that situations requiring
a waiver of rights demanded a painstaking examination into the knowing and under-
standing nature of the waiver, and that such an examination could not be properly
conducted by a police officer in the informal atmosphere of a consent search. Id. at
244-45.
30. 68 N.J. at 353-54, 346 A.2d at 68.
31. Id. at 353, 346 A.2d at 67. For the text of the relevant state constitutional
provision, see note 10 supra. The issue of whether the state constitutional provision
regarding searches and seizures could be interpreted differently from the parallel
federal provision was raised by the court sua sponte. Id. at 353, 346 A.2d at 67-68.
The court cited Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967), as the source of its right to
impose higher standards under its own constitution than those articulated by federal
courts interpreting the United States Constitution. Id. at 353, 346 A.2d at 67. In
Cooper, defendant's car was impounded as evidence under a state statute requiring
forfeiture of vehicles involved in violations of narcotics laws. In holding that the
warrantless search of the impounded car 1 week after defendant's arrest was not
violative of the fourth amendment, the Court stated: "Our holding, of course, does
not affect the State's power to impose higher standards on searches and seizures than
required by the Federal Constitution if it chooses to do so." Id. at 62.
32. Id. at 354, 346 A.2d at 68.
The court stated:
Many persons, perhaps most, would view the request of a police officer as
having the force of law. Unless it is shown by the State that the person involved
knew that he had the right to refuse to accede to such a request, his assenting
to the search is not meaningful. One cannot be held to have waived a right if
he is unaware of its existence.
Id.
33. Id.; see note 15 and accompanying text supra. It is possible to demonstrate
that the subject of the search had knowledge of his right to refuse consent without
requiring the police to administer warnings. Such knowledge may be shown by the
subject's conduct during the search, his past conduct, or his prior training or ex-
perience.. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 286 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
34. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the United States Supreme
Court stated :
[W]hen an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning . . .
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order to ensure knowledge of a right of refusal and adequately protect
fourth amendment rights.35 The dissent reasoned that the standard of
State v. King - freely and intelligently given consent3 6 - required that
the subjects be made aware of their alternatives.3 7 Warnings38 were neces-
sary for two reasons: 1) the arrival of police for the purpose of a search
created an inherently coercive situation which could best be counteracted
by warnings ;9 2) the right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures was too important to be deemed waived absent the strongest
possible showing that the subject of the search knew of his right of
refusal.40 The dissent feared that a standard which did not require
warnings abandoned individual freedom for the sake of administrative
convenience. 41
By extending the waiver analysis to searches and seizures, the court
continued the Warren Court's task of strengthening constitutional rights in
the area of criminal procedure through expansive construction and staunch
that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against
him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and
that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded
to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, and
such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently
waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement. But
unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution
at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against
him.
Id. at 478-79 (footnote omitted).
35. Id. at 366-68, 346 A.2d at 75-76; see notes 8 & 15 and accompanying text
supra.
36. 44 N.J. 346, 209 A.2d 110 (1965). For a discussion of King, see notes 16-20
and accompanying text supra.
37. 68 N.J. at 366, 346 A.2d at 75 (Pashman, J., dissenting). King was decided
under the fourth amendment and therefore was overruled by Schneckloth. However,
the dissent apparently reasoned that the policies underlying King applied with equal
force to the present case arising under the New Jersey Constitution. Id. at 366-67,
346 A.2d at 75.
38. The dissent would have required police to warn the subject of the search
that "[hie had a right to refuse to consent, that his refusal would be respected, and
that anything uncovered by the search could be used in evidence against him." Id. at
366, 346 A.2d at 75.
39. Id. It is submitted that by use of the term "inherent coerciveness," the dissent
was attempting to draw this case under the rationale of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966), although that opinion was not cited.
40. 68 N.J. at 367-68, 346 A.2d at 76.
41. Id. at 368, 346 A.2d at 76. (Pashman, J., dissenting). The dissent agreed
with Justice Marshall's dissent in Schneckloth that requiring warnings would not
destroy the informality, and thereby the efficacy, of the interchange between the police
officer and the subject of the search. Id. at 366, 346 A.2d at 75, citing Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 287-88 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Pashman noted
that the American Law Institute would require police officers to administer a warning
of the right to refuse consent to a noncustodial search prior to undertaking the same.
Id. at 367, 346 A.2d at 75 (Pashman, J., dissenting); see MODEL CODE OF PRE-
ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE §§ 240.2(2), (3) (Proposed Official Draft 1975).
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protection of the Bill of Rights.42 In contrast, the Burger Court's position
in this area has been one of restrictive interpretation and sliding-scale
protection, with different rights accorded different types and degrees of
protection.48
The instant decision implicitly rebuts the proposition asserted in
Schneckloth that a knowing waiver is required only for those rights which
protect a fair criminal trial.4 4 The consent search is a special exception
to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment: it is bottomed not
upon exigent circumstances, 45 but rather upon the ability of citizens to
forego the exercise of their constitutional rights.46  Since neither the
warrant requirement nor the exigent circumstances exception is operative
in the consent search context, knowledge of the right to refuse consent -
the sole safeguard of the citizen's right to be free of arbitrary and un-
reasonable searches and seizures - must be zealously guarded.41
It is submitted that the Johnson court's requirement of a knowing
waiver in the consent search situation will not, as the Schneckloth Court
42. See, e.g., Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (right to compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses applied to states) ; Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386
U.S. 213 (1967) (right to speedy trial applied to states); Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400 (1965) (right to confront opposing witnesses applied to states) ; Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (privilege against self-incrimination applied to states);
Gideon v. Wainright, 272 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to assistance of counsel applied to
States) ; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures and right to have excluded from criminal trials any evidence
obtained in violation thereof applied to states). See generally Consent Searches, supra
note 15, at 146.
43. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (standard of volun-
tariness as adduced from the totality of the circumstances applied to custodial consent
searches) ; Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (no right to counsel at post-arrest,
preindictment showup) ; Harris v. :New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (statements given
without required Miranda warnings can be used at trial for impeachment purposes).
See generally Doctrine, supra note 15, at 894.
44. 412 U.S. 218, 237-44.
45. Warrantless searches are "per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment,
subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1970), quoting Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 357 (1967). Those seeking exemption from the requirement of a warrant
must show that exigent circumstances made their conduct imperative. 403 U.S. at
455, citing United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951). Generally, these ex-
ceptions serve the needs of self-protection for police officers and preservation of
evidence from destruction. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S.
297, 318 (1971). Searches incidental to an arrest, automobile searches, and the pat-
down entailed in a stop-and-frisk situation are all considered to be exigent circum-
stances under which a warrantless search is permitted. See, e.g., Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752 (1969) ; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) ; Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132 (1925).
46. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 282-83 (1973) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting). Justice Marshall also found that in this situation "the needs of law enforce-
ment are significantly more attenuated, for probable cause to search may be lacking
but a search permitted if the subject's consent has been obtained." Id. at 283.
47. This was the main policy consideration underlying the dissent's argument
that fourth amendment warnings should be required for consent searches. See 68
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opined,48 unduly constrain police conduct. First, if the need for a search
were unusually compelling, the police, in the absence of a valid consent,
would be able to avail themselves of one of the exigent circumstances
exceptions to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment.4 9 Second,
there is little merit to the Schneckloth Court's argument that the knowing
waiver test would require a detailed subjective examination of the subject
beyond the ken of the police officer. 50 The question of whether the subject
had knowledge of the right to refuse consent should not be determined
by the police officer conducting the search, but by the trial judge.51 There-
fore, there is no need for the policeman to make an on-the-spot determina-
tion of the individual's understanding of his rights; the officer's inter-
change with the subject, including the administration or lack of administra-
tion of warnings, is but one piece of evidence to be considered by the trial
court in its determination of the existence of such knowledge.
52
In light of the Johnson court's apparent attempt to provide more
stringent protection of constitutional rights, it is arguable that the court
was inconsistent in adopting a waiver analysis for noncustodial consent
searches while simultaneously refusing to require prior warnings on the
part of the police. As the dissent in Johnson made clear,53 Miranda-type
warnings would have done much to ensure the greater degree of constitu-
tional protection desired by the majority. Moreover, the interrelationship
between the fourth and fifth amendments, which has been acknowledged
by the United States Supreme Court,5 4 supports the extension of warnings
48. 412 U.S. at 245.
49. See note 45 and accompanying text supra.
50. 412 U.S. 218, 245 (1973). The Schneckloth majority hypothesized that the
detailed determination of the quality of a waiver of the right to counsel required
of a judge in a criminal trial would also be required of a police officer in a consent
search. Id. at 243-45. The Court based this idea upon its reading of Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). The issue in Zerbst concerned waiver of the right to
counsel in a criminal trial. The Court stated:
The constitutional right of an accused to be represented by counsel invokes,
of itself, the protection of a trial court, in which the accused . . . is without
counsel. This protecting duty imposes the serious and weighty responsibility
upon the trial judge of determining whether there is an intelligent and competent
waiver by the accused. While an accused may waive the right to counsel, whether
there is a proper waiver should be clearly determined by the trial court ....
Id. at 465.
51. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 at 243-44. Dissenting in
Schneckloth, Justice Marshall reasoned that, assuming knowledge of a right to refuse
consent to be an essential element of a valid consent search, the issue was who should
bear the burden of proving such knowledge. He criticized the majority, stating:
"[W]hen it is suggested that the prosecution's burden of proof could be easily
satisfied if the police warned the subject of his rights, the Court responds by refusing
to require the police to make a 'detailed' inquiry." Id. at 285 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting) (emphasis in original).
52. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 285 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
53. 68 N.J. 348 at 366-68, 346 A.2d at 75-76 (Pashman, J., dissenting).
54. The Supreme Court has stated that "the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run
almost into each other" for purposes of preserving individual privacy from intrusion
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to the consent search situation.55 In addition, the administering of warnings
would impose no greater burden upon the police than that already required
by the Supreme Court under Miranda.56
Still, the majority's refusal to require warnings in the present case
is not entirely without reason. 57 Miranda warnings were intended to
counteract the inherent coerciveness of the incommunicado questioning
situation ;58 they were required only when a suspect was in custody or
significantly deprived of his freedom. 59 Although the dissent in Johnson
may have been correct in characterizing a noncustodial consent search as
an inherently coercive situation,6 ° it is submitted that the degree of op-
pressiveness or intimidation in such a search is rarely as great as that in
the custodial interrogation situation.61 Thus, while requiring warnings
for a noncustodial consent search might have been consistent with the spirit
of Miranda, such a rule might also have extended its rationale to inapposite
circumstances.
Nevertheless, it is conceivable that the holding in Johnson may result
in the giving of police warnings even in the absence of any explicit judicial
directive to that effect. If warnings are not required to be given by police,
by the state. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) ; see Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 646-47 (1961).
'The Court has further stated:
The law of searches and seizures as revealed in the decisions of this Court
is the product of the interplay of these two constitutional provisions. It reflects
a dual purpose - protection of the privacy of the individual, his right to be let
alone; protection of the individual against compulsory production of evidence to
be used against him.
Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587 (1946) (citations omitted).
55. See, e.g., Wilberding, Miranda-Type Warnings for Consent Searches?, 47
N.D. L. REv. 281, 282-83 (1971) ; Consent Searches, supra note 15; Comment, Consent
Search: Waiver of Fourth Amendment Rights, 12 ST. Louis U.L.J. 297, 309 (1968).
56. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) ; in Schneckloth, Justice Marshall
noted that the FBI warns suspects of their right to refuse consent to search, 412 U.S.
at 287 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) ; see Kluwin & Walkowski, Valid
Consent to Search Determined by Standard of Voluntariness - Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 12 Am. CRIm. L. REV. 231, 245 (1974).
57. It is submitted that, had the court required warnings in the present case, it
would have surpassed the Miranda Court in safeguarding the constitutional rights of
criminal defendants. It is further submitted that such a holding would be a very
difficult one to make in a time of high crime and public resentment of liberal judges.
See F. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND (1970).
58. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 (1966).
59. Id. at 477.
60. 68 N.J. at 366, 346 A.2d at 75 (Pashman, J., dissenting).
61. The Miranda warnings resulted from the Court's concern with the psychologi-
cal effect of incommunicado custodial interrogation upon the suspect. See Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966). The greater coercive effect produced by a
custodial interrogative atmosphere was highlighted by the following statements:
In his own home [the subject] may be confident, indignant, or recalcitrant. He
is more keenly aware of his rights and more reluctant to tell of his indiscretions
or criminal behavior within the walls of his home. Moreover his family and other
friends are nearby, their presence lending moral support. In his own office, the
investigator possesses all the advantages. The atmosphere suggests the invinci-
bility of the forces of the law.
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most citizens will not have knowledge of their fourth amendment right to
refuse consent to search. Since such knowledge is essential to the validity
of a consent, the state may experience difficulty in sustaining its burden of
proving that the subject made an intelligent, knowing waiver.6 2 There-
fore, in order to avoid losing the fruits of consent searches on a grand
scale, the state may be forced to require police to give warnings.
Johnson exemplifies what may be a growing trend on the part of
state courts to provide greater protection in the area of criminal procedure
than that presently afforded by decisions interpreting the United States
Constitution. 3 A number of state courts have relied at times upon the
adequate state grounds doctrine64 to avoid the less liberal opinions of
the Burger Court in this area. 65 The Johnson court, for example, explicitly
62. For examples of means by which the subject's knowledge of his right of
refusal may be shown without warnings, see note 33 supra.
63. See note 65 and accompanying text infra.
64. One commentator has described this doctrine as follows:
Under the adequate state ground rule, the Court will refuse to reexamine a
state decision involving a federal question if there is a non-federal ground sufi-
cient to support the judgment.
Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the
Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421, 427 (1974). There are three standards for determining
the existence of adequate state grounds: sufficient breadth Gf the non-federal question
completely apart from the federal question to support the decision; independence of
the non-federal ground from the federal ground; tenability (fairness and reasonable-
ness) of the non-federal ground. Id. at 429-30.
65. Id. at 425-26. In State v. Santiago, 492 P.2d 657 (Hawaii 1971), defendant
challenged the use at his trial of statements which he alleged had been obtained in
violation of Miranda v. Arizona. Id. at 658. The prosecution claimed that the state-
ments had been properly introduced for purposes of impeachment under the Supreme
Court's decision in Harris v. New York. Id. at 662. After acknowledging that
Harris was determinative of the issue under the federal Constitution, the court held
that the Miranda rules were required under the Hawaii Constitution, and that the
state constitution made statements obtained in violation of Miranda inadmissible for
purposes of impeachment. Id. at 664. For a discussion of the implications of the
rejection of Harris by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, see 21 VILL. L. REV. 769
(1976).
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court, in State v. Collins, 297 A.2d 620 (Me.
1972), held that the standard of proof for the admissibility of an allegedly illegal
confession was beyond a reasonable doubt. The court stated that the Supreme Court
decision in Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972), which held that proof by a
preponderance of the evidence was the standard for this situation was only a minimal
standard. Id. at 626. Basing its decision on public policy and the privilege against
self-incrimination, this court chose a higher standard of proof for Maine. Id. at
626-27.
In People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486 P.2d 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1971),
a warrantless search was held illegal by the California court, which cited an earlier
case holding a search illegal under both the federal and state constitutions. The
Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case, stating that it was
unable to determine upon which constitution the lower court holding was based, and,
therefore, could not determine whether the judgment was based upon an adequate
independent state ground. California v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33, 35 (1972). On remand,
the California court stated that it had relied upon both federal and non-federal
grounds for its decision, but that the non-federal ground had provided an inde-
pendent basis for its decision. People v. Krivda, 8 Cal. 3d 623, 504 P.2d 457, 105
Cal. Rptr. 521 (1973). The California Attorney General filed a petition for certiorari,
asking the Supreme Court to fashion standards for adequate state grounds so that
state courts could not insulate decisions on criminal procedure from Supreme Court
32
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 5 [1976], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol21/iss5/6
960 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 21
rejected Schneckloth66 while raising the state constitutional issue sua
sponte. 6" As most state constitutions contain a search and seizure provision
virtually identical to both the fourth amendment6" and the parallel New
Jersey section, the refusal of the New Jersey Supreme Court to accept
the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of that amendment
may influence other states to do the same.
Rachelle Levin
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - EQUAL PROTECTION - THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT THE DELEGATES TO A
POLITICAL PARTY'S NATIONAL CONVENTION BE APPORTIONED AMONG
A DEFINED CONSTITUENCY ON A ONE PERSON ONE VOTE BASIS.
Ripon Society, Inc. v. National Republican Party (D.C. Cir. 1975)
The Ripon Society (the Society) and nine individual plaintiffs1
brought suit 2 against the National Republican Party (the Party) and the
Republican National Committee challenging the constitutionality of the
formula for apportionment of delegates to the 1976 Republican National
Convention.8 The plaintiffs alleged that the apportionment of 607 dele-
review. See Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 7, 10-11, California v. Krivda, 412
U.S. 919 (1973). The petition was denied. 412 U.S. at 919. For a discussion of a
comparable development in the lower federal courts regarding the Warren Court,
see Note, Lower Court Disavowal of Supreme Court Precedent, 60 VA. L. Rv. 494
(1974).
66. See notes 30-32 and accompanying text supra.
67. 68 N.J. at 353, 346 A.2d at 68; see note 32 and accompanying text supra.
68. 1 J. VARON, SEARCHES, SEIZURES AND IMMUNITIES 5 (2d ed. 1974).
1. The individual plaintiffs were Republican voters from seven states and the
District of Columbia. Ripon Soc'y, Inc. v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567,
572 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1976).
2. The original complaint in this action was filed prior to the 1972 Republican
National Convention. Ripon Soc'y, Inc. v. !National Republican Party, 343 F. Supp.
168 (D.D.C. 1972). The district court enjoined the defendants from adopting the
uniform bonus section of the delegate allocation formula at the 1972 convention. Id.
at 178; see note 3 and accompanying text infra. Both plaintiffs and defendants appealed.
Defendants' request for a stay of the district court order until after the 1972 con-
vention was denied by the District of Columbia Circuit without opinion. However,
Mr. Justice Rhenquist, sitting as Circuit Justice, granted the requested relief.
Republican State Cent. Comm. v. Ripon Soc'y, Inc., 409 U.S. 1222 (Rehnquist, Circuit
Justice, 1972). Following the 1972 general election, the complaint was dismissed
pursuant to motions by both parties. In 1973, plaintiffs filed a second complaint which
similarly challenged the delegate apportionment formula for the 1976 convention.
Ripon Soc'y, Inc. v. National Republican Party, 369 F. Supp. 368, 370 (D.D.C. 1974).
3. Ripon Soc'y, Inc. v. National Republican Party, 369 F. Supp. 368 (D.D.C.
1974). The challenged formula was adopted at the 1972 Republican National Con-
vention. Id. at 369. The district court summarized the delegate allocation formula as
follows:
1. The 1976 Republican Convention will comprise a total of 2,242 delegates
from the states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam and the Virgin
Islands.
2. 1605 delegates, or 72%, will be apportioned to the states on the basis
of 3 delegates for each of the states' 535 electoral votes; that is, 3 delegates for
33
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gates 4 on the basis of Republican victories in the 1972 presidential and
state elections violated their constitutional right to equal protection of the
laws.5 Under the challenged scheme, each state which had voted for the
Republican presidential candidate in 1972 received five delegates (uniform
victory bonus delegates), plus an additional number of delegates equal to
60% of the electoral college vote of the state (proportional victory bonus
delegates) .6
The district court granted partial relief by forbidding the use of the
five-delegate uniform bonus system, but it allowed the proportional bonus
formula to standJ On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia ruled that the entire victory bonus scheme was
unconstitutional.8 On rehearing en banc, the court of appeals reversed,
holding: 1) that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
did not require that delegates to a political party's national convention be
apportioned among a defined constituency on a one person, one vote basis;
and 2) that the entire apportionment scheme was constitutional since it
rationally advanced the legitimate interest of the Party. Ripon Society,
Inc. v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1976).
The "one person, one vote" concept originated in the line of legislative
apportionment cases beginning with Baker v. Carr.9 In Baker, the United
each state's two United States Senators and 3 delegates for each Representative
in the United States House of Representatives from each state.
3. 245 delegates, or 11% will be allocated on the basis of a uniform bonus of
4.5 delegates (rounded to 5) to each of the 49 states which cast its electoral
vote for the 1972 nominee for President.
4. 312 delegates, or 14%, will be apportioned to the states on the basis of
60% of the electoral vote of each of the 49 states which cast its electoral vote
for the 1972 Republican nominee for President.
5. 50 delegates, or 2%, will be apportioned to states on the basis of one
additional delegate to each state which in November, 1972, or at a subsequent
election prior to January 1, 1976, elected a Republican Senator, Governor, or
Republicans to at least half of the state's seats in the House of Representatives;
but in no event shall there be awarded more than 4 delegates to a state.
6. 16 delegates will be allocated to the District of Columbia, 8 to Puerto Rico,
and 4 each to Guam and the Virgin Islands; all of which will constitute 1%
of the total delegates to the 1976 Republican Convention.
Id. at 371 (footnote omitted).
4. These 607 delegates represented 27% of the total number of delegates to
the 1976 Republican National Convention. Id.
5. Id. Plaintiffs alleged that the victory bonus delegate plan invidiously dis-
criminated against certain regions and states in violation of article II, section 1
of the Constitution and of either the fifth or the fourteenth amendment. Id. at
371-72.
6. Id. at 371; see note 3 supra. Plaintiffs did not object to the portion of the
formula which allocated delegates according to the electoral college vote of each
state. 369 F. Supp. at 374.
7. Ripon Soc'y, Inc. v. National Republican Party, 369 F. Supp. 368 (D.D.C.
1974).
8. Ripon Soc'y, Inc. v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 548 (D.C. Cir.
1975), vacated, 525 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
9. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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States Supreme Court held that plaintiffs' allegations that the malappor-
tionment of a state legislature debased their votes and denied them equal
protection of the laws presented a justiciable cause of action under the
fourteenth amendment. 10 In subsequent decisions, the Court consistently
ruled that the right of individuals to have their votes weighted equally with
those of other members of the voting public applied to the election of
both legislative representatives and other officials who performed govern-
mental functions." Nevertheless, the scope of the one person, one vote
doctrine in nonlegislative contexts has yet to be defined clearly. Although
the Supreme Court has extended the standard to party primary voting, 12
it has not ruled upon its applicability to the apportionment of delegates to
national political party conventions.'3
The lack of definitive rulings in this area may be partly explained by
the Court's traditional reluctance to interject itself into the affairs of
political parties unless unusually compelling circumstances warranted such
an intrusion. For example, in a quartet of decisions commonly referred
to as the Texas White Primary Cases,14 the Court early ruled that the
10. Id. at 209.
11. See, e.g., Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968) (voters in local
election have a constitutional right to an equally weighted vote where the elected
officials exercise general governmental powers); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964) (state legislative districts must be equally apportioned according to popula-
tion, and both houses of bicameral legislatures must be apportioned upon a population
basis); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (congressional districts must be
equally apportioned according to population).
In Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970), the Supreme Court
held that since the elected trustees of a junior college district performed general
governmental functions, the equal protection clause required that the trustees be
apportioned among the population of the district on a one person, one vote basis.
Id. at 56. However, the Court did note that
there might be some case in which a State elects certain functionaries whose
duties are so far removed from normal governmental activities and so dispropor-
tionately affect different groups that a popular election in compliance [with the
one person, one vote principle] might not be required ....
Id. In accordance with this caveat, two subsequent cases, Wells v. Edwards, 347 F.
Supp. 453 (M.D. La. 1972), aff'd inem., 409 U.S. 1095 (1973), and Salyer Land
Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973), exempted the
election of certain officials from compliance with the one person, one vote principle.
See notes 56 & 85 and accompanying text infra.
12. In Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963), the Court declared that a county-
unit system of voting in a state primary, which had the practical effect of diluting
the votes of citizens from the more populous counties, violated the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 379-80.
13. The applicability of the one person, one vote principle to the convention
system of nominating candidates was a question expressly reserved by the Court
in Gray v. Sanders. Id. at 378 n.10.
14. The cases popularly known as the Texas White Primary Cases are: Terry
v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) ; Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) ; Nixon v.
Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) ; Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
In Terry the Supreme Court found that the exclusion of blacks from participa-
tion in the primary election of the Jaybird political party, which primary effectively
decided who would ultimately be elected, violated the fifteenth amendment. 345
U.S. at 470. Smith held that the exclusion of blacks from voting in a Democratic
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exclusion of blacks from participation in party primaries was an abridgment
of the right to vote in violation of the fourteenth and fifteenth'" amendments.
More recently, however, in O'Brien v. Brown,'6 the Court expressed grave
doubts as to the propriety of the federal courts intervening in the internal
workings of the Democratic Party's delegation selection process.' 7 In
O'Brien, the Court stayed a court of appeals decision which had held that
the Credentials Committee of the 1972 Democratic National Convention
acted unconstitutionally in recommending that certain members of the
California and Illinois delegations not be seated at the convention because
the makeup of the delegate slates violated the party delegate selection
guidelines.' 8 The Court found little authority to support the lower courts'
intervention into the internal determinations of the party on the eve of its
convention 19 and noted that, unlike the White Primary Cases,20 O'Brien
involved no claim of racial discrimination in a state party primary.2 '
Furthermore, the Court was unwilling to decide the important constitutional
questions of justiciability and the applicability of the due process clause to
the committee's action without full briefing and argument. 22
Prior to O'Brien, several lower federal courts had addressed the issue
of the application of the one person, one vote standard to the apportionment
of delegates to a state political convention at which delegates to a party's
national convention were to be chosen. In Irish v. Democratic-Farmer-
Labor Party,23 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the
one person, one vote principle need only be applied at the party's precinct
fifteenth amendment even though the exclusion was by resolution of the party's
state convention. 321 U.S. at 765. In Nixon v. Condon, the executive committee of
the Texas Democratic Party, acting pursuant to a state statute which gave every
political party in the state the power to set membership qualifications, excluded
blacks from participation in primary elections. The Supreme Court held such action
to be state action in violation of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. 286 U.S.
at 89. In Nixon v. Herndon, a Texas state statute barring blacks from participation in
the Democratic Party primary was held to violate the fourteenth amendment. 273
U.S. at 541. The Court has clearly stated that its holdings in the White Primary
Cases would extend to all primaries. See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 318
(1941).
15. The fifteenth amendment provides in pertinent part: "The right of citizens
of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States
or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." U.S.
CONST. amend. XV.
16. 409 U.S. 1 (1972).
17. Id. at 4-15.
18. Id. at 3.
19. Id. at 4 n.1. The petitions were filed with the Court 4 days prior to the
opening of the convention. Id. at 3.
20. See notes 14 & 15 and accompanying text supra.
21. 409 U.S. at 4 n.1.
22. Id. at 4-5. The Court was not confronted with the issue of whether the one
person, one vote standard applied to delegate apportionment. In a dissenting opinion,
Justice Marshall stated that the excluded delegates' arguments were essentially that
the party's refusal to seat them was a denial of due process and that the voters
who elected them were being denied the right to full participation in the electoral
process. Id. at 6-7 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
23. 399 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1968).
1975-19761
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level.2 4 Similarly, in Smith v. State Executive Committee,2 5 the District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia ruled that because the one
person, one vote rule was observed at the lower levels of the delegate
selection process, there would be no extension of the rule to reapportion the
state's delegation to the 1968 Democratic National Convention. 26
However, in Maxey v. Washington State Democratic Committee,2 7
the District Court for the Western District of Washington adopted a posi-
tion contrary to that taken by the courts in Irish and Smith. The Maxey
court held that the principle of one person, one vote applied to the appor-
tionment of delegates to a state political convention which selected national
convention delegates.2 8 The court asserted that the practice of allocating
five delegate votes to each county, regardless of population, and awarding
bonus delegates to counties that voted for the Democratic candidate in the
past presidential election violated the equal protection clause.2 9 The court
reasoned that the one person, one vote principle must apply to "[a]l1
integral phases of the state-created presidential-election process . . .- 0
Two recent District of Columbia Circuit cases have dealt with the
apportionment of delegates to a national political convention. In Georgia
v. National Democratic Party,81 the court held that because the con-
stituency of a delegate to a national political convention is composed only of
those voters within his state who are of similar political persuasion, the
use of population as the sole basis for delegate apportionment to the 1972
Democratic National Convention did not satisfy the fourteenth amendment. 2
Shortly thereafter, in Bode v. National Democratic Party,33 the court re-
jected plaintiffs' contentions that the delegates allocation formula of the 1972
Democratic National Convention, which was based upon past party voting
(46%) and states' electoral college strength (54%), violated the equal
protection requirement, and that the proper basis for delegate allocation was
party voting in previous presidential elections. 34 Reasoning that all voters
"to the extent that they are given alternative slates by the two major parties
24. Id. at 120.
25. 288 F. Supp. 371 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
26. Id. at 377.
27. 319 F. Supp. 673 (W.D. Wash. 1970).
28. Id. at 681-82.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 679. The court stated that the nominating phase of the presidential
election process is critical, and often determinative of the entire election. Id. The
court further observed that if political equality in the voting booth extends to all
phases of the state election, it must apply to the nomination stage, whether that stage
is a primary or a convention. Id. The court explained that
[a] contrary result would permit evasion of the one person, one vote principle
announced in Gray [v. Sanders] by simply substituting a weighted-voting or
unit-voting convention for the primary elections system of nominations . ...
Id.
31. 447 F.2d 1271 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971).
32. Id. at 1279-80.
33. 452 F.2d 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1019 (1972).
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have a stake in the nominating process of the parties,"35 the court found that
population, as measured by the electoral college standard 6 and prior party
voting, would seem to constitute a proper measure of the Democratic
Party's constituency. 7
It was within this historical framework 38 that the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia assumed the task of further refining the rela-
tionship between equal protection and one person, one vote principle in
the context of apportionment of delegates to a national political convention.
Judge McGowan, writing for the court, 9 dealt initially with preliminary
issues of standing, state action, and justiciability.
First, while determining that the individual plaintiffs had standing
to bring the instant action,40 the Ripon court declined to rule on the
standing of the Society, 41 noting that its presence in the case would not
"lessen the controversy, or blur the presentation of the issues .... "42
Second, since the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment -
the constitutional provision upon which the plaintiffs primarily relied 48 -
can be invoked only when the state, rather than private individuals, has
35. Id. at 1306. The court admitted that the constituency to be represented at
a national convention was not readily identifiable, but felt that it would be improper
to limit a convention's constituency to those who voted Democratic in past presidential
elections. Id. at 1306-07. The court explained that because the constituency of a
convention includes, to some degree, the entire electorate, a proper constituency is
more than past party voters. Id.
36. For an explanation of the electoral college standard, see note 82 infra.
37. 452 F.2d at 1309. The court also found that the Democratic formula had an
independent rationale to support its use - it helped to maintain and enlarge party
appeal. Id. The majority in Ripon used this point as the cornerstone of its holding
that the Republican victory bonus formula was constitutional. See notes 65-72 and
accompanying text infra.
38. See generally Bellamy, Applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Allocation of Delegates to the Democratic National Convention, 38 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 892 (1970) ; Rauh, Bode & Fishback, National Convention Apportionment: The
Politics and the Law, 23 AM. U.L. REV. 1 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Apportionment].
39. Four judges concurred in the opinion of the court. 525 F.2d at 568. Chief
Judge Bazelon filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at 615-20; see notes 78, 85, 88 & 92
and accompanying text infra.
40. Id. at 574. 'The court found that all of the individual plaintiffs except
plaintiff Gillette, who resided in the District of Columbia, were residents of states
whose representational status would improve if their claims were to prevail. Id. at
572-73. Thus, these individual plaintiffs had a sufficient stake in the controversy
to bring the suit. Id. at 573.
41. Id. at 573-74. The court noted that the Society claimed no harm to itself
nor to any interest to which it was dedicated. Id. at 573. Furthermore, the court
stated that the Society had not made a strong case for being excepted from the
general rule that a party may not ordinarily assert the rights of others. Id. The
court explained:
[The Society] makes no claim that its members are uniquely, or even pre-
dominantly, injured. It gives no reason to believe that those members who are
adversely affected cannot assert their own rights. It seems, in short, merely to
have an Executive Committee whose "spirit of criticism" extends to the allocation
formula for convention delegates.
Id. at 573-74 (footnotes omitted).
42. Id. at 574 (footnote omitted).
43. 525 F.2d at 574.
38
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 5 [1976], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol21/iss5/6
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
engaged in discriminatory conduct,44 the court considered whether a
national party's allocation of convention delegates constituted state action.45
Recognizing that two recent Supreme Court decisions took a "different,
and arguably narrower view of what constitutes 'state action' than is
reflected in [the] Georgia decision, ' 46 the Ripon court expressed doubts
as to the correctness of its prior findings of state action in Georgia and
Bode47 and declined to decide the state action question because it would
not affect the outcome of the instant case. 48
Finally, noting that Georgia and Bode had been decided "in the wake
of Baker v. Carr and Powell v. McCormick, two decisions which ap-
peared to drain the 'political question' doctrine of much of its vitality, '49
the court declined to rule on the justiciability issue.50 Although the court
took cognizance of the admonitory language in O'Brien,"' it chose, for
purposes of the present suit, to pass over the justiciability question and
assume that defendants were subject to justiciable constitutional limita-
tions.52
44. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). These cases established the basic
dichotomy between discriminatory action by a state, which the equal protection clause
forbids, and private conduct, which the fourteenth amendment does not prohibit.
45. 525 F.2d at 574.
46. Id., citing Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (exclusion
of black guests by private club holding state liquor license was not state action subject
to the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment), and Jackson v. Metro-
politan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (termination of services by state-regulated
public utility was not state action subject to the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment) (footnote omitted).
47. 525 F.2d at 574. In Georgia, the court stated that since the action of state
parties in selecting their candidates and convention delegates was state action, the
result could not be different when those parties acted through their delegates at the
national convention. 447 F.2d at 1275-76. The court also observed that placing the
convention's nominee on the ballot was a necessary adjunct of the state's election
procedures, and thus subject to constitutional scrutiny. Id. at 1275-76; see notes 31 &
32 and accompanying text supra. The court adhered to its Georgia holding in finding
state action present in Bode. 452 F.2d at 1304; see notes 33-37 and accompanying text
supra.
48. 525 F.2d at 574-76. The court reserved the question of state action because
"plaintiffs' case must fail on its merits without regard to whether or not there is
state action." Id. at 576.
49. Id. at 577, citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), and Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). In Powell, the United States Supreme Court held
that the question of whether the House of Representatives had properly excluded one
of its members was justiciable. 395 U.S. at 548-49.
50. 525 F.2d at 577-78.
51. 525 F.2d at 577, citing O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1 (1972) ; see notes 16-22
and accompanying text supra.
Justice Rehnquist relied heavily upon O'Brien when he stayed the district
court's order in the first Ripon case. Republican State Cent. Comm. v. Ripon Soc'y,
Inc., 409 U.S. 1222 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice, 1972).
52. 525 F.2d at 578. The court stated:
We recognize that . . . "justiciability" [is] often regarded as [a] threshold
issue . . . . We see nothing illogical about passing over [it], however, and we
certainly do not lack authority for doing so.
Id. at 578 n.28. The court also noted that the justiciability question was closely related
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The court proceeded to deal with the merits of the case, considering
first the applicability of the one person, one vote concept to the apportion-
ment of delegates to a national party convention.53  The court noted that
although the conduct of a political convention may be subject to the equal
protection clause, this, in and of itself, does not mandate that the one
person, one vote rule be applied.5 4 Furthermore, the court maintained that
even if the one person, one vote concept were applicable, "the Equal
Protection Clause does not impose the same one person, one vote rule
upon all elected and decision-making bodies, even if they are formally
and indisputably organs of the state." 55 To support this proposition, the
court reviewed instances in which the one person, one vote rule was held
not to apply: the election of state judges;56 the apportionment of the
assembly of delegates to a state constitutional convention;57 and "special
purpose" assemblies whose decisions disproportionately affect different
groups.55  While admitting that these exceptions to the one person, one
vote rule occurred in "contexts too far removed from that of a national
political convention for them to be dispositive of the case before us," 59
the Ripon court nevertheless asserted that these instances did demonstrate
that "the principle of one person, one vote is not an absolute, to be
unthinkingly invoked every time two or more persons are selected to make
decisions on other people's behalf, even if the making of those decisions
is very plainly 'state action.' "60 The court declared that the constitutional
mandate "is not one person, one vote but equal protection of the laws,
and what [that] requires by way of representation in a given assembly
must depend on the purposes for which the assembly is convened and the
nature of the decisions it makes." 61
53. Id. at 578-79. Plaintiffs claimed that the constituency of the Republican
National Convention should be comprised of either the entire population of a state
or that part of the population that had voted for the Republican nominee in one or
more past presidential elections. Id. The court also examined plaintiffs' assertion that
the chosen constituency be given equal representation. Id.
54. Id. at 579.
55. Id.
56. Id., citing Wells v. Edwards, 347 F. Supp. 453 (M.D. La. 1972), aff'd nem.,
409 U.S. 1095 (1973). The plaintiffs in Edwards challenged the constitutionality of
Louisiana's scheme for the election of judges to the state supreme court. The judges
were elected from judicial districts of unequal population. The court held that the
concept of one person, one vote did not apply to the judicial branch of the government.
347 F. Supp. at 454.
57. 525 F.2d at 580, citing West v. Carr, 212 Tenn. 367, 380, 370 S.W.2d 469, 474
(1963), cert. denied, 378 U.S. 557 (1964). The West court held that the one person,
one vote principle did not apply to state constitutional convention delegations because
such conventions "only make proposals which can have no effect unless and until
they are ratified in another election" which comports with the one person, one vote
principle. 212 Tenn. at 380, 370 S.W.2d at 474.
58. 525 F.2d at 580, citing Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage
Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973); see note 85 and accompanying text infra.





Villanova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 5 [1976], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol21/iss5/6
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Next, the Ripon court explained that, traditionally, national party
conventions have never been viewed as providing a strict one person, one
vote representation to a defined constituency. 62 The court asserted that
its decision in Bode, expressly upholding the practice of allocating dele-
gates according to electoral college strength, supported the proposition
that national convention delegates need not represent a given constituency
on a one person, one vote basis. 63 Moreover, the court noted several
instances in which political party affairs, although conducted inconsistently
with the one person, one vote standard, would nevertheless survive judicial
scrutiny. 64
Stressing that such political party noncompliance with the one person,
one vote standard "deserves the protection of the constitution" so that a
political party can choose the formula of self-government best suited to
further its needs and strengthen party support, 5 the Ripon court appeared
to balance this protected right against the right to vote.0 6 The court
decided that, as between the right of meaningful participation in the
nominating process and the right of free political association, the latter
was in greater need of protection. 67 Accordingly, the court concluded that
the equal protection clause did not require that some defined constituency
be represented at a presidential nominating convention on a one person,
one vote basis.6 8 The court stated:
62. Id. at 581.
63. Id. at 582-83, The court stated:
In thus upholding electoral college apportionment we have in effect already
discarded the notion that national convention delegates must represent some
constituency on a one person, one vote basis. Electoral college apportionment
obviously is not related to any set of Republican Party members or adherents. It
bears some relation to total population, but only a very rough one.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
64. Id. at 583. The court noted:
The Republican Party does much of its business through a National Com-
mittee, which is malapportioned to the extent of being comprised of two members
from each state. Moreover, one of the members must be a woman and one a
man, a condition of dubious validity in respect of membership in, let us say, a
state legislature. A committee system of such malapportioned and predetermined
membership has historically dominated both parties down to their grass roots.
They have been excused from equal representation requirements on the ground
that they only administer the party's "internal affairs," but the distinction is not
a strong one.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
65. Id. at 585. The court further explained that
[t]he express constitutional rights of speech and assembly are of slight value
indeed if they do not carry with them a concomitant right of political association.
Speeches and assemblies are after all not ends in themselves but means to effect
change through the political process. If that is so, there must be a right not only
to form political associations but to organize and direct them in a way that will
make them most effective.
Id.
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[The equal protection clause] is satisfied if the representational
scheme and each of its elements rationally advance some legitimate
interest of the party in winning elections or otherwise achieving its
political goals. 69
The Ripon court proceeded to consider whether the challenged victory
bonus formula withstood this test.7 0 The court stated that the justification
for the electoral college formula approved in Bode carried within it much of
the justification for the entire formula in the instant case.71 Explaining
that the electoral vote indicates the "relative importance of a state to the
party in terms of winning the election,"'7 2 and that a convention's goal
is to choose a candidate capable of winning a majority in the electoral
college,73 the court reasoned that a bonus, or promise of a bonus, to those
states that vote for the candidate may help to win a state for the party or
keep it in the party camp.7 4 Therefore, the court concluded, as the formula
seeks to advance the legitimate Republican Party interests of increasing its
chances for victory and strengthening party cohesiveness, the formula is
rational, and not violative of the equal protection clause.7 5
With its decision in Ripon, the District of Columbia Circuit seemingly
departed from the position it previously took in Georgia76 and Bode.77
Chief Judge Bazelon78 and several commentators 79 have asserted that the
core of the court's rulings in Georgia and Bode was that even though a
political party may vary the one person, one vote principle and apportion
some delegates on the basis of a state's electoral college strength, it may
69. Id. at 586-87.
70. Id. at 587-89.
71. Id. at 587.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. The court explained:
As between two states of equal electoral importance, a party could more profitably
focus its attention on the one in which it has a chance of victory. This purpose
we think is rationally served by the victory bonus system. A state which has gone
Republican in the past may do so again. If electoral college apportionment
weights the vote of the states according to the value of the prize, the victory
bonus system does the same according to the likelihood of winning it.
The victory bonus system may help to keep a state in the Republican camp
not only by orienting party policies to that state's interests, but also by providing
a reward and incentive for the efforts of that state's party organization.
Id.
75. Id. at 588.
76. For a discussion of Georgia, see notes 31 & 32 and accompanying text supra.
77. For a discussion of Bode, see notes 33-37 and accompanying text supra.
78. Ripon Soc'y v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 548, 563 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(opinion of Bazelon, C.J., prior to rehearing en banc).
79. Apportionment, supra note 38, at 23-25. Note, Bode v. National Democratic
Party: Apportionment of Delegates to National Political Conventions, 85 HARV. L.
REv. 1460 (1972).
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not apportion delegates solely upon the basis of a state's population.8 0
Bode further established that a political party may also deviate from the
one person, one vote principle and allocate a portion of its delegates on a
one party adherent, one vote scheme based upon a state's voting record
in previous elections.8 ' Under this narrow reading, the thrust of Georgia
and Bode was to limit a political party's discretion to apportion delegates
to a scheme which measured a party's constituency on the basis of a
mixture of electoral college strength or total population and previous party
voting. Consequently, while a party is not required to apportion its dele-
gates on a one person, one vote basis or on a one Democrat (Republican),
one vote basis, the party must in some way apportion delegates equally
among its potential constituency.
It is submitted that the Ripon court, in upholding the instant victory
bonus plan, has disregarded this notion and relied upon the alternative
basis of the holding in Bode. The court in Bode approved the use of the
electoral college model in apportioning party delegates primarily because
of the college's constitutional status.8 2 As an alternative justifiication, the
court stated that the use of the electoral college analogy was supported
by the party's right to exercise its judgment, and to adopt a plan of
delegate allocation which would maintain and enlarge party appeal on
a national scale.83 However, the Bode court also noted that the Democratic
formula challenged in that case could not be "held on the basis of any
data submitted . . . to concentrate power in the convention on so unrepre-
sentative a basis as to cause the candidates to fail to give the electorate
an opportunity, insofar as the nominating process is involved, to govern
themselves through the exercise of the right to vote."84 Thus, the Ripon
court apparently disregarded this discussion in Bode and justified the
80. The Georgia court stated:
[T]he imposition of a population-based criterion would constitute a departure
from the equal representation standard underlying the reapportionment cases.
It should be too plain to admit of serious doubt that a population index imposed
as the sole criterion on Democratic Party delegate selections would lead, on the
one hand, to overrepresentation of Democrats residing in states in which the
voters are of a heavily Republican persuasion. Likewise it would lead, on the
other hand, to underrepresentation of Democrats in the predominantly Demo-
cratic states.
447 F.2d at 1278-79.
81. 452 F.2d at 1309.
82. Id. at 1307-08., The Court stated:
Under Article II of the Constitution, the electoral college is composed of
members from each State equal in number to the Senators and Representatives
in the House to which the State is entitled. . . . The [Supreme] Court has
never held ...that it is an impermissible departure from [the one person, one
vote] theory to permit the electoral college analogy to have some part in the
allocation of delegates to a national convention which is to nominate candidates ...
for President and Vice-President, whose very elections are to be made by the
electoral college.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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Party's use of the patently malapportioned scheme 85 by relying upon other
language in Bode which upheld the use of the electoral college analogy
as an exercise of a party's right to adopt a delegate allocation plan best
suited to its needs.
It is further submitted that the result reached under the majority's
balancing of the one person, one vote principle against the first amendment
rights of political parties is open to question.8, While the majority assumed
for purposes of its decision that the apportionment of delegates to a
political party convention constituted state action,8 7 Chief Judge Bazelon
suggested in his dissent that the majority failed to recall this assumption
85. The malapportionment of the victory bonus plan was exemplified by data
presented by the plaintiffs:
[E]ach delegate from Florida, under the victory bonus scheme, would represent
28,148 1972 Republican votes for President while each delegate from the District
of Columbia would represent 2,515 such votes . . . . [Elach delegate from Penn-
sylvania [would represent] 25,181 1968-71 Republican votes while each delegate
from Alaska [would represent] 2,089 of such votes . . . . As applied in terms of
the 1972 election, each delegate from Massachusetts would represent 132,306
citizens while each delegate from Alaska would represent 17,775 citizens.
525 F.2d at 550 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (opinion of Bazelon, C.J., prior to rehearing
en banc).
Chief Judge Bazelon critized the majority's acceptance of the Republican
Party's argument that the delegate allocation formula best suited the Party's needs.
He stated :
[T]he party itself seems to admit quite openly that the purpose of the victory
bonus and its consequent malapportionment is not . . . some sort of reward or
as a measure of "probable success" in capturing a state's electoral college votes.
Rather, the purpose is an ideological compromise designed to apportion power
within the party by means of a territorial discrimination.
525 F.2d at 619 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting). Under this analysis, the decision of the
court is seemingly contrary to the Supreme Court's condemnation of territorial dis-
crimination in the nomination process in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
The majority may also have mistakenly relied upon the "special purpose
assembly" exception to the one person, one vote principle as set forth in Salyer Land
Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973). In Salyer, the
Supreme Court permitted the directors of a water storage district to be elected solely
by the district's land owners whose votes were proportionately weighted according to
the value of their lands. Id. at 733-35. The Court reasoned that the district did not
exercise normal government authority and that "all of the costs of district projects
[were] assessed against the land ... in proportion to the benefits received." Id. at 729.
However, in the instant case, Chief Judge Bazelon noted in his dissent that "it does
not follow from the fact that a constituency of a state organization does not en-
compass all eligible or registered voters that malapportionment of the constituency
that does exist is constitutionally appropriate." 525 F.2d at 617-18 n.12 (Bazelon, C.J.,
dissenting). Furthermore, a close reading of Salyer reveals that the Court was con-
vinced that the persons whose interests were affected by the district were equally
enfranchised according to their stake in the district's special functions. 410 U.S. at
734. In the context of a political convention's nomination process, the constituent
voter's stake in this "special purpose" assembly is his vote. Under the scheme
approved in Ripon, voters, Republican or otherwise, are not equally enfranchised
according to their stake in the convention's outcome, but are discriminated against
on a territorial basis. 525 F.2d at 550 (opinion of Bazelon, C.J., prior to rehearing
en banc).
86. See notes 65-75 and accompanying text supra.
87. See text accompanying notes 43-48 supra.
1975-1976]
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in its discussion of the Party's first amendment interests.8 8 Asserting that
the assumption that state action was present required an analysis of the
first amendment rights of political parties different from that used by the
court, the Chief Judge stated that "instead of the rights of the association
being paramount, the rights of the members of the association become
paramount, and if distinct from the interests of the association, should
prevail."8 9 Accordingly, it is submitted that when a political party's
activities are viewed as state action, a voter's right of meaningful participa-
tion in the nominating process, if distinct from the interests of the political
party, would necessarily be paramount to the right of the party. Thus,
there would be no need to balance a political party's first amendment
interests against the interests of the party's constituents in having their
votes be of equal force at the convention.
The court's apparent reasoning that the many instances of party non-
conformity with the one person, one vote standard justify further non-
conformity with that standard in the delegate apportionment situation is
also open to question. 90 While it may be true that many political party
activities are conducted in a manner inconsistent with the one person,
one vote principle, the great majority of these activities may be charac-
terized as "internal affairs," and thus not subject to judicial scrutiny.91 In
contrast, what was at issue in this case was the fair apportionment of
delegates to a political party convention. This issue necessitated an
inquiry into the most external, public, and essential act of a political
party - the nomination of a presidential candidate. The arguably un-
democratic maneuvering of professional politicians in "smoke-filled" rooms
was not at issue here. As Chief Judge Bazelon pointed out in his dissent,
while a party's internal affairs may be conducted in an undemocratic
fashion, it is both proper and compelling that the one person, one vote
standard should apply to the nomination process. 92
The effect of the court's decision in Ripon is clear - absent a showing
of racial discrimination or a demonstration that only one party has a realistic
chance of winning a presidential election, federal courts will not intervene
to resolve intraparty conflicts. 93 Thus, the Ripon court has conferred a
judicial blessing upon a political party's exercise of broad discretion in con-
stricting voter access to its candidate-nominating activities.
Robert T. Carlton, Jr.
88. 525 F.2d at 618 n.13 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).
89. Id.
90. See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
91. See, e.g., Lynch v. Torquato, 343 F.2d 370 (3d Cir. 1965), where the election
of a party county chairman was held to be a matter of internal party management, and
a challenge to such election was held to be a nonjusticiable controversy.
92. 525 F.2d at 618 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - STATE ACTION - A LESSER STANDARD
OF STATE ACTION IS TO BE EMPLOYED FOR CLAIMS INVOLVING SEX
DISCRIMINATION.
Weise v. Syracuse University (2d Cir. 1975)
Plaintiffs Selene Weise and Jo Davis Mortenson brought suit in two
separate actions' alleging that Syracuse University unlawfully discriminated
on the basis of sex in the employment of faculty members.2 Weise, who
had applied for a position as lecturer, asserted that she was rejected in
favor of a less qualified male.3 Mortenson was terminated from her
position as Assistant Professor of English, although two male faculty
members, whose qualifications were allegedly inferior, were retained. 4
Plaintiffs brought suit in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of New York seeking relief for deprivation of their
constitutional rights under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1875. 5
The district court dismissed both claims for lack of jurisdiction, holding
that the complaints alleged insufficient indications of state action on the
part of the University to support the claim under section 1983.6 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and remanded
for further proceedings, holding, inter alia, that a less stringent state action
standard should be employed in claims involving sex discrimination, and
that the lower court was to apply the test laid down by the Second Circuit
1. Weise v. Syracuse University, 522 F.2d 397, 400 (2d Cir. 1975). Though
the cases were heard separately in the district court and separate appeals were
docketed, the Second Circuit consolidated the appeals for oral argument. Id. at 400 n.1.
2. Id. at 400.
3. Id. at 401. Though eventually hired by Syracuse University as a teaching
assistant, Weise was later terminated from this position, and after requesting con-
sideration for any teaching position, she was denied employment altogether, allegedly
because of her sex. Id. at 401-02.
4. Id. at 402. Although Mortenson held a Ph.D. and had had work published,
two of the male faculty members who were retained by the University possessed
neither of these qualifications. Id.
5. Id. at 400. Section 1983 provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
The plaintiffs also sought relief for a conspiracy to deprive them of the
equal protection of the laws under section 1985(3) of the Civil Rights Act of 1875,
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970), and for a redress of violations of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et. seq. (1970), as amended (Supp. V, 1975),
which prohibits sex discrimination in employment. 522 F.2d at 401.
6. 522 F.2d at 401. The district court also dismissed the section 1985(3) claims
for lack of jurisdiction because insufficient indications of state action were alleged,
and alternatively, because of insufficient factual allegations of conspiracy. Id. Plain-
tiffs' claims under Title VII were also dismissed by the lower court because 1) the
alleged discrimination occurred at a time when private universities were exempt from
Title VII; 2) the lifting of the exemption was not retroactive; and 3) the failure to
file timely charges with the EEOC precluded the Title VII actions. Id.
46
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in Jackson v. Statler Foundation7 for deciding state action claims.8 Weise
v. Syracuse University, 522 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1975).
In determining the sufficiency of the jurisdictional allegations under
section 1983,9 the Second Circuit was presented with the question of
whether the actions of Syracuse University, a private institution, con-
stituted state action.10 Private activity may be subject to constitutional
restraints in cases where either the degree of state involvement in such
activity has been found sufficient to satisfy the state action requirement,"
or where the private activity assumes a public function. 12 Generally, the
determination of whether state action exists requires a balancing of the
7. 496 F.2d at 623. In Weise, the Second Circuit was unable to apply the test due
to the insufficiency of the record. 522 F.2d at 407. For a discussion of the Jackson
test, see note 37 and accompanying text infra.
8. With respect to plaintiffs' conspiracy claims under section 1985(3), the
Second Circuit held that a finding of state action was not necessary because section
1985(3) "embraces a limited category of private conspiracies," and that, although
plaintiffs' allegations of conspiracy were "sketchy," they were sufficient. 522 F.2d
at 408. The court thus remanded the section 1985(3) claims for further consideration.
Id. at 413.
The court also held that, although the lifting of the exemption from Title
VII for private universities was not to be applied retroactively, the acts of discrimina-
tion alleged by both plaintiffs had taken place subsequent to the elimination of the
exemption. Id. at 409. Furthermore, the court determined that the plaintiffs had
complied sufficiently with the procedural requirements so as not to be precluded from
asserting their Title VII claims. Id. at 412-13.
9. For text of section 1983, see note 5 supra.
10. 522 F.2d at 403. Since the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments to the Constitution restrict only state and federal governments, a claim
alleging deprivation of rights guaranteed by these provisions must demonstrate "state
action." Note, State Action: Theories for Applying Constitutional Restrictions to
Private Activity, 74 COLUM. L. Rav. 656 (1974) [hereinafter cited as State Action].
In addition, a showing of state action is a prerequisite to an action brought under
section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. 522 F.2d at 403. For text of section 1983, see
note 5 supra.
11. There must be a "significant" governmental involvement in private activity
to support a finding of state action, with the judiciary undertaking such a determina-
tion on an ad hoc basis. Comment, State Action: Judicial Perpetration of the
State/Private Distinction, 2 OHio NORTH. L. REV. 722, 723 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as The State/Private Distinction]. For cases demonstrating the state involve-
ment approach, see Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (holding
that the actions of a private utility company, although connected with the public
interest and subject to state regulation, were not, without more, actions of the state) ;
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (rejecting the claim that private
club's racial discrimination constituted unlawful state action because the club held a
state liquor license); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961)
(holding that discrimination by a restaurant located at a public parking facility owned
by a government agency which received as rental payments a percentage of the
profits involved state action).
12. Although assumption of a public function by a private entity includes no
actual state control or involvement, constitutional restraints will be applied to a
private entity where that entity performs a "service to public in nature that it must
be treated as a surrogate of the state." The State/Private Distinction, supra note 11,
at 735. For cases demonstrating the public function approach, see Amalgamated Food
Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968) (permitting labor
picketing within shopping plaza, reasoning that plaza was equivalent to town's busi-
ness district); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (upholding right to distribute
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constitutional right asserted'3 against the nature of the interest of the
party who is allegedly causing a deprivation of that right 14 and the potential
burdens involved in applying constitutional standards to the activity in
question. 15 In general, a claim alleging racial discrimination will trigger a
less stringent standard for determining state action, requiring a lesser
degree of state involvement to constitute state action than in claims in-
volving other constitutional guarantees. 16
Although it is undisputed that the administration of state and munici-
pal universities involves state action, 17 the issue of whether state action
is present in the activities of private universities, so as to subject them to
constitutional restraints, is a recent one.' 8 Proponents have unsuccessfully
attempted to assert the existence of state action based upon the state's
regulatory power over university standards, 19 the state's financial assist-
ance to such universities, 20 and the state's interest in the public functions
which private institutions perform. 21 However, state action has been found
to exist where a private college had contracted to provide specific programs
(1944) (determining that, in conducting primary elections, Democratic Party was
performing a governmental function).
13. State Action, supra note 10, at 661-62; see Hendrickson, "State Action"
and Private Higher Education, 2 J. LAW & Enuc. 53, 55 (1973) ; The State/Private
Distinction, supra note 11, at 728. In assessing the challenger's argument, the court will
consider the nature of the constitutional right asserted, the context in which it is
asserted, and whether this right could be exercised through alternative means. State
Action, supra note 10, at 662.
14. State Action, supra note 10, at 661-62. In assessing the interest of the private
party, the courts will also consider whether the interest could be afforded protection
through alternative means. Id.
15. Id. at 662. Potential burdens which could result from imposing constitutional
restraints may weigh in favor of a finding of no state action. Examples of such
burdens include the cost and interference with the educational process that might
result from applying equal protection guarantees to college admissions policies, and
the administrative burdens of imposing due process standards upon school disciplinary
proceedings. Id.
16. It has been noted that the Supreme Court has rarely failed to find state action
present in situations involving racial discrimination. Note, Constitutional Law -
Student Academic Freedom - "State Action" and Private Universities, 44 TUL. L.
R v. 184, 185 (1969); see The State/Private Distinction, supra note 11, at 727.
17. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966).
18. Hendrickson, supra note 13, at 58. The first case involving state action in the
context of private universities occurred in 1962, with no state action being found
despite claims of racial discrimination. Guillory v. Administration of Tulane Uni-
versity, 212 F. Supp. 674 (E.D. La. 1962).
19. See generally Hendrickson, supra note 13, at 62-66. The claim that state
action was involved in the requirement that all colleges, public and private, file their
procedures for maintaining campus order with the state was rejected in Coleman v.
Wagner College, 429 F.2d 1120 (2d Cir. 1970). However, in that case the state in
no way mandated what procedures were to be employed, but only required filing.
Id. at 1122.
20. It has been held that state financial assistance, "without a good deal more,"
does not warrant application of the state action doctrine to private universities.
Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia University, 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)
see, e.g., Cohen v. Illinois Institute of Technology, 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975);
Blackman v. Fisk University, 443 F.2d 121 (6th Cir. 1971); Brown v. Mitchell, 409
F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1969) ; Furumoto v. Lyman, 362 F. Supp. 1267 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
1975-19761
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for the state. 22 Furthermore, in Coleman v. Wagner College,2 3 the Second
Circuit held that students were entitled to a hearing to determine whether
the university's disciplinary policy was in fact state imposed, in which
case state action would exist.24
In initiating its discussion of state action, the court in Weise reviewed
several previous Second Circuit decisions involving state action in con-
nection with private universities. 25 The court warned, however, that
previous decisions involving one form of state involvement and a particu-
lar constitutional provision would not be determinative in situations con-
cerning other forms of government involvement and different constitutional
guarantees.2 6 Thus, the court noted that while the forms of state involve-
ment alleged in Weise - funding and regulation27 - would probably
be insufficient to warrant a finding of state action if the case concerned
21. The theory that private universities perform a public function by providing
an education for the citizens of a state, and thus satisfy the state action requirement,
has been explicitly rejected. Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968).
22. Id. at 82. The state action requirement in Powe was an element of a due
process challenge to university disciplinary proceedings. Id. at 79.
23. 429 F.2d 1120 (2d Cir. 1970).
24. Id. at 1125; see note 19 and accompanying text supra.
25. 522 F.2d at 403-04. The court noted that state action was found to exist
where disciplinary proceedings were instituted against students enrolled in the New
York State College of Ceramics at Alfred University since the College was, in reality,
a state institution, although situated on a private campus. Id. at 403; see Powe v.
Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 82-83 (2d Cir. 1968). However, the same disciplinary action
taken against students from Alfred University's College of Liberal Arts was held
not to constitute state action due to insufficient government involvement in that par-
ticular college. Id. at 79-82; see note 28 and accompanying text infra.
In Coleman v. Wagner College, 429 F.2d 1120 (2d Cir. 1970), the Second
Circuit held that if the disciplinary policy of Wagner College, a private institution,
was state policy, disciplinary action taken by the college would constitute state action,
and students affected by such action would be constitutionally protected. For a dis-
cussion of Coleman, see notes 19, 23 & 24 and accompanying text supro. In a subse-
quent case, however, the Second Circuit distinguished Coleman in rejecting an allega-
tion of state action where it was shown that the Brooklyn Law School's disciplinary
code was not adopted pursuant to a state regulation. Grafton v. Brooklyn Law
School, 478 F.2d 1137, 1143 (2d Cir. 1968).
The Second Circuit also refused to find governmental action to exist where
an individual claiming deprivation of procedural due process and first amendment
rights had been dismissed from a federally funded research project in a private
scientific institution. Wahba v. New York University, 492 F.2d 96 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1974). The court reasoned that, although the project was
federally funded, the individual was not paid with federal funds, and that since the
governmental involvement was relatively slight, a research project of this nature
should not be subjected to judicial interference. Id. at 99, 102. In addition, the court
expressed its reluctance to interfere with the administration of such research projects.
Id. at 102.
26. 522 F.2d at 404, citing Wahba v. New York University, 492 F.2d 96, 100 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1974).
27. 522 F.2d at 405. Alleging extensive supervision and regulation of the
University by the state, the plaintiffs claimed that Syracuse University should be
considered a quasi-public institution, because it could not operate efficiently without
such governmental financial aid. Id. at 404. The public function argument as a basis
for a finding of state action was summarily rejected. Id. at 405 n.6. For a discussion
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discipline and the first amendment,28 the nature of the right allegedly
infringed in the instant case - the right "to be free from discrimination
on account of sex" - weighed heavily in favor of a finding of state action.2 9
Recognizing that a determination of state action "necessarily entails a
balancing process," 30 the court stated: "[A]s the conduct complained of
becomes more offensive, and as the nature of the dispute becomes more
amenable to resolution by a court, the more appropriate it is to subject the
issue to judicial scrutiny."3' The court reasoned that it was the presence
of these two factors - the degree of offensiveness and the possibility of
effective judicial redress - which accounted for the application of a more
liberal standard for state action in race discrimination cases. 32 However,
while holding that a "less stringent state action standard should be em-
ployed than in the discipline cases," 33 the court explicitly refused to
equate sex and race discrimination in terms of offensiveness.3 4 The court
concluded by remanding the case to the district court for a determination
of whether the complaints sufficiently alleged the existence of state action
under this lesser standard,35 in light of the five factors previously set
forth by the Second Circuit in Jackson v. Statler Foundation:36
(1) the degree to which the "private" organization is dependent on
governmental aid; (2) the extent and intrusiveness of the govern-
mental regulatory scheme; (3) whether that scheme connotes govern-
ment approval of the activity or whether the assistance is merely
provided to all without such connotation; (4) the extent to which the
organization serves a public function or acts as a surrogate for the
State; (5) whether the organization has legitimate claims to recogni-
28. Id. at 405. For a short history of such claims in the Second Circuit, see note
25 supra. It is also likely that these forms of state involvement would be insufficient
to establish state action if the case involved a due process claim. See, e.g., Wahba
v. New York University, 492 F.2d 96 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1974).
In comparing factually similar cases, a recent commentator has noted that, in cases
involving racial discrimination in private schools, state action has been found to exist,
while in cases involving due process, state action was not found. The State/Private
Distinction, supra note 11, at 727. The court also noted that, in cases involving claims
other than discrimination, the state regulation generally must be related to the
challenged activity in order to support a finding of state action. 522 F.2d at 405,
citing Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 81 (2d Cir. 1968). But see note 25 and accom-
panying text supra.
29. 522 F.2d at 405-06.
30. Id. at 406, citing State Action, supra note 10, at 661-62; see note 13 and
accompanying text supra.
31. 522 F.2d at 406.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. The significance of the court's refusal to equate sex and race discrimination
is apparent in light of the "greater proclivity of the courts to find 'state action' in
racial discrimination cases." State Action, supra note 10, at 661; see note 16 and
accompanying text supra. An assertion by the court that an identical state action
standard was to be applied in sex and race discrimination cases would undoubtedly
result in more frequent findings of the presence of state action in sex discrimination
cases, thus potentially extending constitutional protection to a greater number of in-
dividuals victimized by sex discrimination.
35. 522 F.2d at 406.
36. 496 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1974).
9771975-1976]
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tion as a "private" organization in associational or other constitutional
terms.
37
The utility of Jackson's five factor test appears to be open to attack
for several reasons. For instance, while the lower court was instructed
to determine, on remand, the extent of state financial aid received by
Syracuse, the Weise court offered little guidance as to the amount or degree
of government assistance required for a finding of state action.38 Another
factor under the Jackson test, state regulation of the activity, has been
criticized as an improper consideration in evaluating state action, since
such regulation generally restricts rather than promotes the challenged
private activity.3 9 Furthermore, it has been argued that the United States
Supreme Court has rejected the employment of a "combination" theory,
such as the Jackson test, to determine state action. 40
In addition, the Weise court's failure to equate sex and racial dis-
crimination, despite the arguments of the plaintiffs,41 lends itself to
criticism on two grounds: first, the court's inconsistent application of its
own criteria42 for determining whether the claim alleged warranted appli-
37. 522 F.2d at 407, quoting Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623, 629
(2d Cir. 1974). Although the Weise court found the record to be inadequate with
respect to the first two factors - the substantiality of state aid and the extensiveness
of state control in the area of faculty hiring - the court indicated that state regula-
lation need not be directly related to the challenged activity if the state and University
"were otherwise so closely intertwined that they formed a symbiotic relationship
that could not be dissolved." 522 F.2d at 407 n.12 (citations omitted). The court
acknowledged that the third and fourth factors seemed to weigh in favor of the
University. Id. at 407.
As to the fifth factor, although recognizing that a private university maintains
an interest in preserving its private status, the court was unable to state, on the basis
of the record, that such an interest outweighed the offensiveness of the alleged conduct.
Id at 407-08.
38. 522 F.2d at 407. It has been suggested that, before state action can be found,
the state must become involved in the private activity "'to some significant extent.'"
State Action, supra note 10, at 673 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted), quoting
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
39. State Action, supra note 10, at 685-90. However, to find state action where
state imposed regulations caused the deprivation of constitutional rights appears to
be consistent with this rationale. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
40. The State/Private Distinction, supra note 11, at 729-30. In cases which
require a finding of state action, several types of state involvement are often alleged,
.with the hope of demonstrating state action under a "combination" theory. Id. at 729,
citing Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1974). However, the
commentator interprets a recent Supreme Court decision as indicating that where no
one theory advanced would independently support a state action finding, state action
is not present, especially where the state involvement does not directly relate to the
challenged activity. The State/Private Distinction, supra note 11, at 729-30, citing
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974). It appears, therefore, that
the "combination" theory employed by the Second Circuit in Weise is somewhat
contradictory, since it considers both the state regulation and the public function
factors. 522 F.2d at 407. A finding that a private entity assumed a governmental
function would seem to preclude the necessity of any actual government involvement,
since state action in such a context is predicated upon the concept that the. private
entity replaces the government. See State Action, supra note 10; at 660.
41. 522 F.2d at 406.
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cation of the lesser standard of state action, and secondly, the court's refusal
to apply this lesser standard to sex discrimination claims. While de-
nouncing class-based discrimination as particularly offensive43 and recog-
nizing that the issue of whether invidious discrimination had occurred has
been amenable to judicial resolution in the past, 4 the Second Circuit dis-
tinguished sex-based discrimination from racial discrimination without
offering any concrete reasons. Thus, in light of the court's analysis, the
retention of such distinction is somewhat surprising.
The Weise court's adoption of a less stringent state action standard
for sex discrimination claims while refusing to equate sex and race dis-
crimination seems directly analogous to the Supreme Court's approach
to claims alleging violations of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. In determining whether a state has denied persons the equal
protection of the laws, courts have traditionally employed a two-tiered
approach.45 In most cases, a legislative classification will be upheld if the
state can demonstrate that a rational relationship exists between the classi-
fication and some legitimate state object.46 However, in cases involving
fundamental rights or suspect classifications, the courts have applied a
strict scrutiny standard which mandates that the state's interest in making
the classification be compelling.4 7 However, in recent years, the United
States Supreme Court has apparently utilized an intermediate approach in
43. 522 F.2d at 406; see note 16 and accompanying text supra. The court illus-
trated the offensiveness of class-based discrimination by comparing the plaintiffs'
plight to that of students who were denied educational opportunities due to discrimi-
natory admissions policies. 522 F.2d at 405-06. In each instance, the court found it
especially offensive that, while all citizens support educational institutions through
taxes, a particular class was excluded from sharing in the benefits of their taxes.
Students who were denied admission to school on a discriminatory basis would be
deprived of the innumerable cultural, financial, and employment benefits commensurate
with the educational experience. Id. In the instant case, the plaintiffs were deprived
of the opportunity for further scholarship and research at a major university, which
are important aspects of employment in the educational field. Id. at 405. Courts
invoke a less stringent state action standard in discrimination cases in order to afford
greater constitutional protection against such offensive deprivations. Id. at 406.
44. Id. In addition to the offensiveness of the conduct, the court noted that, as
the nature of the dispute becomes more amenable to resolution by a court, judicial
scrutiny becomes more appropriate. Id. The court noted that, unlike Grafton v.
Brooklyn Law School, 478 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1973), where adjudication of plaintiffs'
rights would have required the regrading of examinations, or Wahba v. New York
University, 492 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1974), which would have required judicial inter-
ference with a scientific research project, the remedies requested in Weise were within
the usual scope of judicial comptence. 522 F.2d at 406.
45. See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 658 (9th
ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW].
46. Id. at 657. The judiciary has accorded legislative discretion great weight
under the rational relation test. Id. This was the test traditionally applied to sex
discrimination claims. Id. at 771.
47. Id. at 658-59. Under the strict scrutiny test, the burden is on the government
to demonstrate that the statutory means are necessary to accomplish a permissible
state purpose. Id.; see Loving v. Virginia, 338 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). Statutes seldom
pass constitutional muster when subject to the strict scrutiny standard. See Gunther,
Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972).
52
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determining the validity of sex-based classifications. 48 The landmark case
of Reed v. Reed49 has been interpreted as initiating a "means-focused" equal
protection analysis5° under which the state must show that the means
utilized bear a "fair and substantial" 51 rather than merely a "rational"52
relationship to the objective of the legislation.53 Furthermore, in Frontiero
v. Richardson,54 a plurality of the Supreme Court labeled sex a suspect
classification,55 thereby invoking strict judicial scrutiny over state legislation
(or state action) which differentiates on the basis of sex - a scrutiny
which few challenged state statutes survive.5 6
Since Frontiero did not command a majority of the Court,57 and since
the Supreme Court failed in later cases5" to term sex a suspect classification,
48. See Gunther, supra note 47, at 21-37. This third equal protection test enunci-
ated by the Supreme Court has been characterized as falling somewhere between the
rational relation and strict scrutiny tests. Id., citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972), James v. Strange, 405 U.S. 128 (1972), and Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971);
see 7 CREIGHTON L. RaV. 69 (1973); 6 CREIGHTON L. REV. 393 (1972).
49. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). In Reed, the Court held that a state intestacy statute
which gave preference to males as administrators of decedents' estates was violative
of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 76.
50. Gunther, supra note 47, at 20-29.
51. 404 U.S. at 76, citing F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415
(1920). Professor Gunther has indicated that, in Reed, the means did appear to
contribute substantially to the state purpose, and that the result can therefore be
explained only by imputing "some special suspicion of sex-related means." Gunther,
supra note 47, at 34.
52. In contrasting "means-focused" equal protection with the traditional "rational"
relationship approach, Gunther observed that, under the rational relation test, the
Supreme Court traditionally has accorded great deference to legislative determinations
by requiring only minimal rationality. See Gunther, supra note 47, at 18-20. However,
the "means-focused" equal protection analysis, which requires that "legislative classi-
fications have a substantial relationship to legislative purposes," is characterized by
Professor Gunther as raising the level of scrutiny from "virtual abdication to genuine
judicial inquiry." Id. at 20-24.
53. It should be noted, however, that some commentators believe that, in Reed,
the Supreme Court did not invoke a new standard of equal protection with respect to
sex-based discrimination claims, but merely employed the traditional rational relation
test. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 45, at 769-71; see, e.g., 5 AKRON
L. REv. 251, 256 (1972).
54. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
55. Id. at 682.
56. See note 47 supra. Chief Justice Burger has stated that the compelling state
interest test is almost never met. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
57. Justice Brennan authored the plurality opinion, which held sex to be a suspect
classification; he was joined by Justices Douglas, Marshall, and White. 411 U.S. at
678-91. Justice Stewart concurred on the basis that the statutory presumption con-
stituted "invidious discrimination." Id. at 691 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice
Powell concurred, contending that the rational relation test should properly be em-
ployed, and that the statute did not satisfy this test. Id. at 691-92 (Powell, J., con-
curring). Justice Powell refused to identify sex as a suspect classification, reasoning
that a judicial determination of the issue would intrude upon the legislative function
involved in ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment. Id. at 692. Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Blackmun joined in Powell's concurring opinion. Id. at 691.
Justice Rehnquist, the sole dissenter, claimed that the statute was constitutional under
the rational relation test. Id. at 691 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
58. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S.




Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1976
1975-1976] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 981
the judicial approach to sex discrimination claims has been characterized
as uncertain and indefinite;59 indeed, some maintain that judicial action
to the present has been inadequate. 60 Lower court decisions on the state
and federal level have generally reflected the uncertainty of the Supreme
Court's position,6 1 although several federal district courts 2 and a state
supreme court 3 have rendered opinions labeling sex a suspect classification.
The intermediate approach of the Weise court subjects it to criticism
similar to that which has been directed toward the Supreme Court's failure
to label sex a suspect classification. Advocates of classifying sex as suspect
have contended that sex, like race, is an irrational basis of classification
with respect to most legitimate state interests." In addition, sex, like
classifications to be unconstitutional under the rational relation test, and refused to
affirmatively label sex a suspect classification. Stanton, supra at 14; Wiesenfeld, supra
at 651. The uncertainty of the Supreme Court's approach to sex discrimination claims
is demonstrated in particular by the Wiesenfeld decision, in which Justice Brennan,
who had labeled sex classifications suspect in Frontiero, wrote the majority opinion
which did not hold sex to be suspect. See Wiesenfeld, supra.
59. See Gunther, supra note 47, at 34. See generally 7 CREIGHiTON L. RaV. 69
(1973); 10 GA. ST. B.J. 493 (1974).
60. Characterizations of the Supreme Court decisions in the sex discrimination
area have ranged from acceptable to inexcusably poor. Johnstone, Sex Discrimination
and the Supreme Court 1971-1974, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 617, 688-92 (1974). It has been
urged that sex be declared a suspect classification in order to resolve the uncertainty
of the law surrounding sex discrimination and to accord the rights of women greater
legal protection. 10 GA. ST. B.J. 493, 499 (1974). See also 7 CREIGaToN L. Rv. 69,
76 (1973) ; 14 WASHBURN L.J. 127, 131 (1975).
61. See 14 WASHBURN L.J. 127, 129 (1975). In sex discrimination cases involv-
ing an equal protection challenge, courts have applied either the strict scrutiny
standard, the intermediate test, or the rational relation test. Id. at 129 n.15 and cases
cited therein; see, e.g., Brenden v. Independent School Dist., 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir.
1973) (rational relation test); Eslinger v. Thomas, 476 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1972)(intermediate test) ; Stern v. Massachusetts Indem. & Life Ins. Co., 365 F. Supp. 433
(E.D. Pa. 1973) (strict scrutiny test).
62. E.g., Johnston v. Hodges, 372 F. Supp. 1015 (E.D. Ky. 1974); Daugherty
v. Daley, 370 F. Supp. 338 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Wiesenfeld v. Secretary of HEW, 367
F. Supp. 981 (D.N.J. 1973) (three-judge court), aft'd, 420 U.S. 636 (1975). The
court in Wiesenfeld held that a social security provision, which provided certain
benefits for widows but not for widowers, was unconstitutional. Wiesenfeld, supra at
991. Noting that the statute could withstand the rational relation test, the district
court explicitly declared sex to be a suspect classification, and found that the statute
failed the strict scrutiny test. Id. at 990-91 ; see 10 GA. ST. B.J. 493, 499 (1974). The
United States Supreme Court upheld the district court's determination of unconsti-
tutionality, but did not label sex a suspect classification. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,
420 U.S. 636 (1975) ; see note 58 supra.
63. Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971).
64. See Ruben & Willis, Discrimination Against Women in Employment in
Higher Education, 20 CLEV. ST. L. RE. 472, 482-83 (1975). As Justice Brennan
54
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race, is an immutable, highly visible characteristic 5 which has been utilized
for centuries as a basis for, depriving an entire class of legal power. 66
Furthermore, the reasons advanced by the judiciary to explain their cautious
approach toward sex discrimination claims - the imminence of legisla-
tive 7 and constitutional68 . relief - appear as unconvincing in view of the
problems involved in revising statutes to reflect sexually neutral policies6 9
and the uncertain future of the Equal Rights Amendment. 70  Given the
possible delay in legislative relief and in light of the fact that a determina-
tion of state action dictates whether or not a claim of sex discrimination
will be adjudicated, 71 it is unfortunate that the Second Circuit bypassed
the opportunity to lend more affirmative support to a judicial remedy
for sex discrimination.
Despite the Second Circuit's refusal to apply to sex discrimination
claims the less stringent state action standard employed in racial dis-
crimination cases, Weise does extend the constitutional protection afforded
women seeking positions on the faculties of private universities, in that
a finding of state action under a less onerous standard will more frequently
subject the employment practices of private universities to constitutional
restraints. 72 It is uncertain, however, whether courts in other jurisdictions
recognized in Frontiero, statutory classifications often have relegated women to inferior
legal status without regard to individual capabilities. 411 U.S. at 686-87.
65. Justice Brennan explained that, since sex is unchangeable, disadvantages
imposed upon members of one sex violated the basic principle that "legal burdens
should bear some relationship to individual responsibility." Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677, 680 (1973), quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164,
175 (1972).
66. See 5 AKRON L. REV. 251, 258-59 (1972) and articles cited therein.
67. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e
et seq. (1970), as amended (Supp. V, 1975).
68. The imminence of constitutional relief is discussed in Justice Powell's con-
curring opinion in Frontiero. See note 57 supra.
69. Such revision would require comprehensive action on the part of Congress,
50 state legislatures, courts, and executive agencies. Assuming these governmental
bodies would be motivated to prohibit sex discrimination, the unavoidable time lag is
indicative of the infeasibility of this solution as an immediate remedy. See 5 AKRON
L. REV. 251, 261 (1972).
70. Ratification requires the approval of 38 states by 1979. See U.S. CoNsT. art. V.
At present, only 34 states have approved the amendment, making ratification uncertain.
71. See note 72 infra.
72. However, one commentator has observed that "even if state action were
applied to private institutions, faculty employment rights would not be within the
ambit of the fourteenth amendment's due process and equal protection clauses."
Hendrickson, supra note 13, at 65. Based upon an analysis of several cases involving
employer-employee rights and state action, the author concluded that even were state
action found, the government would refrain from interfering with the hiring and firing
processes of private institutions since these processes do not relate to the manner in
which the organization carries on its public function. Id. at 65.
This view was amplified by studies which indicate that, even where the
government has attempted to foster affirmative hiring programs in universities, there
was only 1% increase in the number of women hired. Bienen, Ostriker & Ostriker,
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will apply the Second Circuit's test. For example, in Cohen v. Illinois
Institute of Technology,7 3 a case decided subsequent to Weise, the Seventh
Circuit required that significant state involvement be present in order to
find state action in sex discrimination cases.7 4 In failing to find state
action, the Cohen court distinguished Weise by noting that, in Weise,
it was alleged that the University received so much state aid that it was
dependent upon it.7 Since Cohen did not explicitly refer to the lesser
state action standard set forth in Weise, whether the Seventh Circuit has
adopted this less stringent standard is questionable. However, even were
a lesser standard adopted, Cohen indicates that a substantial level of
state involvement must still be alleged in order to warrant a finding of
state action. 7
6
Obviously, the impact of a more liberal state action standard will
most likely be felt in areas outside the sphere of the private university.
A less stringent standard would enable courts to find the requisite state
action in the activities of clubs, institutions, and establishments which
presently bar women from admission. For example, in Seidenberg v.
McSorleys' Old Ale House, Inc.,7 7 a finding of state action permitted
women to patronize a tavern which previously prohibited women from
entering its premises.7 8 Though decided prior to Weise, the decision in
McSorleys' illustrates the extent to which a more liberal state action
standard could extend constitutional protections and aid in extinguishing
discrimination based upon sex.
WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. RPR. 3, 5 (1975). Moreover, faculty cutbacks find women
especially vulnerable due to lack of tenure. Ruben & Willis, supra note 64, at 484.
There are indications, however, that section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of
1875, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), may provide relief for women fired due to lack of
seniority or tenure under cutback programs. For the text of section 1983, see note 5
supra. One case has held that a public university employer cannot terminate an em-
ployee for economic reasons if the employee is a member of a class against which the
university had previously discriminated. Smith v. Board of Educ., 365 F.2d 270
(8th Cir. 1966). Though the case involved racially discriminatory practices, it appears
that a similar remedy under section 1983 would be available to women employees,
assuming state action is present. See generally Ruben & Willis, supra note 64, at 484.
In addition, although Title VII prohibits sex-based discrimination in em-
ployment, its applicability solely to employers of more than 15 employees leaves a
gap in employment protection which can be filled only by actions which require a
showing of state action. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., as amended (Supp. V, 1975).
73. 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975). In Cohen, the plaintiff alleged that she was
denied tenure at a private university because of her sex. Id. at 821. The court held
that state action was not present and, accordingly, the claim was dismissed. Id. at 827.
74. Id. at 824-26.
75. Id. at 827. The court noted that there was no allegation in Cohen of state
support of the University or state approval of the discriminatory practices of the
University.
76. See note 74 and accompanying text supra.
77. 317 F. Supp. 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
78. Id. To determine whether a club or institution is private or public, a balancing
approach is employed. See Comment, State Action and the Burger Court, 60 VA. L.
Rav. 840, 852 (1974). In Seidenberg, the court found the'existence of state action on
the basis of the tavern's state liquor license. 317 F. Supp. at 596-603.
1975-19761
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In conclusion, although the Second Circuit did not pursue the oppor-
tunity to apply to sex discrimination claims the less stringent state action
standard employed in assertions of racial discrimination, the court took a
significant step forward. The impact of Weise is as yet unclear. While
the holding applied only to the question of whether funding and regulation
of private universities by the state constitutes state action, a less onerous
state action standard might well be employed in other types of sex dis-
crimination claims. Also, other jurisdictions may follow the lead of the
Second Circuit in loosening the state action standard in sex discrimination
claims.
James Michael Ronan
CONSUMER LAW - INSTALLMENT DEBT - FTC RULE PROHIBITS
SELLERS FROM ACCEPTING CONSUMER CREDIT NOTE OR CONTRACT
OR PROCEEDS OF "RELATED" LOAN WITHOUT NOTICE OF PRESERVATION
OF CONSUMER'S CLAIMS AND DEFENSES PROMINENTLY PLACED ON
CREDIT INSTRUMENT.
16 C.F.R. § 433 (1975)
On November 4, 1975, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
promulgated Trade Regulation Rule section 433 (Rule), the purpose of
which was to preserve a consumer's claims and defenses against a seller
for breach of contract in many of the situations where they traditionally
had been cut off.1
1. FTC Trade Regulation Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 433 (1975). The Rule, which took
effect on May 14, 1976, was originally proposed in early 1971. See Proposed FTC
Trade Regulation Rule § 433, 36 Fed. Reg. 1211 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 1971
Proposal]. Hearings were held, amendments were made, and a revised proposal was
submitted in 1973. See Proposed FTC Trade Regulation Rule § 433, 38 Fed. Reg.
892 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 Proposal]. After a second set of hearings, the
final version was drafted and accepted.
The Rule reads as follows:
In connection with any sale or lease of goods or services to consumers, in or
affecting commerce as "commerce" is defined in the Federal Trade Commission
Act, it is an unfair or deceptive act or practice within the meaning of Section 5
of that Act for a seller, directly or indirectly, to:
(a) Take or receive a consumer credit contract which fails to contain the
following provisions in at least ten point, bold face, type:
NOTICE
ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT
IS SUBJECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH THE
DEBTOR COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE SELLER OF GOODS
OR SERVICES OBTAINED PURSUANT HERETO OR WITH
THE PROCEEDS HEREOF. RECOVERY HEREUNDER BY
THE DEBTOR SHALL NOT EXCEED AMOUNTS PAID BY THE
DEBTOR HEREUNDER
or, (b) Accept, as full or partial payment for such sale or lease, the proceeds of
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The cutoff of these claims and defenses had arisen in three different
types of credit sales transactions. 2 Typically, the purchasing consumer,
consumer credit contract made in connection with such purchase money loan
contains the following provision in at least ten point, bold face, type:
NOTICE
ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT IS
SUBJECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH THE
DEBTOR COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE SELLER OF GOODS
OR SERVICES OBTAINED WITH THE PROCEEDS HEREOF.
RECOVERY HEREUNDER BY THE DEBTOR SHALL NOT
EXCEED AMOUNTS PAID BY THE DEBTOR HEREUNDER.
16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1975).
The definitional provision reads as follows:
(a) Person. An individual, corporation, or any other business organization.
(b) Consumer. A natural person who seeks or acquires goods or services
for personal, family, or household use.
(c) Creditor. A person who, in the ordinary course of business, lends
purchase money or finances the sale of goods or services to con-
sumers on a deferred payment basis; Provided, such person is not
acting, for the purposes of a particular transaction, in the capacity
of a credit card issuer.
(d) Purchase money loan. A cash advance which is received by a con-
sumer in return for a "Finance Charge" within the meaning of the
Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z, which is applied in whole
or substantial part, to a purchase of goods or services from a seller
who (1) refers consumers to the creditor or (2) is affiliated with
the creditor by common control, contract, or business arrangement:
(e) Financing a sale. Extending credit to a consumer in connection with
a "Credit Sale" within the meaning of the Truth in Lending Act and
Regulation Z.
(f) Contract. Any oral or written agreement, formal or informal, be-
tween a creditor and a seller, which contemplates or provides for
cooperative or concerted activity in connection with the sale of goods
or services to consumers or the financing thereof.
(g) Business arrangement. Any understanding, procedure, course of
dealing, or arrangement, formal or informal, between a creditor and
a seller, in connection with the sale of goods or services to con-
sumers or the financing thereof.
(h) Credit card issuer. A person who extends to cardholders the right
to use a credit card in connection with purchases of goods or services.
(i) Consumer credit contract. Any instrument which evidences or
embodies a debt arising from a "Purchase Money Loan" transaction
or a "financed sale" as defined in paragraphs (d) and (e).
(j) Seller. A person who, in the ordinary course of business, sells or
leases goods or services to consumers.
Id. § 433.1.
A proposed amendment to section 433.2 would extend the application of the
Rule to purchase money loans, as defined in section 433.1. See Proposed Amendment
to FTC Trade Regulation Rule § 433, 40 Fed. Reg. 53530 (1975).
2. For an overview of consumer credit transactions, see Comment, Consumer
Protection - The Role of Cut-Off Devices in Consumer Financing, 1968 Wis. L.
1975-1976]
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to obtain credit, signed consumer paper - either a negotiable note,3 or
an installment sales contract, 4 or both. This obligated him to pay off
REv. 505 [hereinafter cited as Cut-Off Devices]. In a credit transaction, the con-
sumer usually makes a downpayment and agrees to pay the purchase price, plus a
finance charge, in installments over a specified period of time. See id.
Consumer credit has experienced tremendous growth in recent decades and
is now a major method of providing consumers with goods and services in today's
market. Consumer credit in the United States increased from $21.5 billion in 1950 to
$137.2 billion in 1971. NATIONAL COMM'N ON CONSUMER FIN., CONSUMER CREDIT
IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (1972) [hereinafter cited as NCCF REPORT]. Installment
debt, in which the debt is repaid in more than one payment, comprises four-fifths of
consumer credit; most of the growth has occurred in the installment credit area. Id.
at 8. The FTC has recognized the major role of credit institutions in providing con-
sumer goods and services in today's economy. FTC Trade Regulation Rule § 433,
Statement of Basis and Purpose, 40 Fed. Reg. 53506, 53507 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as FTC Statement].
3. One method of incurring consumer debt is for the seller to take a negotiable
note from the consumer, wherein the consumer obligates himself to pay a certain sum
of money to the holder or to his order. Comment, Consumer Defenses and Financers
as Holders in Due Course, 4 CONN. L. REv. 83, 84-85 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Consumer Defenses]. The note is considered a negotiable instrument within the mean-
ing of article three of the Uniform Commercial Code as long as it is signed by the
consumer, contains only a promise to pay a sum certain in money, and is payable at a
definite time to order or to bearer. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-104(1) [herein-
after cited as UCC].
The seller normally sells, or discounts, the note to a financer. Consumer
Defenses, supra at 84. As long as the financer takes it for value, in good faith, and
without notice of any defense against it or claim to it on the part of any person, the
law of negotiable instruments confers upon the financer the status of holder in due
course. UCC § 3-302. This protected status enables the financer, with certain
exceptions, to take the note free from the claims and defenses that the consumer may
have against the seller. UCC § 3-305. The reason traditionally given for the pro-
tected status conferred on a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument is that
its existence promotes commerce by insuring the free flow of commercial paper. See,
e.g., Miller v. Race, 97 Eng. Rep. 398 (K.B. 1758).
4. In addition to, or instead of, taking a note, the seller may obtain from the
consumer an installment sales contract which, like a note, obligates the consumer to
make periodic payments to the seller. See Cut-Off Devices, supra note 2, at 505.
When the seller assigns, or discounts, such an obligation to the financer, the functional
equivalent of negotiability can be conferred upon the contract and the assignee can
be insulated from the consumer's claims and defenses by the use of a waiver of
defense clause in the contract. This "negotiability by contract" is sanctioned by the
UCC as follows:
Subject to any statute or decision which establishes a different rule for
buyers or lessees of consumer goods, an agreement by a buyer or lessee that he
will not assert against an assignee any claim or defense which he may have
against the seller or lessor is enforceable by an assignee who takes his assignment
for value, in good faith and without notice of a claim or defense.
UCC § 9-206(1).
A typical waiver of defense clause found in an installment sales contract
reads as follows:
If the seller should assign the contract in good faith to a third party, the
buyer shall be precluded as against such third party from attacking the validity
of the contract on grounds of fraud, duress, mistake, want of consideration . . ..
NCCF REPORT, supra note 2, at 35. See also Dugan, Severance of Buyer's Defenses
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periodically the balance of the debt to his seller or to the assignee or
transferee of the consumer paper, a finance company or bank (financer).
By entering this "commercial paper market," the consumer was often
unable to assert against the seller's financer any of the defenses he might
have had against the seller for breach of the sale contract. 5 Consequently,
the financer could force the consumer to pay the entire cost of noncon-
forming goods or services.
Another common method of incurring consumer installment debt was
the related lender loan, whereby the financer loaned money directly to
the consumer.0 Consumers seeking credit were referred by the seller to
a particular financer. The financer, while related to the seller, was not
a party to the sale transaction, and, therefore, was not bound to the
consumer to perform under the sales contract. 7 Credit card transactions
involving three parties (card issuer, cardholder, and seller) constituted a
third form of consumer credit, and the terms of repayment to the card
issuer resembled those involved in related lender loans.8
Because the widespread use of cutoff devices encouraged predatory
marketplace abuses,9 both the legislatures and the courts in many juris-
Against Seller's Assignee Through Merger-Disclaimer Clauses: Circumvention of
UCCC Sections 2.403 and 2.404, 19 VILL. L. REv. 555, 583-87 (Appendix II) (1974).
The effect of these two cutoff devices is to assure the seller, who in many
instances depends upon the immediate sale of this consumer paper for his economic
survival, of a market. Financers will readily purchase these consumer obligations
because they impart immunity from the consumers' claims or defenses against their
sellers. See Consumer Defenses, supra note 3, at 88.
5. See notes 3 & 4 supra.
6. Faced with increasing judicial and legislative hostility toward the traditional
negotiable note and contractual waiver of defense cutoff devices (see notes 9-11 infra),
consumer credit transactions to an increasing degree have been financed by direct
loans to the consumer. See FTC Statement, supra note 2, at 53514-15.
7. See NCCF REPORT, supra note 2, at 35. The direct loan transaction has the
same effect upon the consumer as the traditional cutoff devices because the consumer
has an obligation to pay back the loan even if the seller does not perform as agreed.
8. FTC Statement, supra note 2, at 53516. See also NCCF REPORT, supra
note 2, at 38.
9. One court has remarked that "[u]nder the umbrella labeled 'free flow of
commercial paper' have flourished not only legitimate businesses, but the most per-
nicious rackets." Geiger Fin. Co. v. Graham, 123 Ga. App. 771, 773, 182 S.E.2d 521,
523 (1971). See also FTC Statement, supra note 2, at 53509, 53511. For documen-
tation of the hardships to consumers resulting from cutoff devices, see id. at 53509-15.
The typical pattern of abuse involved unscrupulous sellers who took the
consumer note or installment contract in exchange for inferior goods and sold the
consumer paper to a financer. The financer could then enforce the consumer's obliga-
tion, leaving him to seek relief against the seller for breach of the contract of sale.
The costs of litigation against an uncooperative seller and the possibility of the
seller's insolvency often made relief against him impractical. See note 16 infra.
Without the cutoff devices, the consumer could simply withhold payments due. See
UCC § 2-717.
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dictions provided protective measures for the consumer.' 0 The vast ma-
jority of states enacted some form of consumer protection in the installment
credit area, but the degree of protection varied substantially from state to
state."
10. See FTC Statement, supra note 2, at 53521; NCCF REPORT, supra note 3,
at 35. See generally Murphy, Another "Assault Upon The Citadel": Limiting the
Use of Negotiable Notes and Waiver-of-Defense Clauses in Consumer Sales, 29
OHIO ST. L.J. 667, 685 (1968).
11. The variations among the states as to the use of consumer notes can be
classified as follows: 1) those which apply to home solicitation sales and peddlers;
2) those which prohibit execution of negotiable instruments other than checks, but
leave open the possibility that an instrument issued in violation of the prohibition
may be acquired by a holder in due course; 3) those which prohibit execution of
consumer notes, unless they bear a conspicuous indication of their origin and the
note is not negotiable; 4) those which enable a transferee of a consumer sale note to
cut off the consumer's defenses only if the consumer fails to raise his claims or
defenses within a specific period of time; 5) those which provide that any transferee
of a consumer sale note shall be subject to all of the consumer's underlying claims
and defenses against the seller. Dugan, supra note 4, at 564 n.36.
Some courts have denied holder in due course status to the financer who pur-
chased an otherwise negotiable note when the financer and seller had a "close relation-
ship." Under this approach, the good faith required of the holder under UCC § 3-302
(b) (see note 3 supra) has been deemed to be lacking in situations where the financer
prepared the notes for the seller already endorsed over to the financer, or where the
financer exercised substantial control over the operations of the seller. See, e.g., Unico
v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967) ; Westfield Inv. Co. v. Fellers, 74 N.J.
Super. 525, 181 A.2d 809 (1962). The UCC defines "good faith" as "honesty in fact
in the conduct or transaction concerned." UCC § 1-201(19) ; cf. UCC § 2-103(1) (b).
Still, some courts, utilizing an objective standard, have concluded that proximity in
business alone will negate "good faith." See Hesse, Consumer Defenses, in 1975
CONSUMER CREDIT 9, 53 (Practising Law Institute ed. 1975).
Waiver of defense provisions are unenforceable under some state laws, while
other states require that the assignee provide the consumer with. notice of the assign-
ment, and that he receive no complaint within a specified period of time. This time
period ranges from 10 days in New York to 1 year in Wisconsin. See Dugan, supra
note 4, at 564 n.38. The 1968 Uniform Consumer Credit Code [hereinafter cited as
UCCC] enacted by at least seven states, prohibited the taking of negotiable instru-
ments in consumer sales and lease transactions. UCCC § 2.403 (1968). As to the
use of the waiver of defense clauses, the 1968 UCCC provides two alternatives. One
alternative prohibits waiver of defense provisions altogether. Id. § 2.404, Alternative
A. The other alternative permits an assignee to escape a consumer's defenses only if
the consumer is given notice of the assignment and 3 months within which to make
a defense. Id. § 2.404, Alternative B. The 1974 UCCC eliminated the alternatives and
prohibited waiver of defense clauses entirely. UCCC § 3.404 (1974).
Some courts have judicially invalidated waiver of defense provisions in install-
ment sales contracts. See Fairfield Credit Co. v. Donnelly, 158 Conn. 543, 264 A.2d
547 (1969) (waiver of defense clauses contrary to general policy of protecting con-
sumers); Rehurek v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 262 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 1972) (financer
closely connected to seller lacks good faith as a matter of law) ; Quality Fin. Co. v.
Hurley, 337 Mass. 150, 148 N.E.2d 385 (1958) (invalid attempt to confer negotiability
on non-negotiable paper); Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967)
(financer substantially controlled affairs of seller and supplied installment sales con-
tract with assignment printed thereon).
Responding to the increased use of direct loans, seven states have enacted
legislation imposing some form of liability on lenders who are connected to the ulti-
mate sale by a referral arrangement with the seller. See Hesse, supra at 49. The
drafters of the 1974 UCCC also included a provision aimed at the related lender
situation. It states that in each of the following circumstances a sufficiently close
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Notwithstanding the trend in state courts and legislatures to restrict
the use of cutoff devices in consumer credit transactions, 12 the FTC rea-
soned that broad remedial action was appropriate. 13 The resulting Rule,
which characterizes the use of certain cutoff devices as an "unfair or
deceptive trade practice,"'14 reflects the FTC's recognition that such de-
vices permitted unscrupulous sellers and lenders to engage in abusive sales
practices to the detriment of honest merchants, 15 unwary consumers,' 6 and
the marketplace in general.'1
relationship exists as to subject the lender to the consumer's claims and defenses
against the seller:
(a) the lender knows that the seller or lessor arranged for the extension
of credit by the lender for a commission, brokerage, or referral fee;
(b) the lender is a person related to the seller or lessor, unless the rela-
tionship is remote or is not a factor in the transaction;
(c) the seller or lessor guarantees the loan or otherwise assumes the risk
of loss by the lender upon the loan;
(d) the lender directly supplies the seller or lessor with the contract
document used by the consumer to evidence the loan, and the seller
or lessor has knowledge of the credit terms and participates in
preparation of the document;
(e) the loan is conditioned upon the consumer's purchase or lease of the
property or services from the particular seller or lessor, but the
lender's payment of proceeds of the loan to the seller or lessor does
not in itself establish that the loan was so conditioned; or
(f) the lender, before he makes the consumer loan, has knowledge or,
from his course of dealing with the particular seller or lessor or his
records, notice of substantial complaints by other buyers or lessees
of the particular seller's or lessor's failure or refusal to perform his
contracts with them and of the particular seller's or lessor's failure
to remedy his defaults within a reasonable time after notice to him
of the complaints.
UCCC § 3.405(1)(a)-(f) (1974).
12. The FTC, recognizing the importance of uniformity in commercial law, noted
the lack of uniform and comprehensive protection in the various state approaches.
FTC Statement, supra note 2, at 53521; see note 11 and accompanying text supra.
13. FTC Statement, supra note 2, at 53510-11.
14. 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1975).
15. Honest merchants were thought to be at a disadvantage in having to compete
with the unscrupulous sellers. FTC Statement, supra note 2, at 53520, 53523.
16. The FTC viewed the traditional cutoff devices as resulting from an adhesive,
if not unconscionable, "bargaining" process evidenced by the following elements:
1) the use of boiler plate provisions on a take-it-or-leave-it basis; 2) consumer ignor-
ance of the effects of fine-print waiver of defense clauses, and of the concept of negoti-
ability in commercial paper law; and 3) the seller's overabundant market power and
commercial advantage. Id. at 53523-24. When the consumer sought relief, his ex-
pectation of obtaining a remedy against the seller was frustrated. Id. at 53507-12.
The FTC recognized, moreover, that the aggrieved consumer is often not in
a position to obtain legal recourse. Procedural difficulties, seller insolvency, pro-
hibitive legal costs, and difficult burdens of proof make individual affirmative action
by consumers impractical. Id. at 53511-12. Permitting the misperforming seller to
profit from the transaction, while forcing the consumer to bear the burden of the
seller's misconduct, often resulted in consumer disdain for the commercial and legal
systems. Id. at 53509, 53511.
17. Id. at 53509.
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The Rule requires sellers to place prominently upon the consumer's
note and/or installment sales contract a provision reciting that the con-
sumer can assert his sale-related claims and defenses against any holder
of that instrument.' 8 In addition, sellers who accept loan proceeds as
payment in a consumer sale must ascertain that a "related lender" who
made the loan to the consumer included a similar "preservation of defenses"
provision in the loan contract.19 The Rule creates an irrebuttable pre-
sumption that, in certain circumstances, a purchase money loan will be
deemed a loan from a related lender and thus subject to the Rule. 20 The
Rule prevents the aggrieved consumer's right to bring affimative action
against the financer from being cut off and gives the consumer a defense
to an action by the financer for the consumer's nonpayment. 21 However,
the Rule limits the consumer's affirmative recovery to amounts already
paid .22
18. 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1975). Congress has given the FTC the power to issue
cease and desist orders to prevent unfair or deceptive acts or practices. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41
et seq. (1970), as amended, (Supp. V, 1975). The Rule defines as an unfair or
deceptive act or practice, the taking, by a seller, of a note or contract or proceeds
of a related loan transaction without a preservation of defenses provision. The failure
of the seller to comply with the Rule will thus enable the FTC to issue immediately
a cease and desist order. 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1975).
19. Id.
20. Id. The 1971 Proposal did not deal with the related lender loan transactions.
36 Fed. Reg. 1211 (1971). This loophole was closed by the 1973 Proposal which set
forth nine indicia of seller-financer relationships that would give rise to a rebuttable
presumption that the lender was "related." 38 Fed. Reg. 892 (1973). See generally
notes 5, 7 & 11 and accompanying text supra. The Rule appears to have gone beyond
the 1973 Proposal by creating an irrebuttable presumption of relatedness whenever a
consumer is referred by a seller to a lender or the lender is formally or informally
affiliated with the seller. 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1975).
21. See notes 51-53 and accompanying text infra. See also FTC Statement, supra
note 2, at 53526-27. The FTC was apparently persuaded by the reasoning of the
Supreme Court of California in Vasquez v. Superior Ct., 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964,
94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971). The Vasquez court stated, in dicta, that a consumer could
take affirmative action against an assignee of his contract containing a waiver of
defense clause, even though the applicable statutory provision provided that the rights
of the consumer could be asserted only defensively. Id. at 824-26, 484 P.2d at 979-80,
94 Cal. Rptr. at 811-12. The FTC reasoned that limiting the consumer to a defensive
position by forcing him to withhold payments and await suit by the financer, would
involve at least temporary injury to his credit rating. Since, as a consequence,
aggrieved consumers might then feel compelled to pay, the policy behind the Rule
would be thwarted. FTC Statement, supra note 3, at 53527.
22. The FTC appears to have limited the affirmative action that a consumer
may take against a financer to rescission. The FTC noted:
Consumers will not be in a position to obtain an affirmative recovery from a
creditor, unless they have actually commenced payments and received little or
nothing of value from the seller. In a case of non-delivery, total failure of per-
formance, or the like, we believe that the consumer is entitled to a refund of
monies paid on account.
FTC Statement, supra note 2, at 53527. The prevailing view appears to be that it
would be unfair to subject the financer to the position of a seller or manufacturer for
purposes of product liability. UCCC, Prefatory Note at xx (1974) ; NCCF REPORT,
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A primary aim of the Rule is to reallocate the risk of seller non-
performance from the consuming public to the sellers and their financers. 23
While members of the consuming public were deemed to be incapable of
protecting themselves from marketplace abuses, 24 the FTC considered the
finance companies to be in an ideal position to effect a remedy. As financers
become more selective in choosing those from whom they purchase con-
sumer paper, the FTC expects many unscrupulous sellers to be driven
from the marketplace. 25 Confronted with the argument that the loss of
the financers' protected status would reduce the amount and increase the
cost of available consumer credit,2 6 the FTC relied upon economic forecasts
and reports from states having similar legislation 27 in concluding that any
reduction in the availability of consumer credit, or increase in cost to the
credit-seeking consumer, would be minimal, and would certainly be out-
weighed by the positive commercial and social impact of the Rule.2 8
23. FTC Statement, supra note 2, at 53523. Much commentary has been generated
concerning the inequity of placing the burden of seller misconduct on the consumer
by the use of cutoff devices. One court has remarked that "the finance company is
better able to bear the risk of the dealer's insolvency and in a far better position to
protect his interests against unscrupulous and insolvent dealers." Mutual Fin. Co. v.
Martin, 63 So. 2d 649, 653 (Fla. 1953). The FTC has noted that the financer has
greater access to information concerning certain merchants' activities, can utilize
contractual recourse devices to return costs of seller misconduct to the seller, and is
in a better position to litigate the matter if necessary. FTC Statement, supra note 2,
at 53523.
24. FTC Statement, supra note 2, at 53523; see note 16 supra.
25. FTC Statement, supra note 2, at 53520; see NCCF REPORT, supra note 2,
at 36. The FTC's policy of creating this unprotected financer status is aimed at
forcing the financer to police the marketplace. As their sources of credit are cut off
by exposed and unprotected financers, disruptable sellers will be discouraged from
continuing many of their predatory practices. See FTC Statement, supra note 2, at
53523. The FTC was persuaded that financers have full opportunity and ability to
detect and predict a seller's misconduct. Id. at 53518. The FTC reported:
The only effective means of control of these merchants is by making it in the
interest of the financing institutions to deal only with reputable merchants. This
can be done only by abolishing the financial institutions' opportunity to get free
of merchandise defenses.
Id. at 53519.
In addition, one commentator has observed:
As a policy matter, the answer [to the problem of cutoff devices] ...might be
designed to serve the interests of policing the marketplace by making it less
profitable to engage in practices which generate claims and defenses. In the
absence of meaningful consumer influence over sales operations, it might be deter-
mined that the effect of nonpayment of the obligations and assessments of damages
as set-offs would be most quickly and efficiently visited upon the seller by reaching
his source of finance. Such an approach ought to concern itself with the ability
of the financing institution to adequately protect themselves from losses, the re-
liability of those institutions to reform marketplace abuse, and the resulting costs
to the consumer in the form of high prices for both goods and credit.
Hesse, supra note 11, at 47-48.
26. FTC Statement, supra note 2, at 53517.
27. Id. at 53520-21. The FTC relied heavily upon a nationwide survey conducted
by the National Commission on Consumer Finance. Id.; see NCCF REPORT, supra
note 2, at 36.
28. FTC Statement, supra note 2, at 53520. The FTC reasoned that the available
credit that would be lost due to the elimination of the cutoff devices would be "poor
1975-1976]
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In view of the marketplace abuses which developed under the shield
of cutoff devices, 29 the Rule serves the salutary purposes of protecting
individual consumers and forcing nonperforming sellers from the market-
place. s° Additionally, it manifests federal administrative recognition that
the financers, and not the consuming public, should bear the risk of
merchants' inadequate performance. 31 The Rule may thus provide impetus
for more widespread, comprehensive, and uniform legislation by the states.32
Since the Rule should not seriously diminish the amount of available
credit,33 its anticipated effects are commendable.
Nevertheless, the ultimate efficacy of the Rule may be attenuated by
several factors. Due to limited resources, it may be difficult for the FTC
to investigate and enforce the sellers' compliance with the Rule.3 4 More-
over, the extent of the Rule's impact may be diminished by the continued
use of certain sales techniques left uncontrolled by the Rule. The Rule,
as enacted, shows a significant retreat from an earlier version (1973
Proposal) 35 in failing to deal with the liability of three-party credit card
issuers. 36 There is substantial support for the proposition that issuers of
credit cards should be subject to the credit card holder's claims and defenses
against the seller.3 7  Credit card transactions, like related lender loans,
credit" - the type of credit usually extended by disreputable sellers. Id. It has been
observed in connection with possible increases in credit cost that
spreading the costs of abolishing third party cutoff devices to all consumers in
the marketplace would be more than counter-balanced by the protections which
the consuming public will receive in the form of better goods and services.
NCCF REPORT, supra note 2, at 37.
29. See notes 9, 13 & 15-17 and accompanying text supra.
30. See notes 23-25 and accompanying text supra.
31. See id. See generally Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor-
Oriented Viewpoint, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 445, 469-72 (1968).
32. FTC Statement, supra note 2, at 53521.
33. See notes 26-28 and accompanying text supra.
34. Still, since it is unlikely that financers will deal with sellers not meeting the
Rule's requirements, it is arguable that the effect of the Rule will be widespread even
in the absence of direct FTC enforcement. See note 25 and accompanying text supra
35. 1973 Proposal, supra note 1.
36. The 1973 Proposal would have treated a third party credit card issuer much
like an assignee of a consumer installment sales contract. Id. § 433.2(d). The FTC
eliminated third party credit cards from the scope of the Rule for several reasons:
1) while the potential for abuse in that area exists, it has not yet occurred; 2) con-
gressional enactment of the Fair Credit Billing Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1666i (Supp. V,
1975), would provide sufficient protection to the consuming public; and 3) credit
card holders tend to be wealthier and better able to protect themselves. FTC State-
ment, supra note 2, at 53516-17; see Dugan, supra note 4, at 579.
37. See NCCF REPORT, supra note 2, at 38; Littlefield, The Continuing Demise
of the Holder in Due Course Concept, 79 CoM. L.J. 41, 43 (1974). The arguments in
favor of credit card issuer liability are much the same as those supporting elimination
of the traditional cutoff devices: 1) the issuing parties (usually banks) would be
better equipped to police the sellers; 2) they could obtain charge-back agreements from
the seller if claims did arise; and 3) it would be more equitable that such risks be
borne by the more powerful card issuers. UCCC, Prefatory Note at xix (1974). It
could also be contended that the waiver of defense provision in the credit card con-
tract is obtained by adhesive means or is contrary to public policy. FTC Statement,
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have presented a substantial loophole in legislation restricting the tradi-
tional cutoff devices.3 8 Although both the UCCC39 and the Fair Credit
Billing Act 40 preserve the cardholder's claims and defenses in certain limited
circumstances, the FTC's decision not to subject credit card issuers to
the Rule is surprising in light of its determination that broad and all-
inclusive remedial action was needed in the area of consumer installment
credit. 41
A second loophole has apparently been left open by the FTC in its
failure to prohibit the use of disclaimer and merger clauses. In a sales con-
tract, a seller can both disclaim all warranties in connection with the
sale,42 and provide in a merger clause that the terms of the contract
embody the entire agreement between the parties.43 If effective, 44 the
disclaimer and merger clauses operate to enable the assignee of such a
contract to enforce the consumer's payment obligation without regard to
defects in the goods sold.45 It appears anomolous, therefore, in light of
the purpose of the Rule,46 that the FTC failed to exercise some degree
of control over the use of such clauses.
38. Dugan, supra note 4, at 579. The comment to the pertinent section of the
1974 UCCC states:
The policies . . . of abolition of the holder in due course doctrine could be
thwarted if the parties could deprive consumers of their claims and defenses
merely by recasting assigned paper transactions into credit card transactions.
UCCC § 3.403, Comment 1 (1974).
39. UCCC § 3.403 (1974).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 1666i (Supp. V, 1975).
The 1974 UCCC provides that a credit card issuer who is not the seller of
the goods is subject to claims and defenses of the cardholder if: 1) the original trans-
action involved an initial debt to the issuer of more than $50; 2) the residence of the
cardholder and the place where the sale occurred are in the same state or within 100
miles of each other; and 3) the cardholder has made a good faith attempt to settle
the matter with the seller. UCCC § 3.403 (1974). The Fair Credit Billing Act con-
tains essentially identical provisions. See 15 U.S.C. § 1666i (Supp. V, 1975).
41. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
42. UCC § 2-316. Under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301
et seq. (Supp. V, 1975), numerous restrictions are placed upon the seller's ability to
disclaim implied warranties. See id. § 2308.
43. UCC § 2-202.
44. For a detailed discussion of the validity of merger and disclaimer clauses,
see Dugan, supra note 4, at 567-79. See also Performance Motors, Inc. v. Allen, 280
N.C. 385, 186 S.E.2d 161 (1972) ; Zwierzycki v. Owens, 499 P.2d 996 (Wyo. 1972);
note 11 supra.
45. Dugan, supra note 4, at 563. By virtue of the disclaimer and merger clauses,
the consumer has no claim or defense based upon defects in the seller's performance
against either the seller or his assignee. Id. at 566. It has been observed that use of
such clauses places the assignee-financer in a more protected position than that
afforded by the traditional cutoff devices:
[T]he disclaimer-merger clause, if effective, provides [the financer] with even
greater immunity from claims and defenses than that available under waiver-of-
defense clauses and the holder-in-due-course doctrine. Disclaimer-merger clauses,
unlike the traditional immunity devices, can operate even where [the financer]
was closely connected with the seller and had notice of the defects.
Id.
46. See notes 23-25 and accompanying text supra.
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The 1973 Proposal dealt with a third potential deficiency by requiring
that sellers attach a printed notice to consumer paper informing the pur-
chasers of their legal rights.47 This was finally rejected as too burdensome
upon sellers, and largely unnecessary in informing consumers of their
rights.48 Consumers can be made aware of their rights under the Rule
via the mass media - a method which may prove more effective than
attaching another printed page to the sales receipts and papers. Indeed,
the absence of an attached notice may even serve to further at least one
major objective of the Rule - the policing of the marketplace - because
once the financers lose their protected status they will no doubt refuse to
take consumer paper from disreputable sellers.4 9
The ultimate effect of the Rule upon both consumers and the market-
place appears to hinge upon the future use by disreputable sellers of
unaffected devices such as disclaimer and merger clauses and credit cards.
Unfortunately, the objectives of the Rule may be thwarted should these
unregulated devices become loopholes. In that event, further remedial
measures would be appropriate.
Robert Lee Dean
TORTS - WRONGFUL DEATH - RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH OF A
STILLBORN FETUS EXAMINED.
I. INTRODUCTION
There continues to exist a great disparity in the judicial treatment
accorded a recovery action for the wrongful death of a fetus' injured en
ventre sa mere (in its mother's womb).2 Originally, no right of recovery
for "prenatal"8 injuries was recognized by the courts. Although such
recovery was eventually allowed, the circumstances under which the right
was granted varied among the jurisdictions. At present, several bases
of dispute remain. This comment will explore the areas of greatest con-
troversy faced by the courts: 1) questions of equity in treating live birth
differently from stillbirth; 2) the issue of double recovery; 3) evidentiary
47. 1973 Proposal, supra note 1. The proposed rule would have required that a
notice, printed in the customer's own language, be attached to the sales contract.
The proposed notice would have told the consumer that if the goods bought were
defective, he could refuse to make payments to the seller or financer, or he could sue
for money already paid. It also suggested that the customer keep all receipts, report
any defects to the seller immediately, and consult with an attorney, local legal aid
office, or consumer protection office if not satisfied. Id.
48. FTC Statement, supra note 2, at 53525-26.
49. See notes 23-25 and accompanying text supra.
1. The word "fetus" has been medically defined as "the product of conception
from the end of the eighth week to the moment of birth." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL Dic-
TIONARY 461 (22d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as STEDMAN'S].
2. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 619 (4th ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as BLACK'S].
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problems of causation and damages; and 4) the interpretation accorded the
term "person" as used in the statutes.4
II. HISTORY
In Dietrich v. Northampton,5 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts introduced the principle that no distinct right of action existed
for prenatal injuries. 6 Though an occasional vigorous dissent would
articulate dissatisfaction with this proposition,7 Dietrich remained the law
for more than half a century. One explanation for its longevity was the
reluctance of the courts "to delve into the unknown world of the fetus,
an area clearly within the province of medical experts." It was not until
1946, in Bonbrest v. Kotz,9 that any jurisdiction squarely held in favor of
a right of action for prenatal injuries. In Bonbrest, the injuries allegedly
resulted from the negligent removal of the fetus from the womb.10 The
District Court for the District of Columbia noted that since the injured
fetus was viable," it was, by definition, incongruous to deny a distinct
right of recovery on the basis of the prevailing' 2 mother-fetus unity
doctrine.'3 Since Bonbrest, there has been widespread acceptance of a
4. In addition, there are older rationales for denying a cause of action for
fetal death which have caused problems in the past, but which are now perfunctorily
discarded by the courts. See, e.g., Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. R.
242 (1884) (denying action for wrongful death for prenatal injuries because of lack
of precedent and mother-fetus unity) (see note 6 infra) ; Libbee v. Permanente Clinic,
268 Ore. 258, 518 P.2d 636 (1974) (permitting action for wrongful death of stillborn
child after having rejected as reasons for prohibiting such action: lack of precedent,
mother-fetus unity, and fear of fraudulent claims). For a discussion of the mother-
fetus unity doctrine, see note 13 infra.
5. 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. R. 242 (1884).
6. Id. Mr. Justice Holmes formulated this position for this court based upon
two grounds: 1) the lack of precedent, and 2) the fact that any recoverable injury
could be pursued only in an action brought by the mother since a fetus was not a
"separate entity" until birth. Id. at 15-16, 52 Am. R. at 244-45.
7. The most noteworthy of these dissents is that of Judge Boggs in Allaire v.
St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900) (Boggs, J., dissenting), which
firmly articulated the view that a cause of action should lie in favor of a child who
had sustained tortiously inflicted injuries while a viable fetus. For a definition of
viability, see note 11 infra.
8. Note, Torts: Recovery for Prenatal Injury and the Wrongful Death of a
Stillborn Fetus, 8 TULSA L.J. 84, 85 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Prenatal Injury and
Wrongful Death].
9. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
10. Id. at 139.
11. Id. at 140. The term "viability" has been defined as follows: "Capable of
living; denoting a fetus sufficiently developed to live outside of the womb." STEDMAN'S,
supra note 1, at 1388.
12. See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
13. 65 F. Supp. at 140. The court expressed the mother-fetus unity doctrine as
follows:
[T]he assumption that a child en ventre sa mere has no juridical existence, and
is so intimately united with its mother as to be a "part" of her and as a conse-
quence is not to be regarded as a separate, distinct, and individual entity.
Id. at 139, citing Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. R. 242 (1884) ; see
note 6 supra. The court observed that, although the fetus is dependent upon the
1975-1976]
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cause of action brought on behalf of a child for its prenatal injuries.14
Unique problems are presented, however, when the injuries sustained
in utero result in death. 5 The application of a wrongful death statute
to permit recovery for prenatal death first occurred in Verkennes v.
Corniea.16 In Verkennes, both mother and fetus died during labor, al-
legedly as a result of the defendant's medical malpractice.' 7 In its recog-
nition of a cause of action, the court found most significant the alleged
fact that the fetus had been viable during labor, and that the deaths
resulted because the physician and the hospital staff failed to administer
the proper care and necessary treatment as complications arose during
the mother's confinement.18 The court deemed the viable fetus an in-
dependent entity that was owed a duty of care separate and apart from
that owed to the expectant mother. 19 Subsequently, many other jurisdic-
tions have been faced with the issue of the propriety of an action for the
mother for sustenance and protection during its development, the fetus is not a con-
stituent part of the mother. 65 F. Supp. at 140. The court's decision may have been
affected by the fact that the alleged tortious conduct occurred during delivery and,
therefore, the resultant injury was not prenatal as that term is generally defined. See
notes 3 & 10 and accompanying text supra.
14. See, e.g., Womack v. Buchhorn, 384 Mich. 718, 187 N.W.2d 218 (1971);
Labree v. Major, 111 R.I. 657, 306 A.2d 808 (1973). In Womack, the court relied
upon "the present state of science and the overwhelming weight of judicial authority,"
which favored the cause of action. 384 Mich. at 725, 187 N.W.2d at 222; see Note,
The Law and the Unborn Child: The Legal and Logical Inconsistencies, 46 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 349, 357-58 (1971). For an extensive list of jurisdictions which now
recognize a cause of action for prenatal injuries, see White v. Yup, 85 Nev. 527,
533-34, 458 P.2d 617, 620-21 (1969).
15. Under the common law, the right to bring a tort action died with either the
person of the plaintiff or of the defendant. Malone, The Genesis of Wrongful Death,
17 STAN. L. REV. 1043, 1044 (1965). Consequently, no cause of action was deemed to
exist on behalf of a living person who sustained injuries by reason of the wrongful
death of another. Id. This proposition is derived from dictum in Baker v. Bolton, 170
Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1808). In England, this gap in the common law was remedied
by the adoption of a statute granting a general right of action for wrongful death.
Fatal Accidents Act of 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93 (commonly known as Lord Campbell's
Act). The purpose of this action was to recognize the loss suffered by certain named
beneficiaries as a result of the "defendant's wrongful act, neglect or default." S.
SPIESER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 1:7, at 12-13 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as SPIESER]. Every American jurisdiction has followed suit and enacted a similar
statute. Id. § 1:8, at 13; Ausabel, Damages: Death of a Minor Child, 17 TRIAL
LAWYER'S GUIDE 155 (1973).
Death statutes properly fall into two classes: wrongful death and survival.
The former is a relatively new action intended to compensate those deprived of a
relationship with the deceased. Though the statutes vary among jurisdictions, the
beneficiary normally may recover for the loss of the decedent's future earnings,
services, and comfort. Survival statutes operate to continue an action the deceased
initiated or would have initiated if alive, and emphasize injury, pain, and suffering
incurred by the decedent between the time of the tortious act and death. Many jurisdic-
tions have formed a hybrid statute by merging characteristics of each type of recovery.
See Davis, Wrongful Death, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 327, 331-36 (1973).
16. 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949).
17. Id. at 366-67, 38 N.W.2d at 839.
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wrongful death resulting from prenatal injuries.20 As a result, several
areas of dispute have arisen.
III. BASES OF DISPUTE AMONG ADJUDICATING TRIBUNALS
A. Should Different Standards Be Applied When Prenatal
Injuries Result in Death Before Rather Than
After Birth?
Some jurisdictions deny a right of recovery for wrongful death when
the fetus succumbs to prenatal injuries before birth, while allowing the
right should the child survive live birth.21 In making this distinction, many
jurisdictions rely upon the same policy considerations and concepts of
justice that are applied in recognizing a cause of action on behalf of a
child who suffers permanently from tortiously inflicted prenatal injuries.
For example, in Endresz v. Friedberg,22 the New York Court of Appeals
held that there was no cause of action for a wrongful death resulting from
injury to a fetus, noting that the unborn fetus "is never faced with the
prospect of impaired mental or physical health" as is the surviving infant.23
Another justification which has been advanced for the maintenance
of this distinction is that, in contrast to the stillborn fetus, the surviving
child who is permanently handicapped as a result of its injuries will
extend the responsibilities of its parents both financially and emotionally
in future years. 24 Furthermore, the surviving child presents a potential
community burden if its parents are either unavailable or unable to care
for it properly.25 This result is clearly inequitable: if the tortfeasor simply
injured the fetus, he would be held accountable for his act; yet, he
would be relieved of responsibility if his tortious conduct resulted in the
death of the fetus. Thus, should death ensue, a wrong would be inflicted
for which there would be no recovery. 26
20. Such wrongful death actions have frequently arisen in the following context:
a young woman, pregnant with a viable fetus, is involved in an automobile accident.
As a result of injuries sustained, the woman delivers a stillborn fetus. E.g., Chrisa-
fogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 Ill. 2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (1973) ; Mone v. Greyhound
Lines, Inc.. .... Mass....., 331 N.E.2d 916 (1975) ; Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d
478, 248 N.E.2d 901, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1969) ; Cardwell v. Welch, 25 N.C. App. 390,
213 S.E.2d 382, cert. denied, 287 N.C. 464, 215 S.E.2d 623 (1975).
21. See, e.g., Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 248 N.E.2d 901, 301 N.Y.S.2d
65 (1969); Cardwell v. Welch, 25 N.C. App. 390, 213 S.E.2d 382, cert. denied, 287
N.C. 464, 215 S.E.2d 623 (1975).
22. 24 N.Y.2d 478, 248 N.E.2d 901, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1969).
23. Id. at 483, 248 N.E.2d at 903, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 68-69.
24. Carroll v. Skloff, 415 Pa. 47, 49, 202 A.2d 9, 11 (1964).
25. Cf. id.
26. Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14 20, 148 N.W.2d
107, 110 (1967). The Kwaterski court, holding that a viable fetus which received
injuries resulting in its stillburth is a "person" for wrongful death act purposes, noted:
Denying a right of action for negligent acts which produce a stillborn leads to
some very incongruous results. For example, a doctor or a midwife whose negli-
gent acts in delivering a baby produced the baby's death would be legally immune
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Though some support remains for live birth as a prerequisite for
the cause of action,2 7 the better view rejects it as artificial, unreasonable,
and illogical. 28 There is no valid justification for denying recovery for a
tortiously killed unborn child simply because the child failed to survive
the tort long enough to be born alive.29
B. Is a Parent Compensated Twice for the Death of a
Stillborn Fetus?
Another rationale employed by some courts to deny a cause of action
for the wrongful death of a stillborn fetus is that to do so would be
inequitable since it would allow a "double recovery" in that recovery is also
permitted for the injury or suffering of the mother.8 0 The Endresz court
stated that such a result would provide the parents with "an unmerited
bounty and would constitute not compensation to the injured but punish-
ment to the wrongdoer."'3 The court opined that the mother's right to
from a lawsuit. However, if they badly injured the child they would be exposed
to liability.
Id. 4t 20, 148 N.W.2d at 110. But see Cardwell v. Welch, 25 N.C. App. 390, 213
S.E.2d 382, cert. denied, 287 N.C. 464, 215 S.E.2d 623 (1975). The Cardwell court
supplanted concepts of justice with "practical considerations" in retaining "live birth"
as the demarcation line for a right to recover. The court stated: "From the moment of
conception onward there must be some cutoff point, and to place this at the moment
of live birth has at least the merit of providing some degree of certainty to an
otherwise highly speculative situation." 25 N.C. App. 390, 213 S.E.2d 382, 383-84,
cert. denied, 287 N.C. 464, 215 S.E.2d 623 (1975). Whether the "live birth" standard
is applied either per se, or as a result of a court's interpretation of the death statute,
the injustice remains. See notes 47-57 and accompanying text infra.
27. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 18.3, at 1031 (1956). But see
SPIESER, supra note 15, § 4:32, at 358, where the author observed: "[Harper and
James] state that there -must be a border line, but never [state] why such a border
line should exist." Id. (emphasis in original). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 869, at 174 (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970). The Second Restatement does not
take a definitive position. It merely implies that there is as yet no general rule of law
supporting a cause of action if the child is stillborn, and that the achievement of such
a result would depend upon statutory interpretation by the courts. Id.
28. E.g., Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 Ill. 2d 368, 373, 304 N.E.2d 88, 91
(1973); Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., ____ Mass. , .-. , 331 N.E.2d 916,
920 (1975).
29. See Todd v. Sandidge Constr. Co., 341 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1964); Moen v.
Hanson, 85 Wash. 2d 597, 601, 537 P.2d 266, 268 (1975). Moen stated that denial
of recovery for a tortiously killed unborn child, on the grounds that the child failed
to survive the tort long enough to be born alive, is eminently illogical. Likewise, Todd
is often cited for the following language:
To balance the right of action upon whether the child, fatally injured by the
negligence of another, is born dead or alive seems not only an artificial demarcation
but unjust as well .... Again, if the fatality was immediate, the suit could not
prevail, but if the death was protracted by a few hours, even minutes, beyond
birth, the claim could succeed.
341 F.2d at 76-77.
30. Gordon, The Unborn Plaintiff, 63 MicH. L. REv. 579, 594-95 (1965) (arguing
that any award to parents of an infant killed in utero is "duplicity").
31. 24 N.Y.2d at 484, 248 N.E.2d at 904, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 69. For a discussion
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sue for personal injuries and suffering as a result of the stillbirth, in
conjunction with the father's action for "loss of her services and con-
sortium," was adequate recovery.8 2 In Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.,88
however, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated that "redund-
ant" recovery was not a serious problem. In the court's view, any danger
could be reduced or avoided through either "joinder or consolidation of
actions, or with clear and precise instructions to the jury. '8 4
Technically, there should be no question of double recovery since
there are two separate rights of action. The mother's physical and mental
injuries are distinct from her interests derived from the wrongful death of
her unborn child.8 5 Nevertheless, a potentially difficult damage issue is
presented when a mother attempts to recover for her personal suffering
as a result of both her own injuries and the loss of her child. The inherent
difficulties in bifurcating the respective damages attributable to each cause
of action may result in the jury's awarding an excessive amount for each
claim. However, if the mother's claims are joined or consolidated, it is
probable that the amount of the awarded recovery for each cause of action
will be mutually tempered.8" From a practical viewpoint, the solution sug-
gested in Mone appears to be the most effective. It provides adequate
protection for the defendant from outrageous recoveries without unneces-
sarily restricting the plaintiff's distinct causes of action.
C. Is Proof of Causation of Death of a Stillborn Fetus
Too Speculative?
Another basis employed by some courts to bar a right of action when
the fetus is stillborn is the speculation involved in the ascertainment of
both causation and damages.87 The courts in both Mone and Chrisafogeor-
recovery theory, see Gordon, supra note 30, at 594-95; Miller, No Recovery for Injury
to a Viable Fetus Which is Stillborn, 36 INS. COUNSEL J. 92, 94 (1969).
32. 24 N.Y.2d at 484, 248 N.E.2d at 904, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 69.
33. --- Mass ...... ,331 N.E.2d 916 (1975).
34. Id. at -..... 331 N.E.2d at 919.
35. Moen v. Hanson, 85 Wash. 2d 597, 600, 537 P.2d 266, 267 (1975) ; see note
15 supra.
36. See, e.g., Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., __ Mass. , _, 331 N.E.2d 916,
919 (1975).
37. See, e.g., Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 484, 248 N.E.2d 901, 903-04,
301 N.Y.S.2d 65, 69 (1969). The New Jersey Supreme Court has also disapproved of
such damages, primarily because of their highly speculative nature. In Graf v. Taggart,
43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964), the court commented:
On the death of a very young child, nevertheless, at least some facts can be shown
to aid in estimating damages as, for example, its mental and physical condition.
But not even these scant proofs can be offered when the child is stillborn....
We recognize that the damages in any wrongful death action are to some extent
uncertain and speculative. But our liberality in allowing substantial damages
where the proofs are relatively speculative should not preclude us from drawing
a line where the speculation becomes unreasonable.
Id. at 310, 204 A.2d at 144. See also Marko v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 420 Pa. 124,
216 A.2d 502 (1966); Carroll v. Skloff, 415 Pa. 47, 202 A.2d 9 (1964). But see
Gullborg v. Rizzo, 331 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1964), which recognized a cause of action
1975-19761
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gis v. Brandenberg,8 rejected such an argument.3 9 Both opinions indicated
that the live-birth, stillbirth dichotomy represented a distinction without a
difference for the determination of causation and damages. 40  Causation
and damages present evidentiary issues which should not be confused with
a right of action. Difficulties of proof should not preclude the right, even
though it is clearly more troublesome to measure damages the younger
the age of the wrongful death decedent.41 The burden of pleading and
proving both the causal connection between the tortious conduct and the
infant's death and the resulting damages is placed squarely upon the
plaintiff. Consequently, if the elements of causation and damages in the
death action for an unborn child are deemed to be too speculative, they
should act either as a bar to recovery or as a mitigating factor in the
determination of the amount recoverable, but should not foreclose the
right to initiate the suit. 42
It appears that those jurisdictions which deny a right of recovery for
the wrongful death of a stillborn fetus, whether on the grounds of double
recovery or the difficulty of proof of causation and damages, present a
serious underlying equal protection question. 43  At least one court has
held that there is a rational basis, in terms of the statutory purpose, upon
which to preclude a cause of action by the stillborn's parents while ex-
tending the right to the parents of a child who survives only momentarily
after birth.44 This position is susceptible to attack on the basis that both
for the wrongful death of a stillborn fetus by applying Pennsylvania law shortly before
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Carroll. See Prenatal Injury and
Wrongful Death, supra note 8, at 89, 95-96.
38. 55 111. 2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (1973).
39. Mass. at _, 331 N.E.2d at 919; 55 Ill. 2d at 372, 304 N.E.2d at 90-91.
40 ... Mass. at . 331 N.E.2d at 919; 55 Ill. 2d at 372, 304 N.E.2d at 90-91.
41. E.g., Libbee v. Permanente Clinic, 268 Ore. 258, 264, 518 P.2d 636, 639
(1974) ; 7 TEXAS TECH. L. REV. 821, 826 (1976).
42. See Del Tufo, Recovery for Prenatal Torts: Actions for Wrongful Death,
15 RUTGERS L. REV. 61, 78 (1960).
43. This issue arises once it is concluded that fairness dictates treating parents of
the tortiously killed, stillborn, viable fetus in the same manner as those of the infant
who died after live birth as a result of tortious prenatal injuries. Comment, Wrongful
Death and the Unborn: An Examination of Recovery After Roe v. Wade, 13 J. FAM.
L. 99, 110 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Wrongful Death and the Unborn]; see note 61
infra.
44. Justus v. Atchison, 53 Cal. App. 3d 556, 126 Cal. Rptr. 150 (1975). This
court interpreted the California wrongful death statute as permitting recovery for
pecuniary damages resulting from the loss of social relationship. The relationship
between expectant parents and their unborn child was held by the court to be "one
characterized by an 'absence of social relations.'" Id. at , 126 Cal. Rptr. at 158.
The majority therefore held that there was a rational basis upon which to exclude
the parents of a tortiously killed stillborn fetus from the class of those who may bring
a wrongful death action. Id.
The dissent argued that equal protection had been denied since no rational
relation existed between the statute's intendment and the live birth requirement.
The dissent noted:
Similarly there is no appreciable increase in the speculative character of the
damages awarded for wrongful death as between the stillborn and the newborn.
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sets of parents have experienced an identical loss ;45 no discernible differ-
ence exists in terms of their respective expectancies of future services and
earnings or their bereavement resulting from the death of their child.46
D. Does the Term "Person" as Used in the Death
Statutes Include Fetuses?
Another frequently litigated issue is whether a viable fetus should be
con:3idered a "person" 47 within the meaning of the respective wrongful
death statutes.4 8 Through highly technical statutory interpretation, some
courts have excluded viable fetuses from this category.49 Apparently, at
least one reason for the utilization of this approach is the desire to avoid
the substantial moral and philosophical implications of the issue.50
In interpreting the meaning of the term "person," some courts have
turned to the intent of the legislature in creating the cause of action.5 '
For example, in Cardwell v. Welch, 52 the court found that the legislature
which enacted the statute in 1855 intended to limit it to those "who by
live birth had attained a recognized individual identity. 53 Since there was
neither an express nor an implied intent to include viable fetuses within
the purview of the legislation, the court believed that any expansion of the
statute to achieve this result was the responsibility of the legislature and
not the judiciary. 54
pecuniary loss that the parents suffer in being deprived of its service, earnings,
society, comfort and protection. It is the destruction of the intimate, mutually
supportive, familial relationship of potentially long duration (the mutual life
expectancy of parents and child) for which compensation is paid.
Id. at -----.. 126 Cal. Rptr. at 161, citing Fuentes v. Tucker, 31 Cal. 2d 1, 5, 187 P.2d
752, 755 (1947); see notes 60-66 and accompanying text infra.
45. Moen v. Hanson, 85 Wash. 2d 597, 601, 537 P.2d 266, 268 (1975).
46. Id.
47. Though the overwhelming majority of wrongful death statutes refer to
"persons," the New York version remains a noteworthy exception. N.Y. EST., POWERS
& TRUSTS LAW § 5-4.1 (McKinney 1967) ("decedents" instead of "persons"). The
interpretation problem also exists here, however, since "decedent" has been defined
as "a deceased person, especially one who has lately died." BLAcK'S, supra note 2,
at 493 (emphasis added). Consequently the issue of whether a viable fetus is inter-
preted as a person capable of death remains.
48. Compare ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, § 1 (Smith-Hurd 1959), with MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 229, § 2 (Supp. 1976) and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-173 (1966).
49. See, e.g., Cardwell v. Welch, 25 N.C. App. 390, 392, 213 S.E.2d 382, 383-84,
cert. denied, 287 N.C. 464, 215 S.E.2d 623 (1975).
50. See McKillip v. Zimmerman, 191 N.W.2d 706, 709 (Iowa 1971); Cardwell v.
Welch, 25 N.C. App. 390, . , 213 S.E.2d 382, 384, cert. denied, 287 N.C. 464, 215
S.E.2d 623 (1975).
51. E.g., Bayer v. Suttle, 12 Cal. App. 2d 361, 100 Cal. Rptr. 212 (1972);
McKillip v. Zimmerman, 191 N.W.2d 706 (Iowa 1971); Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co.,
210 Va. 138, 169 S.E.2d 440 (1969).
52. 25 N.C. App. 390, 213 S.E.2d 382, cert. denied, 287 N.C. 404, 215 S.E.2d
623 (1975).
53. 25 N.C. App. at . 213 S.E.2d at 383.
54. Id. at ...... 213 S.E.2d at 384.
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The Cardwell stance is susceptible to attack on various grounds.
First, wrongful death statutes, though in derogation of the common law,
are remedial in character and should be construed to effect this purpose. 5
Second, it is inaccurate to assume that a statute, enacted in an era when
little was known about prenatal existence, actually represents a conscious
legislative intent to exclude fetuses. 0 Finally, it is counterproductive to
require a legislature to provide for all possible contingencies on the face
of every statute.57
In Mone, a different approach was used. There the court determined
that an action for wrongful death, though originally a legislative product,
had evolved into a part of the common law. 58 Therefore, the court con-
cluded that it was within the judicial domain to interpret the word
"person" in the statute to include a viable unborn fetus. 59
E. Roe v. Wade's Interpretation of "Person" as Used in
Wrongful Death Statutes.
The landmark decision of Roe v. Wade60 contains the only reference
by the United States Supreme Court concerning whether a right of action
for prenatal death exists under applicable tort law. In Roe, Justice Black-
mun, writing for the majority, stated that a fetus was not a "person" within
the meaning of the fourteenth amendment.0 1 Yet, in dictum, Justice
Blackmun tacitly approved the categorization of a fetus as a person in
"narrowly defined situations" such as wrongful death actions. 62 In
weighing this right, however, Justice Blackmun noted that "such an
action ...would appear to be one to vindicate the parents' interest and
is thus consistent with the view that the fetus, at most, represents only the
55. C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (SUTHERLAND'S) §
71.05, at 337 (4th ed. 1974).
56. Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 22, 148 N.W.2d 107,
111 (1967). It has been accurately noted that "[tihe necessity for judicial legislation
will not arise if the legislature clearly manifests its intention." Comment, Wrongful
Death and the Stillborn Fetus - A Current Analysis, 7 HOUSTON L. REV. 449,
460 (1970).
57. In discussing this issue, one commentator has stated:
The legislature must, of necessity, speak in general terms. It is for the judiciary
to supply content to enactments and, with respect to wrongful death statutes, to
determine as a matter of common law who is a "person" within their intendment.
Del Tufo, supra note 42, at 76-77 (footnote omitted).
58 -......Mass. at ...... 331 N.E.2d at 918.
59. Id. at -- , 331 N.E.2d at 918. This conclusion was based upon three points:
1) the judiciary could act more swiftly than the legislature; 2) the change contem-
plated was not drastic; and 3) the result "would not seriously impair an existing in-
terest, disappoint an expectation, or defeat a reliance." Id. at . 331 N.E.2d at 918-19.
60. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
61. Id. at 157. The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part: "No State
shall . . .deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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potentiality of life." 63 A logical extension of this position would be to
recognize the fact that the parental interest is an expectation in the
potential life of the offspring. This interest is substantially the same64
whether or not the fetus is viable at the time of the injury.65
The viability test itself presents practical difficulties. First, "viability"
is an illusive term66 since all fetuses do not arrive at this stage of their
development at an identical chronological point of their gestation.6 7 In
addition, viability is dependent upon several variables, such as the age and
health of the expectant mother. 68 Finally, viability is also a concept which
may become increasingly vague if more sophisticated artificial medical
techniques are developed to permit a fetus to exist outside of the womb
at an earlier stage of its period of gestation than is currently possible. 69
The right to have a abortion as defined in Roe v. Wade also raises
serious wrongful death implications. The majority determined that the
pregnant woman maintained primary interest in the fetus during the
first and second trimesters.70 Consequently, it would seem that neither she
nor her attending physician could be held liable under a wrongful death
statute for an abortion carried out during these periods. Theoretically,
then, during the third trimester when the primary interest in the fetus
shifts to the state,71 both the pregnant woman and her physician would be
63. Id. at 162. See generally Wrongful Death and the Unborn, supra note 43,
at 99.
64. Cf. Note, The Impact of Medical Knowledge on the Law Relating to Prenatal
Injuries, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 554, 562 n.57 (1962) [hereinafter cited as The Impact
of Medical Knowledge].
65. To deny the right of action on behalf of a stillborn, nonviable fetus while
recognizing the right for a stillborn, viable fetus is as inequitable as the live birth-
stillbirth demarcation line. See notes 25-29 and accompanying text supra.
66. The Chrisafogeorgis court stated: "[I1n drawing dividing lines or borders
for rights or disabilities, lines which unnecessarily produce incongruous and in-
defensible results should be avoided." 55 Ill. 2d at 375, 304 N.E.2d at 92.
67. In Roe, the United States Supreme Court noted that viability is usually
reached sometime between the 24th and the 28th week. 410 U.S. at 160, citing L.
HELLMAN & J. PRITCHARD, WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 493 (14th ed. 1971).
68. Louisell, Abortion, the Practice of Medicine and the Due Process of Law,
16 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 233, 241 n.48 (1969); see Comment, Roe v. Wade and the
Traditional Legal Standards Concerning Pregnancy, 47 TEMP. L.Q. 715, 735-37
(1974) [hereinafter cited as ROE and the Traditional Legal Standards]; cf. H.
BARNETT, PEDIATRICS 22-23 (15th ed. 1972).
69. See Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE
L.J. 920, 924 (1973) ; Roe and the Traditional Legal Standards, supra note 68, at 737.
70. During the first trimester the decision is within the sole discretion of the
pregnant woman and her physician. In the second trimester, the decision remains
with the woman, though the state can prescribe abortion procedure regulations meant
to secure the mother's health. 410 U.S. at 163-64.
71. In the third trimester, the Court noted that the state's interest in potential
life becomes compelling. Id. An exception exists if, in the opinion of appropriate
medical judgment, an abortion, though proscribed by the state during this period of
the pregnancy, is deemed necessary to preserve the mother's life or health. Id. at 164-65.
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potentially liable in a wrongful death action brought by a beneficiary
designated by the statute for the performance of a proscribed abortion.7 2
IV. CONCLUSION
A recapitulation of the tort law in this area indicates a marked in-
crease in the recognition accorded the unborn fetus. Yet, there has been
a deemphasis upon the particular stage of development attained by the
fetus at the time the tortious act was committed. There is now, however,
general acceptance of a surviving child's right of recovery for prenatal
injuries, whether viable or nonviable when the injury occurred. 73 An action
also exists for the wrongful death of a surviving child as a result of pre-
natal injuries inflicted at any time during gestation.74 Finally, there is a
prevalent trend in favor of a wrongful death action on behalf of a viable,
stillborn fetus.75 Recovery, therefore, has been exclusively denied only for
the wrongful death of a nonviable, stillborn fetus. 76
It is submitted that a cause of action should lie on behalf of any fetus
77
stillborn as a result of the alleged tortfeasor's wrongful conduct. 78 Con-
trary to the fears of some courts, this equitable expansion would not result
in a flood of litigation. All but the most principled of litigants would be
dissuaded from initiating a suit because of both the magnitude of the
evidentiary problems and the prospects of a small or even no recovery.
72. With the progression of medical technology and the concomitant difficulty of
determining the point at which a fetus becomes viable, physicians should prepare for
increased responsibility in this area. See notes 67-69 and accompanying text supra.
See also Friedman, Legal Implications of Amniocentesis, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 92 (1974)
This author posits the physician's potential liability for the genetic abortion of a
"healthy" fetus due to misdiagnosis. Id. at 143 & n.261.
73. See note 14 and accompanying text supra.
74. See notes 21-29 and accompanying text supra.
75. For a list of cases supporting this position, see Mone v. Greyhound Lines,
Inc_ ..... Mass -. , ---- n.5, 331 N.E.2d 916, 918 n.5 (1975).
76. See Mace v. Jung, 210 F. Supp. 706 (D. Ala. 1962), where the court
specifically rejected a right of action on behalf of a stillborn fetus because of its
nonviability. See also Moen v. Hanson, 85 Wash. 2d 597, 601, 537 P.2d 266, 268
(1975). The Supreme Court of Washington stated: "We reach no conclusion, how-
ever, as to whether recovery can be had for injury to a nonviable fetus." 85 Wash. 2d
at 597, 601, 537 P.2d at 268. But cf. Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100
(1955). This oft-cited opinion permitted a cause of action for the wrongful death
of a fetus "quick" in its mother's womb, yet not viable. Porter can be distinguished
on its facts since the applicable Georgia law permitted recovery by parents for the
homicide of their child. The question addressed was whether this "quick" fetus
qualified under the statute. Id. at 715, 87 S.E.2d at 102.
77. See note 13 supra. An argument in favor of a wrongful death action on
behalf of an unborn child up to the eighth week of its existence could be grounded in the
parents' interest in its potential life. Nevertheless, the practical benefits in the fetal
standard outweigh its burdens. Generally, present triers of fact would not be receptive
to the recognition of a cause of action for the death of a being prior to its having
taken recognizable human form in the uterus. However, if medical advancements
make the conceptual and evidentiary problems associated with this extension re-
solvable, then the law should recognize a cause of action during the embryonic stage.
See generally The Impact of Medical Knowledge, supra note 64, at 558-64.
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In addition, this right of recovery should not be inexorably linked to
"viability" since judicial interpretation of this standard ignores the poten-
tiality of medical advances in the areas of maternal health care and artificial
ex utero maintenance of the fetus. A recognition of a cause of action for
any stillborn fetus would eliminate the rigidity inherent in the viability
yardstick and would be consonant with the presumption that the law
"keep[s] pace with the sciences. '" 79 To accomplish the purposes of this
proposal, the legislatures should revise their respective wrongful death
statutes; the courts should not attempt to achieve this result through
strained interpretation of statutory language which fails to reflect the present
medical understanding of prenatal life. It is submitted that the word
"person" should be deleted from the wrongful death statutes and replaced
by the phrase "fetus, infant, or adult." Such an expansion would comport
with the view that there are protected interests in potential life which
exist throughout the various stages of human development prior to birth, 0
and would bring clarity and consistency to this turbulent area of tort law.
Harry Sarkis Cherken, Jr.
79. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 143 (D.D.C. 1946).
80. This position does not attempt to solve the singular question of when life
begins, which has perplexed scholars in varied disciplines, including the justices of
the United States Supreme Court. See 410 U.S. at 159.
1975-19761 1005
78
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 5 [1976], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol21/iss5/6
